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On the 18th July 2013 the city of Detroit filed for bankruptcy; once the icon 
of US industrial might, it faced debts in the region of US$20 billion. The 
city’s financial troubles were largely due to long-term processes that were 
taking place beyond its boundaries, across the US economy.2 Between 1910 
and 1960 the US Steel Belt produced the bulk of the world’s steel and was 
the core and pulse of world capitalism. Detroit’s astonishing expansion had 
once drawn workers from across the world; now it stood as a testament to 
the end of the American Dream. The Steel Belt became a new kind of waste-
land: “America’s Rust Belt”(Bowen 2014).
Although the scale of Detroit’s spectacular rise and equally spectacular 
decline is unmatched elsewhere in the US, its fortunes reflect a broader 
decline in the industrial might of the region. New investment opportuni-
ties were identified in non-industrial regions of the US and industrial cent-
ers emerged across the globe to challenge Detroit’s supremacy. Competition 
from Japan’s flourishing industrial sector was followed by the rise of the 
Asian Tigers, and by impressive advances in Brazil, India and China. In the 
1990s these trends were accelerated and the Steel Belt’s difficulties were 
compounded by the enhanced mobility of capital, itself enabled by ever more 
efficacious information technologies. The global strategies they facilitated 
were part of a wider technological revolution underpinning the emergence 
of a “new economy” that came to eclipse the Fordist model at the heart of 
Detroit’s success. New technologies and globalized market conditions ren-
dered heretofore geographical and historical advantages obsolete and ena-
bled novel strategies by enterprises that were increasingly disengaged from 
local and national ties. Large US companies abandoned an earlier model 
of accumulation linked to investment in particular places, which, as Nash 
(1989) describes, workers from the Pittsfield General Electric plant saw as 
a betrayal of the very premises of industrial accumulation. When General 
Electric relocated key phases of production to Canada, seriously undermin-
ing the Pittsfield site, workers objected to “the failure to live up to their 
own code of competitive free enterprise within national boundaries” (Nash 
1989: 6). In this volume, Kasmir outlines the ongoing history of General 
Motors’ relocation of production from the unionized north of the USA to 




Springhill, Tennessee, where an experiment in worker-management coop-
eration was intended to provide an alternative to the contracts and conven-
tions achieved by trade union struggles spanning many years. As Detroit 
continued its decline, Springhill Tennessee expanded as those searching for 
work—including those escaping the deteriorating conditions and growing 
unemployment in the North—swelled the town’s population.
Similar processes in other industrial regions have invited direct compari-
son with the US Rust Belt3 and have prompted debates about the future 
prospects of industry—and capitalism—in the late 20th and early 21st cen-
turies.4 Discussion of the changes affecting industrial areas in the last decades 
is framed in terms of an historical break between the “old” and the “new”, 
the discontinuities across different forms of production, or distinct stages of 
capitalist accumulation.5 The debates of the 1980s and 1990s, which vari-
ously focused on “flexible accumulation” (Harvey 1990), and the “end of 
work” (Gorz 1982; Rifkin 1995), or have deciphered signs that appeared to 
indicate the imminent “end of capitalism (as we know it)” (Gibson-Graham 
1996), continued into the early 21st century. The altered social, economic 
and political landscapes of post-Fordism have been associated with new 
forms of work or new sources of value; concepts such as “immaterial”, 
“affective” and “cognitive” labor aim to capture a historical shift in the 
mechanisms and strategic sites of capitalist production and accumulation. 
Such shifts entail profound reconfigurations of work and of the relationship 
of workers to capital linked to the emergence of new kinds of workers, new 
classes or class-like formations and thus new political responses (Hardt and 
Negri 2000; Vercellone 2007; Codeluppi 2008; Berardi 2009; Fumagalli 
and Mezzadra 2010; Fumagalli 2011).6
While the changes in the global economy require re-calibrations of theo-
retical constructs and political strategies, it is equally important to rec-
ognize those continuities that may underscore such changes and reflect 
enduring features of the underlying logic of capitalism (Brown 1995; Fed-
erici 2012). Caffentzis (2013), for example, takes issue with the tendency 
to conflate diverse activities within the concept of “cognitive capitalism”. 
While the term is useful in highlighting the centrality of knowledge in the 
organization and orientation of important sectors of the contemporary 
economy, its deployment in conjunction with a problematic dichotomy 
between the “old” and the “new” can result in disguising practices and 
relationships that may overlap across these different forms.7 Caffentzis 
asks:
Are non-knowledge based industries ignorance-based? What brings 
together banks, pornographic film companies, software design firms com-
munication corporations, airplane manufacturers under the knowledge- 
based industry sector rubric that excludes auto companies, real estate 
firms, restaurants, mines, and farms?
(Caffentzis 2013: 100).8
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Early on in the debates Gibson-Graham (1996) observed that the profound 
realignments that took place with the end of the post-Second World War 
boom, the decline of Fordism and the rise of a post-Fordist analog, were 
too readily taken to indicate that industry itself was in decline. Consider-
ing these issues on a global scale, as we must, it is clear that globalized 
production strategies have uneven outcomes, producing a complex land-
scape consisting of diverse forms and particular concentrations of economic 
activity. Thrift (2011) proposes a focus on trends rather than substitutions, 
envisaging the co-existence of different forms of production, in different 
combinations, at different times and in different places. This requires that 
we abandon a notion of a fixed capitalist identity in favor of a focus on 
Gibson-Graham’s conceptualization in terms of “a site of multiple forms 
of economy whose relations to each other are only ever partially fixed and 
always under subversion” (1996: 12).
A greater attention to multiplicity and fluidity is consistent with the 
accounts of lived realities in contemporary capitalism presented in this vol-
ume. The chapters focus on the changing circumstances affecting workers 
and their communities, and their responses to conditions of uncertainty that 
erode privileges and render the future problematic. Drawing on examples 
from North and South America, Western and Central and Eastern Europe, 
the authors in this volume pay attention to the ways lives unfold in relation 
to industrial work and its decline. The locations discussed in the volume 
reflect the histories of work and of livelihoods, as established arrangements 
are overturned and the experience of work is transformed, illustrating the 
entanglements of experience, place and spaces of the economy. Mollona 
et al. (2009) make a strong case for the continuing urgency of research-
ing this sector of the economy, given the enduring significance of industrial 
work. Breman, too, drawing on his wide-ranging research in India (1996), 
argues that it is unlikely that large-scale industry will be eclipsed by smaller 
units, given that demand for high-grade technology and specialized labor 
continues unabated. Rather, the empirical and conceptual elements arising 
from the work of Mollona et al., and Breman, contribute to an understand-
ing of combined and co-existing forms, from large to small-scale, encom-
passing factories, workshops and home-based production, which, across 
regions and industries, may persist through different kinds of arrangements 
of complementarity, accommodation and antagonism.
Industrial Landscapes, Old and New
The historical importance of steel as a commodity, the scale of investment 
required to establish and operate steel plants and the high levels of employ-
ment generated by the sector, account for the historical commitment of 
nation-states to support the industry (ILO 1997). At the height of state-
sponsored modernization projects, such as Import Substitution Industri-
alization where the creation of employment and internal markets was a 
priority, new ways of life and new environments emerged. From Detroit to 
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Nowa Huta, large-scale industry drew migrants and generated new, often 
purpose built urbanizations (Trappmann 2013). Rooted in the industrializa-
tion of Europe and North America, the company town provided a model for 
the settlement, incorporation and disciplining of large workforces, based on 
a projected future that encompassed workers’ public and private lives (Mer-
cier 2001; Cowie 2011; Dinius and Vergara 2011; Borges and Torres 2012). 
The urbanization projects associated with large-scale industrial ventures 
reflected the contractual obligations that linked workers, families, unions 
and employers in complex webs of reciprocities and reflected the intention 
of creating new ties, and new forms of sociality, identity and belonging (cf. 
Holston 1989; Kotkin 1995). The emerging landscapes reflected the pater-
nalistic ideologies and practices through which workers were included in 
the projects of capitalism and the state, and seemed to encapsulate a shared 
commitment to stability and the pursuit of a secure and satisfying way of 
life. The recession and the oil crises of the early 1970s unsettled long-term 
projects, such as those embodied in the company town, as global conditions 
undermined the paternalistic relations that underpin the company town 
model (Sánchez 2012). Restructuring, privatization and internationaliza-
tion heightened the vulnerability of plants and jobs to competition, further 
cutbacks and closure.9 Today, the industry faces increased levels of global 
competition, problems of overcapacity, creeping energy costs and pressures 
from environmental regulators; at the same time, outsourcing grants firms 
flexibility in the global market at the price of greater uncertainty for house-
holds and deeper inequalities across the workforce.10
Responding to cumulative pressures, and anxious to cast off lingering asso-
ciations with smoking chimneys and the landscapes of the Industrial Revolu-
tion,11 the industry has invested in innovation and tuned in to the discourse 
of the knowledge-based economy.12 Today, industry leaders claim the sector 
is future-oriented, innovative and knowledge-rich.13 It is thought that these 
innovations will entail a further loss of blue-collar jobs as the much-lauded 
“breakthrough” or next-generation production technologies are expected 
to require new skills. A new kind of worker is predicted to supersede the 
“historical” figure of the steelworker in a workforce dominated by highly 
trained technicians, engineers, computer scientists, and business graduates—
and only the most highly skilled production workers.14 Yet, anticipating the 
impact of next-generation technologies, today’s steelworkers are very dif-
ferent from their fathers or grandfathers; credentialism, flexibilization and 
an emphasis on multi-tasking, self-management and the manipulation of 
knowledge bring the industrial steelworker closer to the “new worker” of 
the “new economy”. In a parallel process, outsourcing has introduced short-
term contracts and precarious conditions into the heart of the steel plant 
while flexibility in the factory is mirrored in the expectation that out-of-
work men and women will manage their skills, dispositions and employabil-
ity (Trappmann, this volume). 15
Internationalization and redrawn divisions of labor across space also 
transformed the automobile industry, increasing the vulnerability of 
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factories and undermining workers’ bargaining power. The manufactur-
ing core of the car industry in North America and Europe has been shift-
ing steadily away from its original heartlands,16 while global strategies 
highlight the pressing issue of scale in shaping both the experience of 
work and the possibilities of resistance (Kasmir, this volume).17 Overall, 
the industrial sector has pioneered technological and organizational revo-
lutions in the world of production, from Ford’s application of Taylorist 
principles to car production, to the model of speeded-up and market-led 
innovations developed and promoted by Toyota (D’Aloisio, this volume). 
The industrial sector has pioneered new forms of work and management, 
albeit at the cost of jobs, job security and continuity across generations 
and communities. The resilience that is evident in the lives and liveli-
hoods of workers and communities responds to ongoing challenges and 
ever-changing pressures, highlighting the urgency of studies of industrial 
work and their critical role in understanding contemporary social and 
economic systems.18
Work in the Context of Growing Inequalities
The English language edition of Thomas Piketty’s “Capital in the Twenty-
First Century” was widely acclaimed as an important text that demonstrated 
the structures of inequality of contemporary capitalism. His claim that 
wealth inequalities were rising to levels not seen in Europe and the US since 
before the First World War provoked a great deal of debate and controversy. 
Criticism of his work has focused on the detail of the data, and raised ques-
tions about the suitability of statistical measures to capture and represent 
complex phenomena.19 Despite these reservations, policy makers increas-
ingly focus on statistical measures and big data sets, finding little use for the 
detail generated by qualitative research (Okely 2012: 13). In contrast to this 
trend, this volume privileges the detail of local places, the implications of 
local histories and the perspectives of workers, their families and their com-
munities. Ethnographic research in different locations in Europe and Latin 
America supports the contributors’ engagement with large-scale processes 
of capitalist accumulation, and the effects of shifting distributions of invest-
ment across different industries and regions. Such research also reveals the 
ways that ideologies of difference and inequality are experienced in relation 
to work, to production and reproduction, and how they are understood and 
resisted by specific social actors.
The cases explored here pay attention to the divisions and inequalities that 
obtain across workplaces and economies, frequently organized along axes 
that divide workers and capitalists, male and female, young and old, across 
a global division of labor that relies on, yet transcends, geographical divi-
sions (Hoogvelt 2001). The differentiation of space and the production of 
place are entangled with ideologies of difference that are opportunistically 
deployed to reproduce highly segmented labor markets and differentiated 
workforces (Sánchez 2012). Such ideologies can render entire categories of 
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workers and sectors of economic activity invisible (Elson and Pearson 1981; 
Benería and Roldán 1987; Benton 1990; Collins and Giménez 1990; Ber-
man 1996; Weber 2009; Narotzky and Smith 2013) and shape the oppor-
tunities of work for men and women, young and old, and the conditions 
under which they work. Sectors of work that have been historically associ-
ated with masculine identities—as breadwinners, providers and heads of 
 household—are woven into the fabric of family life and underpin ideals of 
masculinity. These have been affected by the scaling down of heavy industry 
that breaks down the identification between working class jobs and work-
ing class men. Men who are displaced by these processes may not adapt, let 
alone thrive, in the new conditions where their skills are unappreciated and 
their earning power is diminished (Arnot 2004; Trappmann 2013 and this 
volume); or they may be driven to defend their accepted roles by intensify-
ing their strategies, perhaps exposing themselves to risks and dangers they 
might not otherwise contemplate (Spyridakis, this volume).
Although male household heads struggle with the new conditions, the 
younger generation faces the most serious challenges, not least in relation 
to achieving personal autonomy. According to the ILO, young people are 
three times more likely to be unemployed than older workers, and they are 
over-represented in low-pay, insecure and informal sector work (ILO 2013). 
Since university graduates also register high unemployment levels, the 
trends pose a serious challenge for policy makers and for aspiring workers 
and their families for whom investment in education may have represented 
a promising strategy for social mobility and improved life chances.20 The 
deregulation and rollback of the state promoted by market fundamentalism 
have aggravated these conditions and left workers and households more 
exposed to the vicissitudes of life and capitalism.
Divisions between young and old intersect with other distinctions that 
play out in everyday life on the shop floor, detailed in Parry’s ethnography 
of the Bhilai steel plant, showing how gender, sexuality, region, and class 
produce tensions and allegiances within a complex tapestry of hierarchies 
and solidarities (1999). From the perspective of workers, these distinctions 
translate into highly significant differences in the degree of stability and 
well-being they can hope to achieve. However, as Parry points out, “privi-
leged” workers may also face difficulties if their pay declines, their job secu-
rity is threatened or they are confronted by growing discrepancies between 
their income and their needs and expectations.21
Ideologies of gender and sexuality are integral to the discursive con-
struction of entire sectors of the economy, informing the qualities of the 
ideal worker and supporting specific forms of sociality and networks of 
solidarity (Elson and Pearson 1981; Kapadia 1999; Mies 1999; Parry 1999, 
2012). However, the specificities of these ideologies and their effects cannot 
be known in advance, as Lee (1998) shows in her study of women work-
ers in Southern China. Her comparison of two sites belonging to the same 
company, in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, highlights the importance of place 
and the particular configurations of kinship, class and space within which 
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gender relations and ideologies are expressed.22 Masculinities may also be 
interpreted in different or contrasting ways, as Trappmann explores in her 
comparison of West German and British steelworkers, while Sabaté, also 
in this volume, shows how men’s priorities change in relation to changes in 
their domestic lives.
Changing Times and Generational Transmission
The fragmentation of the working class is complicated further by temporal 
ruptures associated with the cycles of capitalist accumulation and transfor-
mation. The cases discussed in this volume exemplify the effects of long-
term processes, punctuated by particular critical events (Das 1995; Guyer 
2007). Privatization and neoliberal reforms in Europe and Latin America 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the collapse of state socialism in 1989–91 and the 
imposition of “shock treatment” policies during the transition to a market 
economy in the case of Central and East European countries, and the fallout 
from the 2008 crisis across Europe, felt particularly acutely in Southern 
European countries such as Spain and Greece, are all constitutive of spe-
cific places and temporalities that are simultaneously shared and distinctive. 
These changes go some way to explaining the different conditions of life 
that are encountered by succeeding generations and that find expression in 
the different conditions for continuity and rupture affecting generational 
transmission (Goddard 2014).
Pine unravels the longer-term implications of the cascading effects of the 
end of State Socialism in 1989 through her account of the temporal disjunc-
ture that affects the generational transmissions of skills, memory and values, 
and comes to challenge the very possibility of reproduction. The collapse 
of Polish industry created a lost generation; the young appear to navigate 
a different world from that of their seniors for whom the ideals of progress 
are firmly located in the past. The impact of deindustrialization on jobs and 
livelihoods is linked to a broader overhauling of society. Everything that was 
familiar has been replaced; space and time intersect and collude to disorient 
the present and question the future.
Generational discourses (Foster 2013) articulate tensions arising from 
changes in the economic, social and political landscape in the Latin Ameri-
can examples discussed in the volume. In the case of Brazilian and Argentine 
steelworkers (Díaz Crovetto and Vargas and Perelman), the histories and 
circumstances affecting generations of workers, including different tradi-
tions of trade unionism, are constituted through local experiences of kin-
ship and family, notions of masculinity and femininity, and concerns with 
responsibility and reputation, all of which are themselves subject to con-
testation and change (also Sabaté, Trappmann, this volume). The chapters 
show how the older generation perseveres in an effort to pass on to the next 
the capacity to survive and the hope that they will thrive and prosper. They 
may bind themselves within moral obligations in the attempt to mediate on 
behalf of sons and daughters, or nephews and nieces to help them enter the 
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factory; they may sacrifice time and money to support their children’s train-
ing in the context of the new meritocracy. Or they may invest in preparing 
the next generation for a rupture that is linked to hope: to leave the places 
of the past behind them (Pine this volume; Pine 2014).
Disposable Places, Disposable People and  
the Struggle for Value
Giroux suggests that under neoliberal regimes such as those deployed under 
Ronald Reagan’s presidency, particular social groups became “disposable” 
(Giroux 2009). In her study of work and lives on the Hooghly River, Cal-
cutta, Bear draws on Mbembe’s concept of “necropolitics” (2003), mak-
ing the point that neoliberal practices and ideologies effectively re-signify 
objects, persons and spaces, emptying them of meaning and placing them 
“out of time”; they become “evidence of waste” (Bear 2012: 185). Places 
and environments are path-dependent, just as much as the models that give 
rise to their specific shape and characteristics. While distinctions between 
worth and worthlessness, between the respectable working classes and the 
disgraced poor are entangled in the very constitution of the welfare state 
(Morris 1994), the erosion of the contract between citizens and the state, 
forged under Fordism and Keynesianism, increasingly lays bare the con-
tradictions inherent in the dominant value system. Writing in the 1990s, 
Morris drew attention to shifts in public discourse from a focus on rights 
to an emphasis on obligation, which was accompanied by a hardening of 
the work ethic and a growing sense of discomfort in relation to dependence 
on the state (Morris 1994).23 Arguably, the ideological and material pro-
cesses she describes have shifted, not least in relation to growing contradic-
tions between the reliance on commodities and consumption as a claim to 
respectability and inclusion on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 
declining opportunities for secure employment and wages that have affected 
growing numbers of agricultural and industrial workers since the 1990s.
The connections between things and identities, places and people, imbue 
such places with meaning so that “the destruction of places is not expe-
rienced simply as the loss of replaceable physical landmarks and material 
property” (Filipucci 2010: 167); it also causes profound emotional responses 
related to ruptures in social relations and in lives that are reflected in a sense 
of “place loss” (Filippucci 2010: 168). In our case studies, reflections about 
value, worth and worthlessness are entangled with sentiments of loss and 
expressions of mourning for a way of life, and the landscapes in which 
it unfolded, that are no longer there. Kalb’s focus on personal narratives 
shows how ideologies of waste and worthlessness unfold and “stick” to 
persons and their objectified lives (Kalb this volume; Skeggs 1997, 2004; 
Ahmed 2014). Similarly, Wódz and Gnieciak’s chapter uncovers the “emo-
tional geographies” that emerge as a result of the closure of a mine. In both 
instances, the ebb and flow of histories of industry are entangled with the 
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circuits of valorization of capitalism (Kalb, this volume). From this perspec-
tive, the emotional geographies outlined in the chapters reflect the topog-
raphies produced by the movement of capital, people and resources, by the 
shifting priorities of capital and of power captured in the built environment’s 
effect of “ossifying in the landscape the social relations extant at the time of 
their creation” (Herod 2011: 29). The ruins of a socialist utopia described 
by Wódz and Gnieciak—but also the erasure of alternatives, such as the 
worker-controlled privatization proposed during Poland’s transition to a 
market economy (see Kalb this volume), mirror the production (and destruc-
tion) of space through which the capitalist project is realized (Massey 2005).
Díaz Crovetto’s account of Volta Redonda interprets the city as a “state 
place”, which, like the new, modernist capital of Brasilia, reflects the Brazil-
ian state’s national development project (Amaral and Calafate 2010). The 
collapse of utopias—whether socialist or capitalist (see Grandin 2009)—
and the shifting strategies of accumulation that make and unmake persons 
and places, effectively empty out places and remove people from the sphere 
of value and recognition. In a context where the exchange-value regime 
is dominant and is entangled with class, privilege and inequality, morality 
and value are construed in such a way that exclusions follow, rendering 
persons and things “value-less” (Skeggs 2004: 91). The implications of this 
for industrial and post-industrial contexts are exacerbated by the narrative 
shift in the location of value from production to finance, as Kalb notes in his 
chapter, and the growing centrality of consumption (Friedman 1995; Free-
man 2009; Miller 2012; Lutz 2014). Value appears to remain solely within 
the sphere of exchange, with no apparent need to seek realization within 
particular relationships, people or places.
Given these changes, Skeggs’ proposal to uncover the alternatives “that exist 
outside of the dominant symbolic [value system]” (Skeggs 2004: 88) is particu-
larly pertinent. Such alternatives might envisage value as an expression of social 
relations (Strathern 1988),24 or in terms of what people do and the meanings 
attributed to their actions (Graeber 2001, 2005). By drawing from a wider 
range of registers and frameworks, actions can escape the confines of the nar-
rowly defined “economic” and thus engage with moral, symbolic and aesthetic 
considerations (Graeber 2005: 452). By shifting the focus from narrowly con-
ceived and exclusive notions of value—through consumption and participation 
in the circulation of exchange-value—towards what people do in pursuit of 
“living life with a very different set of values” (Skeggs 2004: 91), the terms 
and limits of the debate are re-defined to enable the imagination, and pursuit, 
of alternative frameworks through which to approach the persons, things and 
places that are displaced by the necropolitics of neoliberal capitalism.
Ethnographies of Value
The identification and pursuit of alternative forms of value require an 
encompassing definition of “labor” such as Kasmir and Carbonella (2014: 7) 
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propose, which enables an approach to industrial work that de-centers fac-
tory wage labor and relates it to a wide range of activities, actors, spaces 
and outcomes. In recognizing the heterogeneity of contemporary social and 
economic landscapes, this approach provides strategic and analytical oppor-
tunities to identify alternative moralities and regimes of value, as Skeggs pro-
posed (also Gibson-Graham 1996). The project of confronting capital and 
engaging with the complexities of lived capitalism (Barber et al. 2012) makes 
visible the marginalized alternatives of those engaged in other forms of work 
and livelihood; it is also well placed to identify new languages and forms of 
resistance and struggle. The task is likely to require new concepts and frame-
works and build on anthropology’s long-standing commitment to under-
standing the relations that constitute the making and unmaking of social life.
In stressing the dialectical relationship between two value systems, Gude-
man outlines an approach, from economic anthropology, that addresses the 
interconnections and the contradictions between what he describes as “com-
munity” values and relationships and the values and actions associated with 
markets (Gudeman 2008). Feminist perspectives tackle a similar issue in 
their emphasis on the co-constitution of production and reproduction and 
the range of value regimes that they encompass (Edholm et al 1977; Benería 
1979). The economists Ferber and Nelson (1993, 2003) point to the failure 
of their discipline to address the economic value of household labor (see 
also Dalla Costa and James 1975; Pine 2002), and omit family and other 
social relations from their analysis. Furthermore, their emphasis on the con-
nections across different spheres of activity, recognition and value, have led 
feminist critiques to broaden the debates on rationality, and propose alter-
natives to the instrumental self-interest of neoliberal ideology and neoclas-
sical economics. Such alternatives abandon the centrality of the individual 
embodied in the concept of “homo economicus” in order to acknowledge 
the multiple ways in which actions are socially embedded and recognized 
(Elson 1998). Different kinds of labor may contribute to the reproduction of 
capitalism, but non-capitalist forms of production and distribution may also 
represent alternatives that disturb or de-center current locations of value 
within the domain of exchange value (Odih 2007).
The entanglements of different kinds of labor and different social relations 
is evident in the livelihood strategies devised in the context of industrial and 
post-industrial landscapes. Such entanglement includes overlapping relations 
of kinship and work, whereby kin may support and encourage but also con-
trol and discipline other workers, as Pine and Kalb discuss in detail in their 
chapters. Similarly, the unemployed or the precariously employed rely on 
family, kinship and neighborhood networks to get by; the young are sup-
ported in their efforts to obtain work and develop careers. Kinship relations 
are a vehicle for gaining access to food, labor and land, and help compensate 
for insecurity or loss of income, as described for Slovakia by Buzalka and 
Ferencová and also explored in D’Aloisio’s study of Fiat women workers 
in rural Basilicata. Kinship and friendship networks may provide a crucial 
resource for employers as well as for workers, when personal networks are 
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deployed to recruit and discipline the workforce, as described in Vargas and 
Perelman’s chapter. Kalb’s discussion of “flexible familism” reminds us of 
the entanglements of patriarchal kinship and capitalist power and how both 
support and domination can constitute relationships where kinship and work 
are entwined. Relationships can be fragile and fraught with contradictions 
and ambiguities. Spyridakis’ chapter describes how, in crisis-ridden Piraeus, 
personal networks are intensified to ensure survival, but also disclose the 
potential for the amoral exploitation of such relationships. Personal friend-
ships and political allegiances can blend seamlessly with more instrumental 
considerations as clientelistic networks mediate between workers and the 
job market (Vargas and Perelman; Spyridakis, this volume).
Armed with an encompassing concept of labor (Edholm et al. 1977; Har-
ris and Young 1981; Kasmir and Carbonella 2014) the analysis of con-
temporary capitalism would include insiders and outsiders, capitalist and 
non-capitalist values and activities. The recognition of industry’s enduring 
legacy in terms of livelihoods, landscapes and identities requires an equiva-
lent recognition of the range of relationships, persons and solidarities that 
sustain them. It is here where we may identify the emerging alliances and 
invisible forms of action that are postulated and hoped for, by workers and 
ethnographers (Gorz 1982; Leach 2012).
Protest, for Change or Continuity?
When subjects and their worth are defined through the prism of individ-
ual achievement, self-management and self-improvement in the context of 
“neoliberal agency” (Gershon 2011), workers are conceptualized as—and 
encouraged to see themselves as—bearers of human capital, to be invested 
in, accumulated and managed. However, the capacity to maneuver and adapt 
flexibly to continuous change, improving the self in relation to the market, is 
unevenly distributed. Trappmann, in this volume, compares steelworkers in 
West Germany and the United Kingdom and concludes that the experiences 
accumulated throughout a life trajectory—as well as the specificities of time 
and place—can converge to shape individuals’ ability to adapt, to respond 
with greater or lesser degrees of resilience when faced with crisis and loss. 
This raises a question regarding history and context, and whether, alongside 
the erasures that affect generational transmission of memory and values, 
broader erasures—of histories of struggle and collective effort—are achieved 
through ideologies that individualize, and result in “the privatization of pub-
lic troubles” (Hall and O’Shea 2014: 12). Personal success and personal 
failure take the place of the stories that speak of collective effort and disclose 
the effects of structural inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power.
Individualization weakens the legitimacy of workers’ organizations by 
denying them their histories of struggle, success and failure. Added to this, 
horizontal and vertical fractures dividing labor markets and workplaces, 
high levels of uncertainty and precarity, unemployment and underemploy-
ment, pose many challenges for effective collective action. The globalization 
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of production and markets poses formidable challenges of scale, as Kasmir 
illustrates in her account of the Saturn autoworkers. Kasmir’s chapter pro-
vides a detailed account of the unfolding struggle of the Spring Hill Saturn 
plant workers, where the workforce had been halved by the time the com-
pany filed for bankruptcy in 2009. She outlines the implications of changing 
conditions of work and the struggles over strategy that divided the trade 
union and finally contributed to deepening the longer-term dispossession of 
US workers, spreading insecurity across one of the strongest sectors of the 
US working class.
Buzalka and Ferencová draw attention to the appeal of right wing popu-
list solutions to what appear to be intractable problems regarding the future. 
The complicities of governments and many conventional political parties 
with neoliberal agendas across the contemporary world in addition to the 
weakening of trade unions, subcontracting and loss of jobs, the erosion of 
the strategic position of large-scale industry in national economies and the 
effects of globalization, all contribute to a complex and difficult environ-
ment for effective political mobilization towards a fair and equitable future. 
There are also conceptual and methodological considerations to take into 
account, as Parry points out regarding the tendency for studies of industrial 
action to focus largely on the formal sector and privilege particular forms 
of action, such as strikes. One way forward may be to start from everyday 
experience and from what Gledhill refers to as “actually existing neoliber-
alism” (Gledhill 2007) while paying attention to people’s “everyday strug-
gles” (Barber et al. 2012; also Scott 1987, 2008; Ong 1987) in the factory, 
in the community and in the home.
The Chapters
In this volume we consider work and livelihoods as interrelated features of 
individual lives and the multiple patterns of social relationships that sustain 
them. The reference to livelihoods draws attention to the changing land-
scapes of public and private, work, family and community that emerge in 
different ways in the cases discussed in the volume. It also highlights the 
important interconnections of different kinds of labor and different spheres 
of work, of the entanglements of production and reproduction. In the first 
section, on Past, Present and Future: Generations in Times of Crisis, the 
chapters explore the conditions of possibility and impossibility of genera-
tional transmission and social reproduction. The chapters by Pine, Perel-
man and Vargas and Díaz Crovetto provide a comparison of generational 
dynamics. Pine’s chapter invites us to reflect on the question of interrupted 
life courses and disrupted generational transmission. She poses the question 
of the implications of encountering the disappearance of what is familiar 
and known, when it is as yet unclear what is to follow. What happens when 
generational transmission confronts its own conditions of impossibility? 
The disruption of lives and the discontinuity of experience provoked by the 
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downfall of socialism in 1989 represent one such moment of radical change, 
where the experience of different generations is anchored in radically dif-
ferent contexts and realities. She explores these questions through the life 
experience of men and women who have witnessed these radical alterations 
in the arrangements and the meanings of everyday life in two different sites: 
Lublin in the early 2000s prior to Poland’s accession to the EU and Łódź, 
once a stronghold of the textile industry, in the early 1990s, just after the 
collapse of state socialism.
Perelman and Vargas focus on a social event to explore the overlapping 
relationships of unionism, work and friendship. These relationships straddle 
the public and the private, work and community as experienced by workers 
in the steel plant of San Nicolás, Argentina. The event revealed the impor-
tance of the trade union, of belonging and participating in social networks 
in order to secure—or attempt to secure—a future in the plant for the next 
generation. Although deep changes in the industry have broken down the 
generational transmission of jobs that generated “steel families” and replaced 
it with highly competitive mechanisms based on credentials, personal contacts 
continue to play a role in the form of “recommendations” from appropri-
ate personnel, including trade union officials. Neither has the introduction of 
flexible and precarious conditions through outsourcing diminished the imme-
diate importance of the trade unions or the strategic advantages of “belong-
ing” to the union. Indeed, the local branch of the metalworkers’ union is a key 
actor in the reproduction of the firm—by providing education and training, 
negotiating the recruitment of suitable workers, offering support in times of 
hardship—and is therefore, potentially, a crucial ally in the reproduction of 
working class families in the area.
While the steel plant remained a highly valued workplace in San Nicolás, 
the denser industrial fabric of the area surrounding Volta Redonda in Bra-
zil offered alternatives to young workers with the appropriate training and 
skills. Díaz Crovetto emphasizes the historical project of the Brazilian state’s 
developmental vision. Comparing the steel town of Volta Redonda (Dinius 
2011) and the modernist project of Brasilia, inaugurated in 1960 under 
the Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek as Brazil’s new capital (Holston 
1989). He notes that the utopian vision embodied in the urban landscape 
of Brasilia reflects one dimension of a longer history of development and 
future-oriented planning, in which the CSN steel plant in Volta Redonda 
was a key element. As occurred in Argentina and Poland, the privatization 
of this mega-structure entailed deep ruptures in the experience of differ-
ent generations of workers, ranging from the migrants who adapted their 
agricultural or mining skills to work in the plant, to the stability and sta-
tus enjoyed by the second generation (who, however, also experienced the 
repression of the 1964–85 dictatorship) and the young, post-privatization 
generation for whom formal education and educational training constitute 
an  indispensable—although not necessarily successful—step in the direction 
of becoming a steelworker.
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The second section, Continuities and Discontinuities, focuses on the rela-
tionships that cut across the spheres of production and reproduction, with 
a particular emphasis on gender relations. D’Aloisio’s chapter is based on 
long-term research in Melfi, Basilicata, where Fiat established a new plant, 
based on new organizational strategies and the recruitment of women in a 
sector that has historically been heavily identified with male workers. In an 
agricultural area with high unemployment, the Fiat plant offered welcome 
opportunities, despite lower wages and worse conditions than those offered 
in Fiat’s northern sites. Tracing the trajectory of Fiat Melfi and the women 
workers over a period of nearly twenty years, D’Aloisio shows continuities 
and discontinuities in relation to the relationships that support the wage 
workers’ fulfillment of the double burden of factory work and domestic 
responsibility, as well as the shift of dependencies from agriculture and 
subsistence activities towards wage-based incomes. Then, when the firm 
attempts to weather unfavorable markets, workers resort to informal activi-
ties to supplement declining wages and thus uphold the levels of consump-
tion—and debt—acquired on the basis of factory wages.
Trappmann’s critical, gendered approach to the concept of “employability”, 
a key concept in the European Commission’s economic strategy, addresses 
the entanglement of ideals of masculinity and work identities in the context 
of deindustrialization. She suggests that these may be a hindrance in situa-
tions of crisis, such as those arising from the loss of work and income that 
challenge the very basis of male identities and the social relations in which 
they are enmeshed. Trappmann also highlights the ways in which broader 
experience, in the workplace and beyond, can shape the ability of individu-
als to respond to critical situations. While her argument is based on a larger 
comparative research project, she focuses on two biographies to explore how 
experiences in work and domestic life inform the different responses to redun-
dancy articulated by steelworkers in Britain and in West Germany.
Long-term precarity and crisis are a feature of the stories of workers in the 
Piraeus shipbuilding industry discussed by Spyridakis. The Greek shipbuild-
ing industry has been affected by long-term decline as production shifted to 
other regions within the global economy, and by the effects of the European 
financial crisis, with devastating implications for workers as employment lev-
els fell from 6,000 to 1,000 workers after 2008. Spyridakis describes workers’ 
strategies in securing what work they might, by intensifying and accelerating 
their use of personal networks. Information is a crucial resource in a context 
in which jobs arise sporadically and opportunities for obtaining work require 
prompt responses. Under pressure from the acute precarity affecting workers 
and their households, work that may have been refused at one time, because 
it was too dangerous or poorly paid, is now sought after. Risk assessments 
are revaluated; networks are intensified in the continuous search for work; 
and the entire social fabric appears to be stretched to breaking point.
The third section, on Lives of Worth, explores the tropes of value and 
worth through narratives that express a sense of loss of worth, regarding 
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people, places and things, as they relate to the circuits of capitalist valoriza-
tion. Kalb juxtaposes two stories based in working class experience relating 
to different places and histories: one linked to industrial life in the context 
of Holland’s welfare state between 1950–90, the other revolving around the 
transition from socialism to a market economy in Poland. The two stories, 
of a woman worker in Eindhoven and a male worker in Wroclaw, reflect 
the specificities of their time and place while revealing shared processes of 
loss, disorientation and devaluation. Like the older generation in Pine’s Pol-
ish study, Maria van der Velde finds that her story does not resonate with 
her children and grandchildren and its meaninglessness renders it obso-
lete, worthless. Krzysztof Zadrony tells a story of struggle and disappoint-
ment in which the Polish working class was devalued by the elites leading 
the transition, who defined them as worthless workers. In Eindhoven, the 
entanglements of factory relations and families—and patriarchal systems 
of control—frame Maria’s story of loss and personal devaluation. Krzysz-
tof, on the other hand, is conscious of the highly politicized public rhetoric 
of devaluation that accompanied the decimation of Poland’s industry and 
working class. Both the privatized and internalized devaluation experienced 
by Maria and the public devaluation of workers in the rhetoric of transition 
are symptomatic of what Kalb describes as the global “rhythm of capitalist 
accumulation”.
Wódz and Gnieciak focus on social and physical landscapes produced 
by different and contradictory economic projects through an ethnographic 
study of the Ksawera estate in Będzin. The depth of the problems and the 
associated feelings of loss and worthlessness that their informants attach to 
this diminished urban landscape are due on the one hand to the large-scale 
investments in extractive and production sectors of the economy in the 19th 
and 20th centuries and, on the other hand, to the fact that the decline of 
these historically significant industries is not being addressed by equivalent 
investments. Furthermore, “new sectors” of the economy demand fewer, 
and highly specialized workers. The Będzin estate arose through a symbiotic 
relationship with the Paryż coal mine, which was nationalized after the 
Second World War and was then closed in 1995. Wódz and Gnieciak trace 
the history of the mine, from the experience of State Socialism, its col-
lapse in 1989, the struggle for the survival of the mine and its eventual 
closure. The residents of Będzin express concerns, similar to those recorded 
by Pine and other contributors to the volume, regarding the failure to pass 
on knowledge to the next generation, encapsulated in their disquiet about 
the young generations’ lack of knowledge regarding the roots of the mine’s 
name—a serious deficit since the history of the mine’s name encompasses 
the histories of local struggle. Such a detachment from history robs the place 
of meaning; it becomes a place of ghosts, loss and memories that may never 
be passed on to the young.
The last section discusses the possibilities of Politics and Resistance, 
focusing on the difficulties faced by workers and their organizations to 
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combat the onslaught of lean production, rising unemployment, the ero-
sion of wages and growing casualization. The divisions of the labor force 
opportunistically deployed to produce different categories of workers and 
differentiated regimes of value (of labor, persons and places) intersect with 
the fragmentation produced by hiring practices, outsourcing and reloca-
tion. The divisions of the working class and the weakening of organized 
labor in the face of the global market are exacerbated by the rollback of 
the state, withdrawing support for those rendered vulnerable in the new 
climate, and promoting the deregulation of markets and workplaces, freeing 
powerful corporations from local obligations to place and from both moral 
and contractual commitments to local workforces. The overall shift in the 
economic and political climate witnessed in the last two decades undermines 
the organizational bases of trade unions and produces a kind of disorienta-
tion as described by Pine and Wódz and Gnieciak in their chapters.
Following the discussion in earlier chapters of the disillusion provoked 
by the failure of capitalism and socialism—or as Kalb’s Polish informant 
explained, the experience of the worst of socialism and the worst of cap-
italism that followed the reorganization of life and work after 1989—to 
deliver the prosperous modernity they promised, Buzalka and Ferencová’ 
argue that socialism and post-socialism have served to undermine the effec-
tiveness and status of workers’ organizations. At the same time, enduring 
links to the land, predating socialism and surviving, to a greater or lesser 
extent, through the networks of kinship and family that subsidize fluctu-
ating wages, produce “post-peasant” identities and strategies. They argue 
that the ability to rely on kinship networks and subsistence activities weak-
ens the resolve of workers to fight for better wages or conditions. In some 
cases, the trade unions are entangled in the everyday life of the firm and 
come to play a strategic role in the reproduction of the labor force, through 
recruitment, training and monitoring both safety and performance. At the 
same time, workers feel threatened, as changes in technology have enabled 
the recruitment of workers from outside the steel industry, introducing an 
unprecedented level of competition for jobs and heightened the difficulties 
in securing favorable conditions in the workplace.
Kasmir’s chapter addresses “the long dispossession of US autoworkers” 
by tracking General Motors’ restructuring and relocation strategies, sup-
ported by the US government, in relation to the Saturn auto plant in Ten-
nessee. The Saturn plant was established as an innovative site of production 
based on workers’ participation, teamwork and cooperation between man-
agement and workers and was intended as the US industry’s response to Jap-
anese competition. The cooperation of Saturn’s local trade union meant that 
the national contract was suspended in favor of participation, with a view 
to developing a different kind of firm and a different kind of autoworker. 
However, over an extended process of dispossession, the privileged status of 
this powerful sector of the working class was neutralized. The chapter gives 
a detailed account of the unfolding struggle of the Spring Hill Saturn plant 
workers, the decimation of the workforce and the impact of bankruptcy 
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in 2009. Her analysis raises important questions about the implications of 
scale and of the spatio-temporalities of contemporary capitalism for work-
ers’ organizations. In the case of the Saturn plant, the strategies pursued by 
the local branch of the AUW caused divisions that weakened the workers’ 
position, contributing to further dispossession and widespread insecurity 
among one of the strongest sectors of the US working class.
Sabaté’s chapter returns the discussion to questions raised in earlier sec-
tions, regarding the interconnections of public and private, production and 
reproduction. Her case study of workers in a steel plant in Galicia, Spain, 
illustrates the complexities of these links and connections, and show how 
changes in the organization of household labor affect the sphere of produc-
tion. As increasing numbers of women enter the workforce, new demands 
arise in the household regarding the allocation of responsibilities, particu-
larly where childcare is concerned. These changes redraw the priorities of 
male steelworkers whose “class interests” become entangled with “gender 
interests” (Molyneux 1998), prompted by changing evaluations of domestic 
roles. In seeking to harmonize the rhythms of work and family life, they 
privilege what Sabaté calls “social” demands over the trade unions’ tradi-
tional focus on “economic” priorities. She notes that there is no perceived 
contradiction between being a “good father” and being a “good worker”. 
Some of the workers in her study adopt a pragmatic acceptance of tedium at 
work in exchange for stability and security—important conditions for their 
role as fathers. Others saw no contradiction between their responsibilities as 
a father and their commitment to political militancy.
The social, spatial and cultural landscapes of the places of work and 
livelihood examined in this volume reflect the ongoing process of capitalist 
accumulation and their intersections with local struggles over value and 
meaning. As such, they reveal the profound effects of the necropolitics of 
capitalism, while also shedding light on the forms of resilience and resist-
ance that contest, however tentatively, contemporary capitalism’s hegem-
onic project. The path-dependency of industrial landscapes encompasses 
the entanglements of work, gender, kinship and place, expressed in histo-
ries and experiences that reflect individual and collective aspirations and 
hopes, the utopias of state and industry, and processes of abandonment 
and decline. In the widely shared context of pervasive “cultural ecologies 
of the precarious” (Weston 2012), the uncertainties that afflict the world of 
industrial work concentrate the contradictions faced by the industrial pro-
ject in the 21st century: the tensions between regulation and deregulation, 
health and jobs, the present and the future that shape the lives of workers 
and communities. In this respect, the emphasis on the interconnections 
between production and reproduction, factory and family, adaptation and 
resistance, speak to the need for new political and economic paradigms 
and for broader alliances across scale, sectors and organizations to effec-
tively address the effects of global capitalist strategies.25 While exploring 
the ways that stories of people and places unfold in relation to broad tra-
jectories of capitalism and power, the chapters in this volume also propose 
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encompassing approaches to labor and struggle that recognize and enable 
new ideals, values and languages of work, worth and value.
Notes
 1 Research on the steel industry was supported by the European Commission 
within the Seventh Framework Programme under Grant Agreement No. 225670 
in relation to the project ‘MEDEA—Models and their Effects on Development 
Paths: An Ethnographic and Comparative Approach to Knowledge Transmis-
sion and Livelihood Strategies’ (2009–12).
 2 The problems of Detroit were many and complex. The city suffered from long-
term decline after the Second World War, with suburbanization depleting the city 
center of jobs and population, as well as poor administration and racial inequal-
ity, which culminated in the 1967 riots (Binelli 2014).
 3 This is the case with the United Kingdom where erstwhile thriving communi-
ties are struggling to find alternatives that may lead to a reversal of the decline 
suffered since the 1980s (‘The Urban Ghosts. Rustbelt Britain’, The Economist, 
12th October 2013, www.economist.com. Accessed 20th October 2015).
 4 In addition to a range of academic texts regarding the new capitalism (e.g., Bol-
tanski and Chiapello 2005, Sennet 2006) there have been a number of volumes 
aimed at a wider audience, including the work of Piketty (2014).
 5 These include early reflections and proposals from Offe and Keane (1985), Lash 
and Urry (1987), Piore and Sabel (1984), to more recent contributions from Sen-
nett (2006) who proposes the term of “new capitalism”, Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005) who refer to the “new spirit of capitalism”, Codeluppi’s “biocapitalism” 
(2008), “cognitive capitalism (Vercellone 2007; Moulier Boutang 2011) and 
“cognitive biocapitalism” (Fumagalli 2011).
 6 Autonomist Marxists, who have led the theoretical and political innovations 
regarding the implications of a transformed and transforming capitalist system 
suggest a potentially positive outcome to the conditions of life that affect work-
ers in contemporary capitalism (see Procoli 2004), and propose a new focus 
for worker identity as in the notion of the “cognitariat” proposed by Berardi 
(2009) and Vercellone (2007); from a different perspective, Huws (2003) 
stresses the exploitative conditions of work of what she calls the “cybertar-
iat”, while Guy Standing highlights the hardships experienced by what he calls 
the “precariat” and the implications of these conditions of work for political 
action (2011).
 7 Some theorists recognize the changing contours of contemporary capitalism and 
address this by proposing vigorous debates and re-evaluations of core concepts 
such as class (Carrier and Kalb 2015) and labor (Kasmir and Carbonella 2014), 
while others emphasize the implications of changing models of economic devel-
opment in the histories of different regions of the global economy (Goddard and 
Narotzky 2015).
 8 Kath Weston raises a parallel critique of simplistic oppositions between old and 
new, Fordist and post-Fordist, from the perspective of sensorial and affective 
experience in relation to mass-produced commodities. In her discussion of the 
automobile she asks: “How different is post-Fordist from Fordist production? If 
people can readily distinguish mass-produced vehicles when apprehending them 
through another register, that is to say, through touch, there is a kind of customi-
zation in the absence of design that customers produce when they take a car out 
for a spin. The sameness that undergirds mass production may be partially an 
optical effect. Not all aspects of mass production, in Ford’s time or ours, occur 
en masse.” (Weston 2012: 440).
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 9 In the 1990s, USIMINAS in Brazil reduced its workforce by 79 percent (D’Costa 
1999). Over a longer period, between 1975 and 1995, there were significant 
job losses in the European Union (over 65 percent, with France and the United 
Kingdom registering rates of 75 percent) (ILO 1997).
 10 In October 2015 the question of the immediate and the long-term future of the 
British steel industry came to public attention as a number of plants were threat-
ened with closure or with mothballing. The Redcar steel plant was bought from 
Corus by SSI, a Thai company that invested in the plant as a supplier for that 
country’s growing car industry. However, it was forced to scale down produc-
tion and eventually to close in 2015. The closure was a blow to workers and the 
wider economy, given the high levels of unemployment affecting the region of 
Teeside. At a meeting in the UK Parliament the Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committee met with representatives of the UK steel industry (representatives of 
Tata Steel Europe, Celsa Steel UK, UK Steel and the Community Trade Union) to 
discuss what is seen as a deep crisis in the industry. There was widespread agree-
ment that the downturn in China had caused that country to export increas-
ing volumes of Chinese steel, undercutting prices in Europe. The UK is thought 
to also suffer from high energy costs and other government-induced costs that 
affect its viability in the current market (www.parliament.uk: Commons Select 
Committee: “Industry representatives and MPs questioned on UK steel” 27 
October 2015; accessed 27th November 2015). Other European countries and 
industry representatives have appealed to the EU regarding the need for inter-
vention to protect European producers from Chinese imports. Indian producers 
have also suffered from local manifestations of global problems: a slowdown 
in demand of local market for steel exacerbated by a lack of working capital to 
weather the storm. Here, too, China is seen as a threat, since it can produce steel 
at lower prices. Consequently, Chinese imports have trebled (also imports from 
Japan and Korea. For the background to Teeside’s current struggles, see Beynon 
et al 1994).
 11 This is despite the industry’s very uneven record regarding worker and environ-
mental health and numerous struggles and tensions regarding the apparently 
contradictory demands for healthy communities and for secure jobs. The Euro-
pean Environmental Agency identified the top 30 polluters, amongst which were 
three iron and steel production facilities. At No. 12 on the list was Thyssen 
Krupp Steel’s facility in Duisburg, Germany; this was followed by Redcar in Tee-
side, United Kingdom at No. 27 and No. 29 was the ILVA steel plant in Taranto, 
Southern Italy (EEA - European Environment Agency 2014).
   Taranto has witnessed a number of state and EU interventions, and given rise 
to trade union protests in Taranto and ILVA sites in the north of the country 
against job losses and in response to the “solidarity contract”, which reduced 
pay and hours of work as many sectors of the plant were closed down. The Riva 
family, who owned the plant until it was intervened by the Italian government, 
were found guilty of failing to prevent high levels of toxic emissions and the plant 
was placed under “extraordinary administration” in an attempt to resolve the 
environmental problems and bolster the plant’s recovery from a period of losses.
 12 The knowledge economy is highlighted not only in the radical perspectives pro-
posed in particular by the Italian Autonomist theorists; a parallel variant of the 
concept is proposed by the World Bank. It is the latter version of the knowledge 
economy that has been embraced by the industry.
 13 Global giants such as Tata Steel, US Steel and Thyssen Krupp define their 
enterprises in terms of the creation of value and of intelligent steel products 
for future innovations (thyssenkrupp.com.cn. Accessed 10th October 2015)13. 
Arcelor Mittal, the world’s largest steel producer, sets its sights on “trans-
forming tomorrow”, producing “safe, sustainable steel” through a clean and 
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sustainable industry (http://corporate.arcelormittal.com). The World Steel Asso-
ciation emphasizes the capacity of steel to be recycled, as a central element in 
the sustainability claims of the industry. They also stress improvements made in 
the area of energy efficiency, the implementation of management schemes for 
extraction and use of raw materials and the application of life-cycle assessments 
by the industry (worldsteel.org). See also the 2009 document produced by the 
European Steel Technology Platform (cordis.europa.eu/pub/estep/docs/steelpa-
per_en.pdf. Accessed 10th October 2015 and 23rd September 2016).
 14 The industry’s own figures (www.worldsteel.org) suggest that between 1972 and 
2012, employment decreased globally by approximately 50 percent (accessed 
October 12th, 2015).
 15 According to Oleg Korzhov: “Currently state aid is the main drivers of growth 
as with the US policy of quantitative easing” . . . “Only with a change in the 
economic growth model and the emergence of radically new industries will the 
situation alter to any degree. So far, we see no reasons for, or signs of, such a 
change, but nor could anyone have predicted 30 years ago just how important 
information technologies would become” (Korzhov 2014: 9).
 16 European producers are at greatest risk. It is expected that producers in emerging 
markets will overtake them in terms of volume, sales and profits. See Mckinsey & 
Company’s 2015 report at www.mckinsey.com “The road to 2020 and beyond. 
What’s driving the global automotive industry?” (accessed October 16th, 2015).
 17 Illustrated by the Saturn plant’s aim to develop a radically new organizational 
framework, the car industry has a historical link with experimentation and inno-
vation, from the adaptation of Taylorism by Ford to the Just-in-Time system 
developed in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s (Kasmir and D’Aloisio, this volume). 
Also known as the Toyota Production System (TPS), the model was exported 
to car producers throughout the world and adapted by a wide range of other 
industries, including steel (see Díaz Crovetto’s chapter) and the IT sector. Antici-
pating many features of the “new” capitalism, this demand-led model made new 
demands on workers, requiring broadly based skills flexibly applied to different 
tasks and processes. While this flexibility is often claimed to empower workers, 
granting them control over the work process, the association of flexibility with 
precarious working conditions, short-term contracts and shift work in many 
sectors of industry has raised concerns about the implications of such innovative 
management and production practices for workers’ individual and social well-
being (Mehri 2005; Odih 2007).
 18 In 2015 the German car manufacturer Volkswagen was rocked by a scandal 
regarding the deliberate rigging of VW cars to salvage their power and speed 
yet pass emissions tests in the US and elsewhere. The contradictions experienced 
in the steel industry between profits and environmental regulation—or indeed 
between environmental impact of the industry and its products and jobs and 
livelihoods— are perhaps more complex in the case of the automobile industry 
given the emotional, sensorial and practical entanglements linking the automo-
bile to everyday life (see Weston 2012).
 19 See, for example, the criticisms of Chris Giles based on inaccuracies he claims to 
have identified in the transcription of Piketty’s data sets (‘Picketty findings undercut 
by errors’, Financial Times, May 23, 2014, amp.ft.com; accessed May 26 2014).
 20 In the countries covered by the chapters in this volume there is considerable 
variation, both in the official figures for general unemployment and for youth 
unemployment. For 2014, at the lower end of the scale the United Kingdom has 
an unemployment rate of 6.1 percent with a youth unemployment rate of 16.9 
percent; the US with 6.2 percent unemployed and 13.4 percent youth unem-
ployed; Netherlands, with 7.4 percent unemployment and 12.7 percent youth 
unemployment; Brazil, with 6.8 percent unemployment and 16.1 percent youth 
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unemployment; Argentina with 7 percent unemployment and 18.8 percent youth 
unemployment. Italy and Slovakia are in the middle group with 12.7 percent. 
Slovakia has an unemployment level of 13.2 percent and a youth unemployment 
rate of 29.7 percent; Rates of unemployment and in particular youth unemploy-
ment are especially high in Southern European countries: Spain’s rate is 53.2 
percent (with a general level of 24.5 percent), Italy has a youth unemployment 
rate of 42.7 percent (and 12.7 percent overall unemployment) and Greece has 
a rate of 52.4 percent for youth unemployment (and an overall rate of unem-
ployment of 26.5 percent) (Country Profiles. ILOSTAT Database 2015 (ilo.org) 
(Accessed on 16th October 2015.
 21 In the Indian steel industry formal sector workers are increasingly forced to sup-
plement their livelihoods by working in the informal sector (Parry 1999; also 
Sánchez 2012). D’Aloisio, in this volume, also describes how Fiat women work-
ers resort to informal sources of income when their work at the car plant is 
affected by the company’s declining market performance.
 22 Lee’s comparison of two electrical good factories that, while belonging to the 
same firm are located in two very different sites, in Shenzhen and Hong Kong, 
shows that place-specific entanglements of gender, age and kinship, and differ-
ent histories of migration and class, produce different kinds of gendered work-
ers. Interestingly, she attributes the contrasting management styles of the two 
factories to the differences arising from the social context of each place and the 
different expectations towards and responses of the “maiden workers” of Shen-
zhen on the one hand, and the “matron workers” in Hong Kong on the other 
(Lee 1998). These variations cannot be separated from the question of desire 
and aspiration, whether this is directed towards the self or towards family and 
dependents, illustrated by Freeman’s study of Barbadian office workers (2009) 
and D’Aloisio’s discussion of Fiat workers in this volume.
 23 Morris points out that changing ideological trends went hand in hand with a 
general lack of analysis of the implications of migration, gender, ethnicity and 
other complexities that constitute social structures (Morris 1994).
 24 Strathern’s discussion is more complex and weaves together work, social relations 
and value. Taking work in Mt. Hagen as “purposeful activity” that produces 
things (such as pigs), and given that things such as pigs are multiply produced, 
by husbands and wives but also incorporating transactions and connections with 
many categories of kin, we can see the connections between value and social 
relations as embodied in the product of work: “To think of the work embodied 
in the pig is to think of the value husband and wife have for each other. A man 
takes a fattened animal as a sign of his wife’s care (it is when he does not that 
conflict arises)” (Strathern 1988: 160). Similarly, in the case of exchange, the cir-
culation of things and persons cannot take place without reference to the social 
relations that are entangled in such things and persons (Strathern 1988: 161).
 25 The creation of Europe based IndustryALL Global Union is an important step 
in the direction of multi-sectorial and multi-scalar organization. See Gibellieri 
(2015) and industriall-union.org. For thoughtful discussions on these issues, see 
Kasmir and Carbonell (2008, 2014) and Barber, Leach and Lem (2012).
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Section I
Past, Present and Future
Generations in Times of Crisis

DOI: 10.4324/9781315747804-2
The primary ethnographic setting of this paper is Lublin, a city in south-
eastern Poland, in 2003–06. In one of the poorest regions of Poland, on the 
edge of the kresy, the borderlands with Ukraine, Lublin is situated on the 
edge of the edge.
In the film ‘Goodbye Lenin’, the main character, a young boy living in 
the GDR who is in late adolescence when the wall comes down, suddenly 
finds himself having to hold onto the material world of socialism as capi-
talism grows all around him. His mother, who was a dedicated and highly 
respected party member, collapses as the crowds surge onto the streets, and 
lies in a coma during the entire first stage of the Wende. When she awakens, 
her son is told that she must not suffer any shocks, as shock could kill her, 
and so, dutifully, he sets about restoring the world she does not know has 
been lost. He fills the cupboards with old East German tins and preserves for 
which he has to scour the countryside, puts back into the flat all of the solid 
furniture of socialist design, obscures the large Coca Cola ad which can be 
seen from the bedroom window, and hires some rather entrepreneurially 
minded local children to dress in old Pioneer uniforms and come and sing 
socialist songs at his mother’s bedside. Like many of the people I talked to 
in Poland between 1990 and 1996, and even as late as the first decade of the 
2000s, his mother has lost her work, her health and her authority within 
both the state and the family. The son attempts to disguise these enormous 
losses, to keep her safe. In taking care of her, like the good son he is, how-
ever, he must also take over from her the role of adult and provider in the 
family.
This film, which as we shall see finds many shadowy parallels in the snip-
pets of life stories from Lublin with which I end this chapter, is basically a 
tale of life courses interrupted by enormous events and changes in the public 
world. The tension between simultaneously attempting to hold things still, 
as they were, and to silence or obscure the monumental changes, and desir-
ing to move into a new and different world and life trajectory, is overwhelm-
ing. The move forward is potentially destructive for the mother, and both 
potentially freeing and incredibly painful for her children. The film reveals 
the core of the problem of such all-encompassing change: generations cannot 
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reproduce themselves as before, and a new direction in the life course for 
one generation can often only be implemented by the paralysis or experience 
of extreme loss of the other.
Throughout eastern and central Europe the year 1989, when socialism 
fell, saw the beginning of an acute and rapid shift in political economy and 
social life. Here, in this chapter, I write primarily about Lublin, a city near 
the border between Ukraine and Poland, which has a complicated, powerful 
and at times troubled political history. The research on which I am drawing 
was conducted in the first decade of the 2000s,1 in the periods leading up to 
and following Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. For comparison, I also 
refer at times to the process of deindustrialization which took place in the 
city of Łódź, particularly around the textile industry, in the early 1990s; this 
was also a decade of remarkable change, but change caused by the demise of 
the Soviet Union and its empire rather than the expansion of the European 
Community.
In the years of the early–mid 1990s that followed the regime change, 
people all over the former socialist bloc had to remake lives and to remap 
life courses which had seemed settled and, although difficult, in many ways 
secure. Now, twenty-five years after, and already a decade into Poland’s 
membership in the new Europe, memories and moral assessments of the 
socialist period still divide generations. The dissonance is between those 
who grew up and lived their adult working lives under socialism and hold 
certain memories, expectations and even moralities associated with social-
ism, and those now just entering adulthood that have very little personal 
memory of socialist daily life and have experienced very different educations 
and ideologies. Disrupture here lies not only between a particular past and 
present, but also between the lived worlds of different generations, and the 
experiences, dreams and losses associated with these, within regions, com-
munities, neighborhoods and even close families. In terms of the discussion 
here, this seems to me to be important, because it addresses the most basic 
level of disrupture, in social, political and above all economic terms. Class is 
a major component in this discussion, although religion, political affiliation, 
ethnicity and all of the other usual suspects are also germane, sometimes 
even within (and dividing) close kin and their families.
In this chapter, I want to consider kinship and labor as two inextricably 
interwoven concepts. If kinship is transmitted from generation to generation 
through definitions of personhood (social and biological), stories, accounts 
of events and moralities, as well as more tangibly through work practices 
and skills and other embodied acts—knowledge of the world as it is and 
how it should be—how can this transmission take place in the now empty 
spaces where what was has gone and what is to be is still emergent or not 
yet clear? What happens when transmission becomes thwarted, or absent 
and silenced?
I am concerned here particularly with how, at times of enormous political, 
economic and social change, transmission can become so problematic that 
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relations between generations are re-mapped. The process of re-mapping 
creates fallout, in the form of lost generations: generations written out of 
the meta narrative of national political economy because there is no longer 
a place for them or a way for them to fulfill the obligations that they had 
previously undertaken; or generations who choose a new path which takes 
them away from the practices of kinship reciprocity, although not necessar-
ily from the emotions, ideologies or moralities. In both cases what occurs is 
an inability of generations, at least in certain classes and contexts, to repro-
duce: a failure of reproduction.
Historians such as Braudel (1972) and Hareven (1982) have discussed the 
existence of different temporalities, in terms of both regimes of  time— family 
time, industrial time, ritual time—and different temporal  perspectives—
the longue durée, the rhythm of everyday life from generation to genera-
tion, and the short-term interruptions by events which shake or unsettle, or 
irrevocably change, the lived world and the life course of the individual. It 
seems to me that in Lublin, the problem of intergenerational reproduction, 
and here I mean reproduction in the widest sense encompassing household, 
work/economy and life course rather than the narrower process of biologi-
cal reproduction, was acute at the time of this research and I suspect still is 
today.
Sophie Day (2007) interrogates the idea of the life course in her writings 
on sex workers. The temporalities of the sex worker, she argues, lie in the 
present, and involve various persons, all of whom are located in one body, 
as well as a complex negotiation of the body as private and the body as 
public, in the latter case a commodity; this presentism and the different 
bodies and persons it entails often results in an inability to reproduce either 
biologically, in terms of bearing and raising a child, or socially, in terms of 
replicating a particular social world in the next generation.
If for sex workers the presentism which they occupy makes a particular 
type of life course difficult or impossible to realize, for others the disrupture 
is rooted more in memories of fractured pasts. Skultans (1997), for instance, 
described the life narratives of Latvians whose lives were torn apart by the 
German occupation and later by Stalinism. Some survived and took up their 
lives again after the trauma of war and deportation, while others, failing to 
do so, instead were hospitalized with a mysterious and obscure, very Soviet 
disease—a form of neurasthenia. The former were those who could give a 
structured account of their lives, beginning in an innocent childhood in the 
forest, moving through a dark and dangerous place of hiding, at the onset of 
a transition journey, which leads to a prison camp in Germany or Siberia or 
Central Asia, and finally back again to the re-established safety and magic 
of home and forest. Those who failed to make and own a coherent and 
resolved narrative were in effect frozen, embodying a paralysis of emotion 
and memory.
Such accounts, from very different places, times or work practices, have 
resonance for my material from Lublin in the early 21st century because 
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they address questions about disrupture and discontinuity: what happens 
between generations when the established legitimate order collapses, and 
the rules, both official and informal, by which people have conducted or 
expect to conduct their lives, no longer apply? How are people able to con-
struct coherent life stories, stories to ‘live by’? Are they able to do so?
We are all familiar with descriptions of decaying and dilapidated factories 
and collective farms in former socialist countries. When people lost their 
jobs in such enterprises, they lost more than work. To use a phrase which 
has become rather widespread more generally in anthropology (Escobar 
1994; Weiss 1996; Kideckel 2002; Humphrey 2002), accounts are rife with 
descriptions of the literal unmaking of the everyday or lived world, when 
the fabric and structures of normal known life under socialism, from secure 
employment to housing and utilities, to subsidized food, childcare and 
healthcare, unraveled, became severely eroded or disappeared altogether.
But other less tangible and certainly formerly less visible aspects of work 
have also shifted. For many state workers, whether in agriculture, indus-
try or services, the socialist workplace had been the site from which infor-
mal dealings, transactions, exchanges, from small jobs contracted outside 
the official work time or place to large-scale redistribution of appropriated 
goods and produce, were built up and developed (see Wedel 1992). Most 
people moved between their public and private worlds, and formal and 
informal work and consumption practices, with relative ease during social-
ism, but often the success or even possibility of informal work, black mar-
keting, shadow economy work, was dependent upon the existence of both 
official, formal and legal employment and the resources attached to this. 
These latter comprised, for example, contacts, goods to appropriate and 
redistribute, access to machinery and vehicles for purposes other than those 
intended, and networks of kinship and friendship (see Morris 1992; Pahl 
1984) and others writing about the context and consequences of long-term 
unemployment and socio-economic polarization in Britain).
Hareven (1982, 2001) argued that among textile workers in the Amoskeag 
Mills in 19th century New Hampshire, “the emergent as well as the more 
established factory system was dependent on kin to recruit workers, to 
organize or assist in migration, to train young workers or newly arrived 
immigrants on the factory floor, to act as interpreters and to supervise or 
discipline the younger members of their kinship group. Workers carried their 
kin ties and their traditions of reciprocity into the factory” (2001: 23–24).
Similarly, studies of the Lancashire mills in the 19th century link their 
success to such kin organization, both on the factory floor and in the recruit-
ment of labor through rural urban kin links (e.g., Michael Anderson, 1971). 
Margaret Grieco’s (1987) work on fish canning factories in Aberdeen, and 
on migration to the steel mills in Colby, tells a similar story placed in the 
late 20th century. She shows that factory workers recruited, trained and 
disciplined their junior kin, not only in local factories, but across significant 
distances involving periodic migration. My own research on textile workers 
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in Łódź revealed the predominance of such processes of kinship recruitment 
and training, and kin-based networks of rural urban migration, beginning 
in the 19th century, and lasting throughout the communist period and until 
the collapse of the factories in the 1990s.
These various accounts are important not only because they demonstrate 
the impossibility of separating and compartmentalizing the apparently pri-
vate world of kinship and the apparently public world of work, but also 
because in making the links and overlaps between the two domains visible 
they provide us with some clues about what kinship may mean, and what 
kinship practices may entail, in an industrial political economy. Processes 
of recruitment, of transfer of skills and of discipline bind junior kin to their 
elders, making them dependent on their knowledge and contacts, and hence 
affording the elders significant power and status. This merging of public and 
private contradicts the more programmatic model of separate or bounded 
public and private spaces, which ascribes authority to senior kin in the 
domestic domain, and to employers, bureaucrats, police and civil servants, 
and/or the state itself in the public. So the question which follows must be, 
what happens to these hierarchical but strongly binding ties of family and 
kinship when many members of the middle/senior generations have not only 
lost their jobs, but the entire economy in which they worked, including the 
workplaces themselves, has collapsed and disappeared.
Mollona’s (2004) sensitive and evocative ethnography of Sheffield after 
the collapse of the steel industry illustrates the intertwining of the for-
mal and informal economies in the face of deindustrialization and socio- 
economic marginality. He shows that in many cases middle-aged men, 
although they themselves occupy increasingly marginal positions in the 
wider economy, are able to carve out strong bases of local power by con-
trolling labor recruitment and work practices of their junior male kin in the 
seasonal waged work in small steel enterprises, and of both male and female 
junior kin in the surrounding sites of informal economic dealing—brothels, 
pubs, drug dealing and clandestine markets. Different domains, family and 
work, public and private, formal and informal, overlap and nest within each 
other. Power structures which subjugate the male workers to exploitation 
by the capitalist in the formal public economy are mirrored by those which 
situate the same male workers in the informal, semi-domestic economy as 
the exploiters, and their wives, sons and daughters as the exploited, alien-
ated and controlled. Kinship is by no means benign or cozy, but it is a source 
of both (economic) support and control across generations.
In the socialist countries, I would argue, the combination of fear of or 
hostility to the state and the workings of the “economy of shortage”2 cre-
ated a particular paradox. Socialist ideology and state practice devalued 
the private sphere as antisocial, bourgeois and individualistic, but for most 
people it became the sphere of trust and morality, and the center for practi-
cal kinship and social relatedness. For instance, officially jobs were open to 
all, through recruitment on an impartial basis by the state; in practice, jobs 
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in both the state economy and the ubiquitous informal sector were arranged 
through contacts, connections and kin. The senior generation operated as 
gatekeepers, setting up work opportunities for their grandchildren, children, 
nieces and nephews in factories and enterprises, teaching them knowledge 
of the workplace and skills of survival. Here I think that socialist emphasis 
on the identification of value with labor is important; in socialist economic 
theory, human value is realized through labor. Although many aspects of 
socialist ideology were generally rejected, this notion of worth through 
labor was, I think, widely internalized by the working populations of the 
socialist states (see also Kalb, Wódz and Gnieciak, this volume).
With the fall of socialism and the collapse of the planned economy, many 
of the avenues to work, and many of the connections which had been nur-
tured by the senior generations and passed on to their juniors, closed. After 
1989, and most markedly since the early 2000s, the change from socialist 
ideology of human value defined through work to capitalist ideology of 
market exchange and possessive individualism has been played out in the 
collapse of primary sites of employment and production such as agricul-
tural and industrial cooperatives, collectives and factories. The holes which 
resulted were filled at first by informal work and work sites; over time this 
unsettled terrain came to be balanced by new economic regimes, manifested 
in the highly mobile information-based economy and migration networks of 
late 20th century global capitalism,
Many of those who were most adversely affected by the collapse of social-
ism relocated themselves exclusively in the informal or gray sector, often 
although not always out of necessity rather than choice. In the new informa-
tion- and knowledge-based sector, characterized by both acceleration and 
extreme mobility, on the other hand, the new Europeans are being formed, 
and they are most likely to be members of the younger generations, those 
with no experience of working under socialism but with education, training 
and social connections in quite different realms.
Ironically, in the accounts I collected in Lublin of working lives of men 
and women in their 50s and 60s, unemployed or fearful of losing their jobs, 
progress tends to be associated with the past. It is a memory of socialism, 
often of the Gierek years (the 1970s), and above all it is a linear memory of 
growth and development, after the horrors of the war and then Stalinism, a 
memory of civilized modernity—full employment, good food and services, 
and a productive industrialized economy characterized by good, stable and 
safe working conditions and very high standards. To my mind, and drawing 
on my own memories of socialism in Poland during the Gierek years, this is 
a rather partial picture.
During socialism, children of factory workers tended to follow their par-
ents and elder kin into the factories; at the time of my research in Lublin the 
directors of the tobacco and the sugar plants, both of which also draw on 
seasonal workers from Ukraine, still tried to hire family members of existing 
or former employees when possible. But where the parents saw this as life 
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work, and as modern work involving sleek technology, skills and knowledge 
which they had received from their parents and could and should pass down 
to their own children, the current young employees say that they plan only 
to work in the factories for a time, or that they work there because there is 
no other work at the moment. Their longer term plans involve either find-
ing different work, setting up something on their own, or going abroad as 
migrant laborers or students. In their accounts of their work in the Polish 
industrial sector, there is no emphasis at all on modernity, modern machines 
or progress. Rather they talk about bad working conditions, poor pay and 
antiquated technology. I rarely heard them speak of skills, or transfer of 
knowledge between generations.
Łukasz (aged 19), for instance, talked about his work history and his 
plans. He was taken on by the tobacco factory at 17 after his mother was 
laid off and his father died. He says that he needs the work for now, to sup-
port his mother and sisters, but in the long term he plans to become a baker, 
and make beautiful and expensive designer cakes, after working in the UK 
for a time. He has no interest in anything his mother can teach him about 
the world of the factory floor.
The underactive local labor market is divided in various ways that position 
categories of people differently: younger versus older workers, those with 
and without education, and those with or without strong and influential ties 
of kinship and friendship. On the other hand, as a counterpoint, there is a 
mobile informal labor force, consisting of young and middle-aged people 
from all backgrounds who travel abroad to work. In their work abroad, 
they often perform the worst paid or the least valued work: cleaning, nurs-
ing and caring for the ill and the elderly, domestic labor, meat packing, 
agricultural unskilled labor, construction, labor in sweatshops, sex work, 
protection and various kinds of petty criminal activity. This is work that 
they are either unable or unwilling (or both) to carry out at home in Poland. 
In Lublin, in fact, this work is often performed by people from further 
east, usually Ukrainians, but also Romanians and Bulgarians. (So, a young 
woman who has just finished her MA in Psychology may be employed by 
an EU-funded NGO in Lublin, to help to establish the ‘know how’ of civil 
society in Ukraine. During the summer she may take two months off, and 
travel to the UK, to work as a cleaner or a nanny. Meanwhile, her Ukrainian 
friend from Kiev, who works for the same NGO, takes time off to travel to 
Lublin and work there as a cleaner).
What this means, of course, is not only that people do different jobs at 
different points in their lives, but also, as David Harvey (1990) among oth-
ers has pointed out, that the age of Fordism, the time when people expect 
to train in one job and then do it in one place for the rest of their lives, is 
long past. But it also means that individuals move backwards and forwards 
between different worlds, kinship and friendship relations, localities and 
work, in their lives. This is not a lineal progression at all, but a set of cycles 
determined by socio-political space. Psychologists and economists trained in 
38 Frances Pine
Ukraine may work as cleaners in Poland, and their Polish counterparts may 
work as cleaners in London. Both may return to work again as economists 
and psychologists in their native countries, and they may go backwards and 
forwards many times, in different work and social relations each time. But it 
is highly unlikely at the moment at least that the process could be reversed, 
and that an English economist would work as a nanny in Poland or a Polish 
psychologist as a nanny in Ukraine.
In the new information- and knowledge-based sector, characterized 
by both acceleration and extreme mobility, the new Europeans are being 
formed, and they are most likely to be members of the younger genera-
tions, those with no memory of working under socialism but with educa-
tion, training and social connections in quite different realms. To the older 
industrial and agricultural workers, their children or grandchildren seem to 
work within a complicated world system where very few people seem to be 
involved in the production of tangible objects or produce, but very many in 
the production and circulation of ideas, words, concepts, and “know-how”.
This kind of rupture and backward and forward movement in time and 
space which occur with temporary migration is a recurrent theme in per-
sonal and family stories in Lublin, calling to mind Hareven’s distinction 
between different kinds of timing (1978:100): synchronization of individual 
with family transitions; interaction involving the relationship between life 
course transitions and historical change; and integration, the cumulative 
impact of earlier life course transitions on subsequent ones, are all impor-
tant here (Hareven 1978:100).
In Lublin after EU accession the interaction between transitions and 
historical change was unsettled. Patterns of kinship interdependence and 
reciprocity, established over generations, continued to be important in 
socio-economic relations and in social imaginings. Everyone I spoke to 
declared that they relied on their parents and grandparents, or their children 
and grandchildren, for emotional support and financial aid. In the work 
histories I recorded in Lublin, the narrators all referred to kinship ties and 
networks when describing their attempts to find or keep work. But the ways 
in which work and a working life were understood varied among the gen-
erations. For the youngest, in their late teens or early 20s, socialism was a 
distant memory, a time when their mothers spent a lot of time in queues. 
For many, work was not life employment but any short-term job, and above 
all any short-term job abroad. Middle-aged women and men, those who 
had been working during the socialist period, all experienced some kind of 
rupture in or shortly after 1989. For most this was expressed as a negative 
and frightening change, a going backwards; some, particularly those now 
unemployed, spoke as though there were two distinct work times—“then”, 
when there was work, and stability, and “now”, when nothing was certain 
anymore.
This, a fragment of a conversation I had with Pani Ula, a 55-year-old 
woman currently unemployed, is typical of many others: “My first job? It 
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was in the sugar plant; my aunt worked there. How did I get it? What do 
you mean, how did I get it? That was then. Things were different then. You 
didn’t look for jobs, you just went to them after you finished school”. She 
lost her job with the cuts after 1989, and had a period of unemployment, 
when she was very depressed and confused. “Then I got a new job in a cos-
metics outlet, a little shop, but that only lasted eight months because it got 
robbed . . . it was down near the station . . . and the owner was frightened 
and closed it down”. The owner was a young woman, a friend of her niece, 
which is how she got the job. Then, after another longer period of unem-
ployment, she got another job in retail. “This was through my daughter, a 
friend of hers opened a small shop and said to her . . . ‘your mother worked 
in a shop didn’t she? Might she want to work for me?’ That was nice work, 
but it didn’t last”.
This is a fairly typical story for a woman of this generation, that recounts 
a movement through a life which seems orderly and smooth and predictable, 
and in which the narrator does all the right things and for the first 20 or so 
years of adulthood life things carry on as expected. Her personal life and her 
work life are knitted together, she works with friends and kin, has time off to 
have her children, and is unworried about the future at least in terms of work 
because, as she says “that was then. There was always work.” Her life was 
progressing as expected. And then, with the big historical changes of the fall 
of communism and the economic restructuring which followed, the pattern 
of her life changed dramatically. Laid off from the factory, she took a series 
of small temporary jobs. Her links to her work were still formed through 
kinship, but instead of first following in the steps of her elder kin and being 
taught and protected by them, and then in her turn leading her daughter’s 
generation, and training her daughter’s generation, it was her daughter and 
her niece who found her work. In other words, the hierarchies of age and 
generation had, like work itself, been disrupted and even reversed.
In Pani Ula’s story we see a world transformed, as security is replaced by 
an overwhelming sense of a precarious life and shadowed by fear of actual 
physical danger. For some of the younger generation, the loss of old certain-
ties and the failing efficacy of old networks were equally traumatic.
Josek, for instance, was 24 when I spoke to him at an unemployment 
center in Lublin. He had finished middle school, and apprenticed to his 
father and elder brother, both of whom had lost their jobs at the auto fac-
tory but were working independently, as auto mechanics. In a way Josek was 
following the “old” pattern in terms of kinship and generations, although 
there was at this point no permanent or even regular work for any of them. 
After his apprenticeship Jozek did his military service, returned to civilian 
life and had had no formal work since. Sometimes he did a bit of work 
for his brother. Usually he worked ‘on the black’, na czarna; he was quite 
open and explicit about this, saying he got his black work from the street, 
not through kin or acquaintances particularly but through word of mouth. 
When I ask him what he wanted to do, whether he was planning to go 
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abroad to work as so many of his contemporaries were doing, he responded, 
unusually for a young man of his generation and class, that all he wanted to 
do was what he was doing, only legally. But the lack of legal work at that 
time affected them all, and in this family neither generation was able to help 
the other in creating steady or formal work.
One person I interviewed made an unusually strong impression on me. 
When I talked to her in an unemployment center, Anka was 22, and the 
mother of three children under five. Unlike Josek (see above), who was more 
or less her age mate, she wanted to leave her origins and to leave the past, in 
all of its dysfunctionality, behind her. She was born outside Lublin on a Pat 
stwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne (PGR from hereon), a state farm. The farm 
was liquidated in 1993, along with most other PGRs. Anka was 10 or 11 
then. Her parents both lost their work and like many former PGR workers 
had nowhere else to go and so stayed on the farm, with no work and no 
income. Both drank heavily and Anka was cared for by her grandmother, 
who urged her to study, helped her with her work and generally protected 
and cared for her. At 17 or 18 she became pregnant and her grandmother 
encouraged her to move to Lublin to be with her boyfriend. They married, 
had more children and moved in with his parents. This meant that Anka 
has the possibility to work, because her mother-in-law who was retired 
could care for the children. Anka’s aim was to study, to gain a qualifica-
tion in business studies and to set up a small business of her own. She saw 
her grandmother as the anchor of her life; although she acknowledges the 
support she received from her parents-in-law, it was her grandmother who 
helped her to escape from her dysfunctional parents and the dying PGR. 
Now her grandmother was ill, and she went back as often as she could, to 
visit and care for her.
In this account Anka was making claims to a proper life course, with 
proper relations between generations, mutual help at the right time and a 
carefully planned and realized future. The disruptions were there, however, 
in the background; the squalor of the former PGR, the dysfunctional par-
ents, and the bleak poverty and privation of her childhood, all appeared 
almost as fallout from the wider historical changes. Her parents, like so 
many of their generation as I have already shown, were lost, and she looked 
to the previous generation, that of her grandmother, for direction and guid-
ance. Through moving away, on her grandmother’s advice, she had been 
able to begin to form a coherent life story.
Other stories also reflect, like Anka’s, the way that help is still streamed 
down from senior to junior generation, even as the old channels have 
become distorted or disappeared. Irek and Ewa were in their early forties, 
and had moved to Lublin from a village about 100 kilometers away in the 
1990s. She was a trained nurse, while he had no formal training but had 
worked in security and construction. They had two small children. Irek had 
two uncles living in Lublin, and one managed to find them a small flat. First 
of all Ewa worked in the hospital, in her own field of cardiology, and Irek 
Lost Generations? 41
got a job, through his other uncle, as a security guard in a bank. However, 
former policemen started to take over the all positions in the highly lucrative 
security business, and he lost his job. Ewa and Irek then took on the fran-
chise of a small general shop, very near the center of the city. Ewa continued 
to work in the hospital, but also did most of the managing, purchasing and 
accounts for the shop, as well as the domestic labor and the childcare at 
home. Irek worked in the shop, and looked after the children when Ewa was 
on her hospital shifts. In about 2002 they realized they would have to give 
up the shop, because people were leaving the city center, migrating out to 
the suburbs or further afield to other parts of Poland and abroad and there 
was no longer adequate custom, only, they said, local drunks. They had 
the opportunity to buy a very dilapidated old house, in one of the roughest 
areas of the city, for a very low price. Again, the uncles came to their aid, 
and in conjunction with Ewa’s parents in the countryside, lent them the 
money for the down payment. They moved in and Irek, still out of work, 
began to fix up the house with a lot of help from the uncles and other friends 
and cousins.
Ewa meanwhile heard from a nursing friend about work abroad, in a 
meat packing plant in Ipswich, and went with her friend to England. She 
moved between Lublin and southeast England for some years, in Lublin 
continuing to work in cardiology, doing the work she loved and excelled at 
but receiving very low pay, and in the UK taking a variety of jobs, with very 
poor working and living conditions, in food processing, which were badly 
paid by local standards but for her represented far more than she could 
earn nursing in Poland. With what she earned she managed to support the 
family, and to pay for the renovation of the house. Her children were both 
studying English and French in school, and she hoped that they would be 
able to attend university abroad when the time came. Irek had not been 
formally employed for a good 10 years, although from time to time through 
the whole period he worked with the uncles as a laborer or builder. He was 
absolutely clear and explicit about how much they owe the uncles, and how 
obliged to them he felt; he said repeatedly that they would never let him and 
his family down, and that he could always turn to them when things were 
hard, or when he needed practical help. Ewa could turn to her parents, but 
because they were farther away it was more difficult to rely on them for 
day-to-day help.
Ewa’s dream was to learn enough English to be able to work in her pro-
fession in the UK, in residential caring if not in nursing. She intended to keep 
traveling backwards and forwards between countries and between jobs. Irek 
was anxious about her absences, and the children missed her, but they all 
realized that they would find it hard to live in the way they wanted to with-
out her UK income. She loved her work in the hospital in Lublin, but wages 
were so low that it was more lucrative for her to work for low UK wages 
as a meat packer in Ipswich than as a Nursing Sister on a cardiology ward 
in Lublin. Although since Poland joined the EU she could work legally in 
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the UK, which she could not do when first she went there, she was unable 
to get work in her own field because, among other factors, she lacked the 
necessary language skills.
In this case, we can see continued reciprocal exchanges of help and 
labor between kin of different generations, as well as the extension of these 
links between the city and the countryside. To some extent, Irek and Ewa 
migrated to the city to get away from the countryside and what they saw 
as the trap of rural poverty. Ewa’s mobility between different labor markets 
in different countries allowed the family to move upward, and not only 
to imagine but also to plan new possibilities and different trajectories for 
their children. All acknowledged that the emotional and personal costs were 
high. Ewa and Irek hoped that their children would move (with them) to 
the West after secondary school, and move into higher education and later 
well-paid positions.
In this family we see a pattern repeated over generations. Ewa’s and Irek’s 
parents, recognizing that there was nothing for their children except hard 
work and poverty in the countryside, encouraged them to migrate, from the 
village to the city first, and then in Ewa’s case abroad as a cyclical migrant. 
The aspirational patterns of the generations can be seen to repeat them-
selves: Ewa and Irek went on to plan the permanent migration of their own 
children.
Here in a sense we see the beginnings of what might come to be consid-
ered another lost generation, although lost in a very different sense. This is 
the generation of young who are leaving and seem likely not to return, or 
who certainly do not intend to return permanently.
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that kinship and work are so 
closely intertwined that it is often impossible to think of or understand 
one without the other. I suggested that kinship provides a necessary frame-
work for both the transfer of skills and information, and the transfer of 
knowledge practices, between generations, particularly in relation to work 
in factories and on farms. Obviously, this is a highly idealized and rather 
functionalist picture, but it is, I would argue, one to which many ordinary 
people subscribed.
The collapse of industry in effect created a lost generation, most strongly 
represented in the industrial and agricultural working classes. The mem-
bers of this lost generation were unlikely to find ‘normal’ work again, or to 
continue on their ‘proper’ life course. The source of their power and their 
authority in relation to their children and successors was unsettled and in 
many cases undermined. This was a drastic change. One minute there was 
a right to work, and a workforce or agricultural/industrial working class 
which reproduced itself in a routine and fairly regular way. The next minute, 
the relations of production, and the process of production itself, were trans-
formed and even eliminated, and thus the basis for reproduction became 
distorted or disappeared. In effect, the state’s abandonment of a generation 
of workers also created a crisis in reproduction, not only in terms of work 
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and production, but also in terms of kinship and the unfolding of a proper 
life course.
I want to end with a reflection on where these new generations may be 
headed. If we refer back to Hareven’s comment that historical changes can 
alter life courses irrevocably, I think we can make a strong argument for 
saying that this was what happened Łódź, in Lublin and Świdnik, and in 
other industrial centers in Poland and beyond, as massive state industries 
collapsed. This is not by any means a situation unique to socialism, but 
the degree of radical rupture and change tends to be greater in the post-
socialist states. The important question now is what new relations between 
generations and within kin groups will emerge. One possibility, of course, 
is that the Parsonian model of increasingly individuated and individualist 
small family units, and the more post modern variations on this which stress 
isolation, collapse of intimacy, and breakdown of kinship and family ties, 
will prove accurate. There are suggestions of this in the Europe of the 21st 
century, and it is possible to argue that the massive migrations of young 
people from Poland reflect exactly this breakdown of family ties. However, 
the pictures evoked by my own work and that of others certainly suggest 
the continuing importance of kin ties, but kinship expressed in ties which 
are more elastic, extended over wider spaces than before and perhaps with 
different time frames. These are reflected in the process of arranging migra-
tion, funding fares, paying for education abroad and sending remittances 
home. While the practical links in the migrant chains seem to me to be, most 
often, forged between contemporaries and peers, and to involve friends as 
often as siblings or cousins, the financial exchanges continue to be played 
out between generations of (close) kin.
One of the most rapidly growing businesses in Lublin, in the mid 2000s, 
was language schools, particularly English language schools. When I spoke 
to school directors and to students, I discovered that, just as in the past, 
parents and, very importantly, grandparents, helped with the procurement 
of a flat, or furniture, or some sort of marriage settlement, now what was 
being settled on the young was likely to be a course in English (which 
is rather expensive) and later perhaps help with a fare to the UK. These 
might be given as first communion presents, well in anticipation of the 
event of leaving, or as presents on the successful completion of school, 
or a 16th or 18th birthday. Further, I found that although many of the 
young generation who traveled abroad were going half on holiday and 
half to work, few of them planned to send any their earnings home, to 
their parents and grandparents. Most, however, anticipated caring for them 
when they were elderly. I suspect that what will become apparent here, as 
we have access to more and more studies of migration, is that there are 
quite different streams of migrants. Some, like Berger’s Seventh Man, are 
going to find work in the face of unemployment, are likely to do the work 
abroad that they cannot get, any longer, at home, and are likely to live 
rather excluded and impoverished lives, socially and economically, in the 
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destination country. Others, I think, will be more likely to be young, going 
abroad either to work and study, or to work in order to fund some profes-
sional development at home. Or, of course, to stay abroad, and to create an 
entirely new life course. At the beginning of this chapter I talked about the 
way that different times and different orders of events all become inscribed 
on places and incorporated into the stories people tell, of their lives and 
their pasts. In Lublin at the moment the stories people tell, particularly 
the stories of the senior generation who have often lost so much, seem 
disjointed and fragmented. There are new empty and silenced places in the 
cityscape and the landscape, dilapidated broken down factories, ruined col-
lective farms, empty city blocks where old socialist statues have been torn 
down and replaced by nothing. There are new absences as well, caused by 
the migrants, young and old, moving east. But they are replaced as they 
go by Ukrainians, Romanians and others. In other words, some borders 
are becoming more porous and the ties which bind people in dependent 
kin relations more elastic. If we take a long view, it is possible to see that 
the history of this area is one of periodic acute change. Some aspects of 
the past are incorporated into personal and social histories while others 
are silenced, or even forgotten. As social scientists, we try to describe and 
analyze processes of immediate and long-term change, and to chart their 
process and consequences. It is in these situations of extreme rupture and 
change that we see the emergence of new economic orders, and new forma-
tions of kinship, generation and work relations.
Notes
1 The research on which this chapter is based was funded by the Volkswagen Foun-
dation with additional funding from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthro-
pology. I am grateful to both for their support. The Volkswagen Foundation 
project was held jointly with Deema Kaneff, and my understanding of these pro-
cesses owes a great deal to her. Kinga Sekerdej and Ania Witeska were my research 
assistants; they were also more than equal colleagues and the collaboration with 
them was invaluable. I have as ever benefited from the insights of Haldis Hau-
kanes, Susana Narotzky and Victoria Goddard; Victoria Goddard has also been a 
most patient editor.
2 “The economy of shortage” was a phrase coined by the Hungarian economist 
Janos Kornai (1980), in his book The Economics of Shortage, to describe the 
failure of centralized production and distribution systems in the Soviet Union and 
its satellite states. Katherine Verdery’s (1996) use of the concept brought it into 
anthropological thinking, used as a term alluding to flawed distribution, inad-
equate centrally led production, and over-employment, leading to empty shops 
and scarce consumer resources.
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This chapter addresses some of the central processes entailed in the repro-
duction of the industrial working class in contemporary Argentina. The 
study focuses on one of the major integrated steelworks of the country, 
which is the main source of employment in the urban setting in which it is 
inserted.2 The company was founded as a state enterprise and continued to 
be under state stewardship until its privatization at the early 1990s.3 The 
plant’s transfer into the hands of private capital entailed a drastic reduc-
tion in the number of workers who were permanently employed and hired 
directly by the company. The restructuring associated with privatization had 
very negative implications for the future possibilities that young working 
class people would have with regard to continuing their family’s tradition of 
working in the industry, sometimes over several generations. At the point of 
the plant’s foundation workers came from different regions of the country 
looking for work and harboring the hope of settling down in San Nico-
lás, the town adjacent to the steel plant. This first generation of workers 
was drawn from migrants who addressed the company’s need for the large 
numbers of workers needed to build the plant and, subsequently, set it in 
operation. Coming from a range of work environments, but largely from 
the agricultural sector, these workers had no significant educational quali-
fications. Their children benefited from what would come to be seen as an 
established practice of intergenerational job transfer, which was widespread 
among state employees, and guaranteed entry into the plant.
This situation changed radically with privatization: minimum educational 
requirements were raised as the company restructured4 the organization of 
management and production. As part of the flexibilization process promoted 
by neoliberal capitalism, the privatized company, Siderar, came to employ a 
wide range of workers under different contractual relations. Since the 1990s 
the number of permanent jobs has decreased, and many work activities that 
had depended directly on SOMISA were outsourced. Today, workers fulfill 
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these outsourced tasks through precarious and unstable employment con-
tracts. Different work and wage conditions has fragmented the workforce 
as permanent plant staff (“los propios”) enjoy different contracts from 
workers who, although they carry out their work on company premises, are 
hired through a network of outsourcing companies and employment agen-
cies (“los de las compañías”).
The chapter explores these changes through the prism of generational 
change and considers some of the main mechanisms through which younger 
workers who descend from a line of steelworkers devise novel strategies of 
reproduction. We focus on two stages in the trajectories of the new work-
ers: their entry into the plant and their advancement and promotion in 
the workplace. Two factors are central to a successful completion of these 
stages. On the one hand, formal education and training related to jobs in the 
steel industry and, on the other hand, access to a range of personal contacts, 
and “recommendations”.
Currently, a secondary level diploma in vocational training is required in 
order to obtain a permanent job at Siderar. Young people and their families 
therefore make enormous efforts to ensure that they obtain such qualifica-
tions. With increased demand for vocational training, educational opportu-
nities in the town have expanded, coordinated by white and blue-collar trade 
union organizations. While in the past having a father in the steel industry 
could in itself put in motion the customary mechanism of generational job 
transfer, today, family ties alone offer no such guarantees although they 
continue to be an informal yet crucial resource.
The continuing importance of kinship and other personal relations in 
accessing work exposes the inequalities that affect would-be workers. The 
company’s hiring policy is expressed exclusively in terms of meritocratic 
criteria, evaluated in relation to training, work discipline and commitment 
to the job. And yet, everyone in San Nicolás knows that recommendations 
facilitate, and in many cases determine, young people’s chances of accessing 
this privileged strategy of working class reproduction. We therefore propose 
to consider the “recommendation” as a social mechanism of class reproduc-
tion that also functions as a location of power, consolidating the status of 
the trade unions, which play an important role in the operation of these 
networks5.
The ethnography of steelworkers and trade unionists in San Nicolás illus-
trates how contacts are built and how they might be deployed. As research-
ers we, too, became entangled in the exchange of favors between candidates’ 
families and trade union leaders, which we explore through a thick descrip-
tion (Geertz 1995) of an event that took place on the “Day of the Met-
alworker”. The event reveals how families invest time and resources in 
support of the younger generation’s attempts to find work through networks 
of recommendations sustained by the trade unions. This ethnographic event 
illustrates the transformations that have affected the reproduction of an 
important segment of the Argentine working class since the establishment 
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of the neoliberal model in the 1990s. In considering the reproduction of the 
industrial working class in the context of flexible capitalism, we draw on 
critical theories that explore the link between education and social repro-
duction and theories of patronage and recommendation systems. While 
the scholarly literature has considered these two factors (educational back-
ground and patronage) separately, describing in ample detail how education 
contributes to, or limits, the reproduction of the working class,6 or how 
recommendation networks make entry into specific labor niches possible,7 
we propose that in the case of the steelworkers of San Nicolás these two 
dynamics operate jointly, reinforcing one another in specific contexts.
“Metalworkers’ Day”: Networks of Recommendation  
at Work
On September 7th in 2011 Argentina commemorated Metalworkers’ Day.8 
Tigre is a member of the metalworkers’ trade union’s executive committee, 
who invited us to participate in the ceremonies and festivities that were 
organized for the day. We joined union leaders and representatives in laying 
flowers at the “Monument to the Metalworker Family” and at the “Monu-
ment to the memory of those who died at the workplace”, located in the 
grounds of one of the union’s educational facilities. We then went to the 
union’s recreational grounds, where we attended the opening ceremony of 
the soccer championship that is organized every year. Everyone’s attention 
was focused on the soccer field. A woman, with a child in her arms and a 
teenager by her side, occupied center stage, accompanied by the secretary 
general and another union official. Tigre explained that the woman was 
the wife of a fellow worker who had died of cancer. The union’s highest 
authority publically promised that the union would continue to help their 
colleague’s family and invited the youngster to kick off the football tourna-
ment. Following the football match, we were taken on a long tour of the 
facilities and then to “the lab chemists” party because “that’s an area where 
there are more female workers” where we might feel more at ease.
When we arrived at the quinta (a weekend retreat owned by a group of 
SOMISA workmates) where the asado9 was being prepared, Tigre intro-
duced us to “Tincho”, our host for the day. Tigre mentioned that we were 
interested in compiling “family histories and interviewing different genera-
tions of steelworkers”, adding: “Treat them well, these gals.” Obligingly, 
our new host responded with: “Sure, sure. Don’t you worry”, and turning 
to us he said: “With this buddy’s help, we’ll go for another new generation”. 
He turned to Tigre and asked: “Are you going to come today to meet the 
‘boy?” At that point he told us that his son had just graduated from the 
technical school, and that the family hoped he could get a job at the factory.
As the afternoon progressed we found out that the “boy’s” grandfather 
was one of the founders of the quinta. Originally from the north of the 
country, he arrived in San Nicolás in1964 having only completed elementary 
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school. He “signed up” for work, and the next day he was called to start 
work at SOMISA. Sitting under the midday sun, he sadly confided that his 
only son had obtained a job at the factory, but had then migrated to another 
city. This filled him with anguish, since he was sure that his son would never 
again find such good employment. Tincho sat down next to his father-in-law, 
and joined in the conversation. He told us how he had started working 
two years after receiving his certificate in chemical technology in 1984. As 
occurred with many of the workers who joined the plant in the 1980s when 
the plant was state-owned, he got a job when his father retired, according to 
the custom of inherited jobs.
There were very few women guests; one of them was Florencia, a young 
woman of 22 years of age, who had been working at the factory for four 
years: “Three years on a contract, and one year as a permanent employee”. 
While studying for her secondary degree at the trade union’s technical 
school, she had an internship at Siderar. Once she had obtained her certifi-
cate in electromechanical technology, she worked for several years, covering 
for workers on holiday leave through Sesa Select, the employment agency 
that supposedly serves as a gateway for a permanent job at Siderar. She 
explained: “I got a job because my father is a supervisor, and he has been 
working at the steel factory for 27 years. He knows a lot of people, and 
spoke to someone from the trade union, for them to take me into account 
[as a candidate]. I went through the entry exams and tests, they went well, 
and they called me in for work”.
She already possessed suitable technical credentials and the company sent 
her on advanced courses at the trade union’s training center. But Florencia 
pointed out: “You learn your work on the job, with the help of the supervi-
sor, who helps you day after day explaining how to do the job as the boss 
expects [it to be done]”. She added: “As you gain more experience and you 
are on top of your job, you show an interest in learning. You do your work 
faster, and in your spare time you learn the other job that you are aiming 
for”. Florencia considered herself really lucky with her job, which was the 
envy of her friends. “They say ‘you got lucky, you got in!’ And one feels, oh, 
yes, I got lucky! Because if you look at it from outside, you feel really impor-
tant because you are inside. You work at the factory as one of the “propios” 
with benefits, good wages and a stable job”.
We counted more than 40 people at the party, preparing the asado, play-
ing football, singing in accompaniment to a guitar and a “bandoneón”—an 
Argentine accordion—while small groups were engaged in lively conversa-
tions. Over lunch a man referred to as Gardelito10 was declared the guest of 
honor because he had just retired. Gardelito thanked them and announced 
solemnly: “Even though I am retiring, I will still belong to the union . . . no, 
no, I meant, I will remain a metalworker . . .”. We all laughed at this slip 
that revealed the intimate connection he felt between being a steelworker 
and a union member. After lunch, Tincho’s son (“the boy”) arrived and 
greeted us awkwardly. While he seemed nervous and embarrassed, his father 
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and grandfather were proudly extolling his virtues and made clear the fam-
ily’s expectations that he might get a job at the plant. We continued our 
conversation and, when we noticed that the women guests were leaving, we, 
too, took our leave.
Credentialism and the Managerial Revolution
The connection between education and the labor market has been widely 
studied, with some authors pointing to improved employment opportuni-
ties correlated with higher levels of educational achievement (Beccaria and 
Groisman n.d.). For our purposes, it is more significant that this connection 
between educational achievement and good employment opportunities is 
part of a widely shared, common sense view found among contemporary 
workers in Argentina. In San Nicolás, where the steel industry has been 
the principal economic institution and employer since the 1960s, the trade 
union and the steel plant invest in education, supporting institutions that 
enroll hundreds of young people who, like Florencia and Tincho’s son, pur-
sue their dream of finding a job in the industry.11 Confirming the validity 
of their strategy, management only hires those in possession of a suitable 
diploma, emphasizing meritocratic values based on academic excellence, 
credentials and the work ethic.
Retired workers we encountered during fieldwork told us that things 
were different when the plant was founded. At that time, large numbers of 
migrants came to work in the steel town; by the end of the 1980s there were 
around 10,000 workers employed in production and maintenance (González 
1986). Our interviewees explained how, in the early days of the plant, they 
had obtained jobs immediately, despite their poor education. Like Tincho, 
their children joined the plant when their fathers retired. The system of gen-
erational transmission meant that those working in the state-run company 
could enjoy stable and secure work, as well as continuity from one genera-
tion of male worker to the next, although sons might take on very different 
tasks to those of their fathers (Colabella, 2012). Tincho benefited from hav-
ing obtained a technical diploma by joining the quality control department, 
while his father had worked in the coke oven of the blast furnace. In the 
1980s those with no secondary school credentials were still able to get a job 
in the plant, although the more prestigious tasks might have eluded them. 
Today, the secondary school diploma is a basic requirement for entry into 
the firm. As Florencia’s story demonstrates, young people of her generation 
are keen to work in the company. Of the more than 200 young students in 
technical and vocational training we contacted, the majority agreed that 
one of their main aspirations was to join the factory and work at its core 
as permanent employees. However, the demand for labor has declined since 
the 1980s, and hiring practices have changed substantially.
In the early 1990s, during the Peronist government of Carlos Menem 
(1989–99), the company fired approximately 7,000 workers. From 1992, 
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the company was privatized and the new owners continued to implement 
policies aimed at reducing the number of employees. A new legal frame-
work enabled the company to increase the flexibilization of the workforce. 
The permanent staff was reduced and new workers were hired through out-
sourcing companies on contracts that were far less favorable, precarious 
and insecure. It is unsurprising that today’s workers consistently point to the 
company’s privatization as the key event that altered the lives and the work 
of the steelworkers of San Nicolás.
To help us understand the system that emerged after privatization, several 
interviewees drew what looked like a solar system. The core of the sys-
tem was the steelworks with its “own” employees; the surrounding planets 
were the outsourcing companies, with their “on-contract” workers. A hier-
archical arrangement of these companies was expressed in terms of their 
distance from the center of the system. Those that supplied workers were 
closer to the core, and those that provided services were farther away. At 
the same time, each of these, called “satellite companies” by the workers, 
had a subsystem of their “own” workers and outside workers who were 
“contracted.” In contrast with past practice, no worker is hired directly as 
a member of permanent staff. As Florencia had explained, workers must be 
promoted from the outsourcing companies into the heart of the plant—and 
the closer they are to the center, the greater their chances of being “chosen” 
to enter the core.
When managers were asked about this system, they emphasized creden-
tialist and meritocratic values as the basis for entry to work and mobility 
across the system. According to these values, young workers are judged 
on the merits of their educational background and their adherence to the 
work ethic. The system works as a field of surveillance as well as train-
ing, and managers confirm that the circulation of workers enables them to 
record “the history of the work attitudes of candidates, as they make their 
way [through the outsourcing companies].” Young workers tend to reflect 
these values in their own attitudes. They recognize that “finishing second-
ary school” is a basic prerequisite that must be complemented by attitudes 
that “show motivation,” that they are “ready to learn”, “committed to his/
her work”. These qualities must be demonstrated in the entry exams and 
subsequently in the conduct of their daily work.
While tests and credentials are important, there are also numerous infor-
mal filters that enable supervisors, foremen and eventually trade union rep-
resentatives to evaluate each aspiring worker and determine whether or not 
they will be recommended for advancement. Florencia succeeded in passing 
the trials and tests, after which she was hired by an outsourcing company 
that was close to the core, supplying the factory with temporary workers. 
Here she demonstrated her capacity to respect and fulfill orders, to learn 
new tasks and to show a proactive attitude. After three years of working 
as a “contract” worker she succeeded in moving to the core, having proved 
her worth and benefiting from the help provided by her father, who as an 
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ex-supervisor was able to set in motion his networks. She was recommended 
by one of her supervisors for promotion and became a permanent member 
of staff in the plant.
Like others who aspire to join the steel plant’s permanent workforce, 
Florencia would not have been able to succeed without her family’s sup-
port. Particularly during the uncertain years of her trial period, when she 
was unemployed in the intervals between one temporary contract and the 
next, it was her family that supported her and enabled her to persevere. 
But the efforts of individuals and families do not always pay off. Interview-
ees agreed that only a handful of those employed by the outsourced firms 
become part of the permanent staff of the plant. The senior manager of the 
company confirmed that only 20 out of the 400 candidates they hire on tem-
porary contracts become one of the company’s ”own” employees.
The striving continues after becoming one of the plant’s “own” employ-
ees. As soon as she was hired, Florencia set about advancing her career. Fol-
lowing a well-established strategy, once she had mastered the tasks related 
to her job, she endeavored to learn new skills. She watched, asked questions, 
and attended training sessions, hoping to be promoted to a more highly-
qualified job, a better paid position or moved to more desirable areas of 
work. Many permanent workers attended courses with a view to moving 
from shift work to fixed working hours, or from repetitive tasks to jobs that 
entail more creative or less routinized work, regardless of levels of pay.
Unlike the older generations of workers, young people start work with 
certain technical skills acquired through training in workshops or through 
internships with the company itself. They enjoy a degree of familiarity with 
the space, with the timing and the tasks. But young and old agree that the 
most important learning takes place on the job: the young worker observes, 
asks questions and is gradually involved in tasks under the guidance of a 
more experienced worker, such as a supervisor or a boss. The intergenera-
tional transmission through training and learning at the workplace is still 
the norm; what has changed since privatization is the location of this learn-
ing experience. The steel plant defines the employment policies and the edu-
cational and behavioral profile that it requires; the satellite companies bear 
the costs of training the workforce, whilst families take on the economic 
burden of the instability generated by the system.
The conditions that sustained the critical attitudes towards schooling 
that Paul Willis encountered among young working class boys in the 1970s 
(1988 [1977]) have altered dramatically, in Argentina and in the United 
Kingdom. The radical changes prompted by the expansion of flexible capi-
talism (Harvey 1990) articulated through the neoliberal model and imple-
mented by government policy, has left an enduring legacy. Twenty-five 
years on from the publication of Willis’ seminal ethnography, (Dolby et al. 
2004) show how in the United Kingdom and the US there is little scope for 
young people to articulate a cultural critique such as that recorded by Willis. 
Instead, the young try to conform to demands for educational achievement 
Credentialism and Recommendations 53
and are forced to rely on their ties with family, kin and neighborhood, and 
embrace ethnic and national identities, which support them through times 
of uncertainty
Since privatization and the impact of broader neoliberal reforms, San 
Nicolás is, like the examples discussed in Dolby and Dimitriadis, a space 
where there is little scope for conflict or resistance among the young. As 
we have shown, the young in this steel town are committed to a project 
that involves working in the industry and they appear to share many of the 
values of management, for example, relating to credentials, discipline and 
the work ethic. This convergence reflects their desire to become part of that 
privileged segment of the working class. However, discipline and conformity 
do not suffice; other resources, perhaps even “luck” in Florencia’s account, 
are needed. The majority will be frustrated in their quest. The question is 
how the “model” of credentialism, discipline and devotion to work can per-
sist in the face of its failure to deliver for the majority of those embarking 
on this particular journey, where a spotless curriculum, excellent grades and 
good attitude do not translate into a permanent, secure and well-paid job.
Whereas “territory” or place may provide a basis for alternative forms 
of sociality, as ties based on territory gain an increasingly important role in 
integrating young people into the social world, in San Nicolás, relations of 
place highlight the need to conform. Here “contacts” play a decisive role 
in the efforts of the young to move across the system of core and periphery 
companies. On the one hand, the importance of these networks exposes the 
limits of the meritocratic discourse and uncovers the importance of family 
and of histories of lineages of steelworkers. While revealing the shortcom-
ings of the model of individual achievement and credentialist competition, 
the entanglement of the young in networks of requests and favor, gifts and 
debt, also ties them to a model of privilege through the desire to be “cho-
sen” and to the need for social conformity.
Favors and Recommendations: The Search  
for a Secure Future
Our participation in the celebrations of Metalworkers’ Day led us into an 
entanglement as well as a witnessing of the unfolding webs of reciprocities, 
through gifting of favors and the ensuing debts these reciprocities produce. 
As guests at the event where “the kid”, his family and Tigre stated and 
restated the case for support of the young man’s future, we became impli-
cated in the performance. When the grandfather made the quinta available 
for the asado and Tincho added the trade union leader and his “protégées” 
(us), (whom the host agreed to entertain in exchange for a “recommenda-
tion” for his son) to his guest list, they were engaged in weaving a chain of 
favors and of reciprocal support with which we were implicated.
But what this performance of hospitality and favors illustrates is not the 
success, but the limitations of the recommendation system. Up until the 
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celebrations of Metalworkers’ Day, we had been presented with a coherent 
account of how a trade union might intercede with management on behalf 
of a candidate. The trade union representatives described how workers 
hand them their children’s CVs, and might even approach them if they are 
not hired. At the same time, young students from the trade union’s training 
centers told us how they wander around the center, hoping to come across 
the secretary general and ask for a recommendation that would weigh heav-
ily in the eyes of their instructors. The asado revealed the incompleteness of 
the official version of the recommendation system and showed the wealth 
of resources that are needed to secure a recommendation; integral to the 
success of this quest is the relative power and the status of those engaged in 
making and receiving the request. Although the “boy” at the center of the 
asado had already complied with the indispensable prerequisite of obtaining 
a technical degree, his family had deployed a unique resource in his favor: 
40 years in the factory, which provided the opportunity to develop personal 
ties with managers and trade unionists. Now those ties were put to work 
to improve the youngster’s chances of success on the long road towards the 
heart of the company.
Our “contact”, Tigre, is a trade union representative of the local branch of 
the metalworkers’ union. Following a well-established tradition in Argen-
tina, the union fulfills multiple functions, which go well beyond workplace 
issues (Perelman 2006; Marshall and Perelman 2008). The union provides 
a number of services to its affiliates, to the extent that Tigre often para-
phrased the lyrics of a soccer song for our benefit: “with this good-hearted 
trade union, we accompany you from the cradle to the grave”. The facilities 
managed by the trade union reflect the union’s involvement with all stages 
of the life cycle: the hospital, schools (kindergarten, primary and secondary 
school, tertiary education, trade school, library and language center), hous-
ing, monuments to honor metalworkers and their families, the recreational 
complex and tourist centers, the amphitheater with its heliport and the 
funeral services. In addition, the trade union is seen as a central agent in the 
company’s recruitment mechanisms, although this role is in actual fact not 
set down in any formal agreement. The exchange that took place between 
Tincho and Tigre at the asado can be understood to work through princi-
ples of asymmetrical and hierarchical reciprocity, sustained by workers’ sup-
port for their trade union representatives. It is for this reason that Gardelito 
revealed, through a slip of the tongue, the importance of “establishing ties 
with the trade union” in order to “be a good metalworker”. Alongside the 
trade union staff, supervisors, foremen and managers may be approached 
for help. Here too, the outcome of this informal mechanism depends on the 
relationship that obtains between the two parties rather than on the relative 
merits of the candidate.
Despite the obstacles, hundreds of young people continue to enroll on 
courses and attend educational institutions, striving to learn and to excel. 
Personal recommendations are considered to be unfair by those who firmly 
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believe in the superiority of meritocracy. Because access to strategic connec-
tions is unevenly distributed, such “deals” normally provoke suspiciousness 
about the true merits of the recommended worker, while it also provides 
him or her with a halo of protection conferred by the power of the person 
who made the recommendation.
Conclusions
For the hundreds of candidates who submit their curriculum to Siderar every 
year, getting a job at Argentina’s most important steel-producing company 
represents their highest possible career expectations. Their hopes are based 
on a history that links the town’s growth and the progress of the working 
class in San Nicolás to the foundation of the ex SOMISA plant, now called 
Siderar (Soul 2002). They also draw on the fact that the company provides 
high quality, stable employment with relatively higher salaries for those who 
manage to overcome all the obstacles and gain a permanent job. Aspiring 
SOMISA workers who manage to join the company—as interns or tempo-
rary workers in the satellite companies—make a real effort to comply with 
the expectations of discipline and hard work.
In San Nicolás, recommendations affect a potential worker’s work atti-
tudes and conduct. The recommendation strategy strengthens the control 
mechanisms that work through the entire network of relations in which the 
candidates become entangled. A breach of confidence in any one of the links 
in the network could disrupt the long and winding road that is, in the end, 
reserved for only a few chosen ones, or the lucky ones. In this sense, “learn-
ing to labor” in San Nicolás consists in part in understanding the complex 
networks of favors and support between union leaders and metallurgical 
families.
The networks of relations that support the dynamics of give and take, 
of requesting and granting favors and recommendations involves families, 
workers, the trade unions and the company. Eric Wolf proposes that in com-
plex societies the institutional systems of political and economic powers 
coexist and are combined with different types of non-institutional or inter-
stitial structures such as family relations, friendship and patronage (Wolf 
1999: 20). He highlights the polyvalent role of the family and its influence 
on the social prestige of a person and on the types of social resources that 
are available to him/her outside the family setting (Wolf 1999: 27). Family 
and friendship relations can be vehicles for exchanges but may give rise to 
asymmetries.12 In the case discussed in this chapter, the most notable attrib-
ute of the relationship between “those who ask” and “those who give” is 
that—as James Scott (1986) puts it—it constitutes a dynamic of reciproc-
ity between people of unequal status. Here, “those who ask” are families 
belonging to a long metallurgical “lineage”, who attempt to reestablish 
the customary mechanism for reproducing the metallurgical working class 
through the intergenerational transmission of jobs. By deploying personal 
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networks built over years of working in the factory, steelworkers hope to 
secure the future of their children through their incorporation into the pro-
tected, well-paid and prestigious core of the Siderar workforce. “Those who 
give” the necessary recommendations also seek their own reproduction as 
the workers’ representatives, through a position that enables them to facili-
tate the reproduction of certain metallurgical families.
Personal recommendations, therefore, make manifest the tension that 
exists between the managerial discourse based on meritocratic ideals (fun-
damentally based on academic performance and a demonstrated commit-
ment to work) and how this ideal is disregarded by the very same people 
who formulate it. By agreeing to the practice of favors and personal sup-
port, company and trade union leaders actually contribute to the increas-
ingly restricted reproduction of the stable segment of the metallurgical 
working class in San Nicolás and, in so doing, also reproduce systems of 
privilege and inequality. As Ernest Geller perspicaciously points out: “we 
dislike patronage because it offends our principles of equality and univer-
sality” (Gellner 1985:9). This is the sentiment that accompanies those who, 
while they recognize the importance of recommendations, do not possess 
the necessary social resources to mobilize them. The case discussed here 
exposes our naturalized respect for merit and justice: when the recommen-
dation does not depend solely on performance (academic or workwise), it is 
illegitimate, although not inefficient.
Notes
 1 This chapter reports some of the results of a comparative international research 
project concerning economic models and their implications for the steel indus-
try, carried out as part of an EU FP7 Collaborative project “Models and their 
Effects on Development paths: An Ethnographic and Comparative Approach 
to Knowledge Transmission and Livelihood Strategies (MEDEA)” (2009–2012) 
under grant agreement No. 225670, coordinated by Victoria Goddard (Gold-
smiths) and Susana Narotzky (University of Barcelona). In Argentina, the project 
research team is based at the Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social (IDES), 
in the City of Buenos Aires, with Dr. Rosana Guber as its coordinator.
 2 The fieldwork was conducted between April 2010 and April 2012 in San Nicolás 
de los Arroyos, a city situated 240 km north of the city of Buenos Aires in the 
main pole of steel production in Argentina, located on the border between 
the provinces of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe. Not far from the city is the 
most important factory of Ternium-Siderar, a company that belongs to the 
Techint Group, which is at present the main steel producer in Argentina. On our 
multiple visits we interviewed more than 100 people who are—in one way or 
another—connected to the metallurgical activity of the factory: workers from 
different generations, supervisors, recruiting staff from subcontracting compa-
nies, factory foremen, trade union representatives, educators and students.
 3 The national metallurgical industry in Argentina received a strong boost during 
the decade of the 1940s within the framework of the growth model based on 
Import Substitution Industrialization. In 1947 the Argentine Congress passed a 
law called National Metallurgical Plan, and founded SOMISA (Sociedad Mixta 
Siderúrgica Argentina), an integrated plant for the production of blast-furnace 
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iron, steel, semi-finished products and hot-rolled sheet metal. Although the pro-
ject was delayed until the early 1960s, SOMISA eventually became the most 
important steel factory in the hands of the Argentine State. Within the framework 
of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s in Argentina, SOMISA was privatized.
 4 At its plant in General Savio, Siderar currently employs approximately 3500 
workers through direct hiring, who mostly work on the production line. They 
identify themselves, and are recognized by the rest of the steelworkers, as “los 
propios” (the [company’s] own [personnel]). The outsourcing companies that 
offer their services to the plant employ a similar number of workers either on 
permanent or on temporary contracts; they are generally referred to as “los de 
las compañías” (the [personnel] of the [outsourcing] companies).
 5 The ASIMRA trade union (Asociación de Supervisores de la Industria 
Metalmecánica de la República Argentina) represents supervisors and man-
agement. These workers are not included in the discussion outlined in this 
chapter.
 6 The critical theories of “reproductionist” approaches to education have focused 
on the relationship between education (or culture) and work, in particular with 
respect to the role it plays in the reproduction of class (Bourdieu and Passeron 
1977; Bowles and Gintis 1986; Baudelot and Establet 1987; Bernstein 1989). 
Basically, these authors have tried to show the correspondence between levels 
of education and labor insertion, or the relationship between social class and 
type of linguistic codes, matching the working class sectors with a command of 
“restricted” codes, and the middle or higher sectors with the use of “elaborate” 
codes. In this sense, education acquires an ambiguous potential in that it can 
help legitimize the knowledge of the subaltern sectors, promote class mobility 
or foment a revolutionary social transformation through pedagogy of liberation 
(Freire, 1970). Finally, we must mention the struggle between the hegemonic 
“cultural arbitrary” and the knowledge of students that are not part of this, 
given their class extraction, and whose refusal to reproduce these codes has been 
interpreted either as resistance or as a form of reproduction and domination, 
inasmuch as they result in the reproduction of their social class (Apple 1986; 
McLaren 1994; Giroux 1996; McRobbie 2009). Within the context of this dis-
cussion we will take up Paul Willis’ work, which will be of special importance in 
this chapter.
 7 Social theories concerning the exchange of favors between individuals connected 
through different kinds of relationship (relatives, neighbors, friends, patronage, 
boss/subordinate or subalternity) have a long tradition in anthropology. What 
constituted the center of their inquiry was the type of exchange, reciprocal obli-
gations and power relations and status differences between “patrons” and their 
“followers” [clients] (Wolf 1999; Gellner 1985), and their fundamental goal was 
to understand the political practices of “clientelism” and “cronyism”. A differ-
ent take on the issue that considers the concept of networks has been essential for 
comprehending phenomena related to migration, in particular for understanding 
processes associated with “giving and getting a job” (Vargas 2005), facilitating 
entry into a specific labor sector (Bourgois 1989; Wallman 1979) or guarantee-
ing a particular type of conduct on the part of the workers (Pardo 1996). Finally, 
we must mention inquiries into the role that social relations play in obtaining 
resources, studies that were inspired in ideas by Pierre Bourdieu (2000), who 
investigated those relations and their potential within the economic field, as still 
another form of capital (symbolic capital).
 8 Even though no mention is made of the fact, the celebration marks the birth of 
Fray Luis Beltrán in 1784, a Franciscan friar, who was recognized for his out-
standing work as Chief of the Artillery of the Army of the Andes under the lead-
ership of José San Martín, hero of the Latin American struggle for independence.
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 9 The word asado has a double meaning in Argentina. On the one hand, it refers to 
the kind of food that is consumed, which consists basically of meat (beef or mut-
ton) and is prepared on an open fire or with charcoal. At the same time, it might 
come with different innards or viscera of the same animals, as well as other 
types of meat (such as chicken or pork), which are also placed on the grill where 
things are cooked. It is a typical Argentine custom, and it requires expertise and 
patience to execute properly. In general there is a person in charge of the process, 
who takes on the role of the asador. At the same time, “going to an asado” (as 
in our specific case) refers to the social situation that this traditional Argentine 
setting for a meal implies: people who participate in the asado contribute with 
drinks, bread, salads. It is also usual for those who play the guitar to take along 
their instruments or for background music to be played. If it is a gathering peo-
ple might eventually dance, play card games or even a soccer game, depending 
on the available space and the length of the event. Given that on average prepar-
ing an asado takes somewhere between 2 and 4 hours, the setting turns into a 
social situation that foments passing time together, conversation and exchanges 
such as the ones we will present in this paper.
 10 “Gardelito” is a diminutive form of “Gardel”, the name of the famous tango 
singer Carlos Gardel, a nickname given to this particular worker because of his 
lively manner and his habit of singing tangos and Argentine folk songs.
 11 One thing that indicates that the company is interested in the training received 
by young people is the project dedicated to strengthening certain technical 
schools in the area, which is part of the company’s outreach program to the 
community. In the framework of this program, the factory provides equipment, 
improvements in building facilities, teacher training and internships, while offer-
ing scholarships to the best students. As far as the trade union of metallurgical 
workers is concerned, they support technical schools at the secondary and ter-
tiary level, as well as a vocational school, which offers programs and specializa-
tions related to the steel/metallurgical industry.
 12 Wolf argues that if imbalances emerge, the relationship turns into patronage: 
while the patron provides economic and legal means or uses his/her influence in 
favor of the client, the client gives respect, loyalty and political backing in return 
(Wolf 1999: 34–36).
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Introduction
This chapter analyzes the history of the relationship between the city of 
Volta Redonda and the Brazilian National Steel Company (CSN) and also 
draws a comparison between Volta Redonda and the city of Brasilia. Both 
cities have been sites for experimentation and implementation of state poli-
cies, projects of national development and the manifestation of national 
ideologies based in notions of work, family and society. Additionally, this 
chapter considers the consistencies and inconsistencies observed across three 
generations of CSN workers regarding significant events and changes in the 
dominant patterns of recruitment, training and administration within CSN. 
The presented reflections emerge from the systematization of ethnographic 
fieldwork data, as well as the bibliographic sources available.
Volta Redonda and CSN
The city of Volta Redonda is located in the state of Rio de Janeiro, 130 km 
from the former capital of the country, the city of Rio de Janeiro, and close 
to the border of the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. The city acquired 
legal status as an independent district in 1956. Before that date, it was a 
district of the neighboring city of Barra Mansa. This means that until 1956, 
basic services were provided by the district’s predominant industry: CSN. 
Nowadays, the city of Volta Redonda, known as the “City of Steel” (cidade 
do aço), has an estimated population of 250,000 inhabitants, and the origi-
nal village2 of Volta Redonda has developed as unique urban space with 
strong links to the steel industry.
In Volta Redonda, the implementation of the company town model (Piquet 
1998; Dinius 2011; Dinius & Vergara 2011) supported the expansion of 
CSN and the reproduction of its labor force.3 The core of Volta Redonda 
as a company town was constituted by neighborhoods that were associ-
ated with specific categories of employees (workers, technicians and engi-
neers). Hierarchy and social difference among the workers of the company 
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were also geographically displaced and evidenced through the size of the 
home construction (Piquet 1998). As pointed out by Lask (1991), the home 
address could reveal the professional position and salary received at CSN. 
Nevertheless, CSN could never afford to fulfill all of the housing demands. 
As Piquet (1998) noted, company towns cannot be understood when disso-
ciated from their social and historical background and from the general con-
ditions of production. This particular model of social organization reveals 
the subordination of the workers and citizens to the company as long as the 
company owned and controlled the means of production and the housing 
facilities—regulating, therefore, the employees’ lives inside and outside the 
steel company by providing them with both work and a place to live.
The original city planning of Volta Redonda located CSN’s work and 
production facilities at one end of a main street (Rua 33) and at the other 
end was the technical school Escola Técnica Pandiá Calógeras (ETPC). 
To the eastern and western sides of the city, various types of housing and 
neighborhoods were located and served as the homes of the workforce. We 
could conclude that this particular map configuration represents a path that 
many could take from the technical school, where the students developed 
their abilities, to simply cross the street and directly enter CSN for full-time 
employment. Over time, new and fragmented neighborhoods appeared, 
some planned while others were the result of spontaneous occupation 
caused by new waves of migrants which arrived to the city through familial 
and friendship ties.
CSN was established on the 9th April of 1941, and although the company 
started operating in 1946, that initial date has become the national steel 
commemoration date. Different from the other steel companies developed 
in the “Steel Valley” (Minas Gerais State), CSN was the only company that 
was conceived and owned by the state until its privatization 1993. Both 
CSN and the city of Volta Redonda are part of a project whose gestation 
predates 1941 and which envisaged the town and the production plant as 
an important pole of development, strategically significant to Brazil’s eco-
nomic development. In fact, the city and the company can be understood as 
a testament to the country’s industrialization project, initiated in the early 
twentieth century and which required a national industry for the domestic 
production of steel (Dinius 2011). This ambitious enterprise also represents 
a concrete expression of President Getúlio Vargas’s ‘ “new social pact”, a 
labor reform package known as CLT (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho) 
and regarded as a necessary step toward creating a technical class capable of 
supporting a massive industrialization process (Dinius 2011; Morel 1989; 
Lask 1991).
Volta Redonda in-between Contexts
There is a great deal of good material written about the city of Volta 
Redonda, the plant, the workers and the relationship between them.4 What 
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this chapter contributes to the literature on Volta Redonda and its rela-
tionship to the steel industry is the set of insights generated by a team of 
brasilienses—that is to say, inhabitants of the city of Brasilia, the capital city 
of Brazil. As someone who is interested in “the anthropology of anthropol-
ogy” (Díaz Crovetto 2008; 2011), I find this intriguing, as it implies the 
possibility at least of generating new and different ethnographical insights. 
Among these are the possibilities offered by a perspective that allows for 
comparisons between Brasilia and Volta Redonda. Volta Redonda and Bra-
silia were projects that entailed total city planning (Scott 1998), whereby 
the state embraced an exceptionally large-scale and totalizing urban archi-
tectural planning project. By doing so in Volta Redonda and in Brasilia, the 
state was capable of shaping the sense and the representations of such new 
spaces, although with time newer uses and representations have emerged as 
the cities’ social dynamics have continued to unfold.
In the case of the city of Volta Redonda, we consistently encountered the 
perception of the city as something relatively old that was seen as new. This 
is a “new old” that is not easily visible or recognizable, yet speaks of a city 
that is still thought of and remembered as new, despite the passing of the 
different generations. The various facets of Volta Redonda, where the suc-
cession of generations marks the passing of time, have produced the subjec-
tivities that lie beneath these conceptions of “new” and “old”. This research 
is not just about the emergence of the city of Volta Redonda, or even about 
the transformation of the village into a city. It investigates the lives and life 
trajectories that were built concomitantly with the implementation of the 
state’s industrial project. In other words, CSN and Volta Redonda together 
represented new opportunities, new flows and new possibilities for continu-
ity in terms of work, family and livelihoods.
Both in Brasilia and Volta Redonda, the workplace and the living-place 
emerged in relation to one another. Alongside these places also arose spaces 
for sociability and spaces which straddled the public and the private sphere, 
such as hospitals and schools. In the case of Volta Redonda, as previously 
mentioned, until 1956 there was no provision from the city administra-
tion; social care and services were distributed solely by CSN. Therefore, the 
workplace was a state-place, as well as the living space and the place where 
employees enjoyed their social life. In other words, the state was an integral 
aspect of their everyday lives—at work, in the public sphere and shaping the 
private sphere as well.
Brasilia was in a similar situation shortly after its inauguration (1960), 
although the social segmentation of state employees was mainly evidenced 
in public service. Both cities were poles of attraction for the waves of immi-
grants from different regions seeking work that settled and thus established 
diverse urban populations. Some of the incoming workers found employ-
ment in CSN, in the case of Volta Redonda, or in the public sector in Brasi-
lia, but not all were successful in achieving these desirable jobs. Interestingly, 
both cities were built by outsiders,5 and both came to be characterized by 
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their heterogeneous populations, with a majority of migrants coming from 
Rio Janeiro but many others who migrated from other parts of Brazil. The 
growth of these cities and the distinctive social and cultural contributions 
made by the different waves of internal migrants gave rise to new per-
spectives and strategies, where informal working arrangements played an 
important part in adapting to the new environment. Over time, the incor-
poration of the various migrants gave rise to distinctive cultural, social and 
linguistic characteristics of these new cities. Thus, regarding the original 
migration population, it is interesting to note the use of the local term arigó, 
as discussed by Lask. This term, which was originally used to refer to a 
migratory bird, was given to CSN construction workers to denote their lack 
of professional qualifications (1991:116). But the term also evokes mobil-
ity/dislocation as a practical feature of labor, highlighting the new arrivals 
and identifying them with a generation of outsiders motivated by specific 
goals—in this case, to build up the city and CSN. This identification enables 
a comparison of Volta Redonda and its arigós with the case of Brasilia and 
its candangos (i.e., see Ribeiro 2008; Scott 1998; Holton 1993). As with the 
candangos who built the city of Brasília, the local term highlights both the 
conditions of work and those of migration as inextricably linked features of 
the labor at the heart of these foundational efforts.
In the case of CSN in Volta Redonda and Brasilia, some common char-
acteristics appear which can be linked to the company town models. These 
models seem to express the limited capacity to absorb the workforce over 
time. Hence, by not being able to be inserted into the companies’ labor 
forces, many of the second generation members which were born in these 
company town cities were forced to migrate in search of work in other cities 
(i.e., Lucas 2008). Whereas in Volta Redonda, we seem to observe a con-
stant incorporation of labor force between generations, initially motivated 
by the expansion processes of the CSN, which allowed fulfillment of the 
work demands of new generations as well as the demands of migrants.
Later, the modernization processes pursued within the plant, linked also 
to the last expansion processes of the industry, brought about a significant 
reduction in the total workforce. At the same time, outsourcing was incen-
tivized, especially in the area of maintenance. The reduction of the CSN 
workforce, a process which was initiated before the privatization of the 
company (Lima 2010), caused high levels of tension and conflict, leading to 
a large number of dismissals. However, despite all of those unfavorable con-
ditions for the reproduction of the labor force, the migrant population of 
the city was not discouraged, as the city continued to attract migrants, con-
verting it into a pole for the services industry. Here, the educational services, 
specifically those related to technical and professional education, stood out. 
Furthermore, as I will insist throughout the text, life in Volta Redonda cre-
ated a territorial identity, incentivized by favorable living conditions, hous-
ing, work and health conditions, characteristics which are reflected in the 
good results obtained by the city in human development and quality of life 
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indexes.6 Therefore, as CSN gradually ceased to be a particularly interesting 
place to work, Volta Redonda continued to be an interesting place to live.
In the case of Brasilia, the large number of workers needed to build an 
entire city planned as the future capital of the country from scratch was 
not considered to be integrated into the original housing facilities, mainly 
destined for public employees. Those populations formed the first satellite 
cities (Ribeiro 2008; Holston 1993; Scott 1998) which expanded over time. 
Brasilia became famous not only for the public positions offered for people 
interested in working in the administrative sphere, but also for the plots of 
land offered to those willing to live in the outlying regions of the suburbs 
of Brasilia. The movement was incentivized by some populist governments, 
which led to the emergence of speculative mafias known as grilheiros.
The new national capital and the first national steel company were both 
built from scratch as major projects of the Brazilian state. In their differ-
ent ways, Volta Redonda and Brasilia were models presented to Brazilian 
citizens and workers of a new, forthcoming Brazil forged with recourse to 
an ideology that can be situated within national history in relation to ideas, 
political processes, workers and citizens. Nevertheless, there are some sig-
nificant differences, arising from the different historical contexts in which 
the two centers evolved. On the one hand, through Brasilia and its particu-
lar architectural vision, the government intended to build a new Brazilian 
Modernism, to which the architect Oscar Niemeyer gave its final lines and 
curves. Brasilia was built not only to expand and develop internal frontiers 
by moving the previous capital, situated on the eastern coast, further into 
the center of the country, but it was also a way to show that it could be 
done, that Brazil was prepared to develop a modern project, raised through 
the triumph of a political, technological and collective effort. Or as Ribeiro 
pointed out, Brasilia was constructed as an epic story which was presented, 
along with a few other projects, for the construction of a national iden-
tity (2008: 3). On the other hand, decades before Brasília was built, Volta 
Redonda and CSN were already projected to be ideological developmen-
tal models for a new Brazil founded on an industrialized welfare state,7 
this being the most important index of President Getúlio Vargas’s above- 
mentioned “CLT”. The capacity of materializing ideas through raising up 
an entire city in a short timeframe is, without a doubt, a remarkable similar-
ity between Volta Redonda and Brasilia. We could think that today these 
cities stand as a clear reminder of state policies, articulated within a specific 
landscape and territory. These are policies that have also marked the liveli-
hood of different groups of population through time.
Finally, Volta Redonda, CSN and its workers brought to mind not only 
the history and character of Brasilia, but also triggered reflections on the dif-
ferent generations of seafarers of the small port town of Corral in southern 
Chile with whom I worked during my doctoral research. Generations of 
such mariners have their histories marked by connections between events, 
policies and interests in the local, regional, national and transnational 
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dimensions, just like those of the CSN. These connections and dislocations 
across different scales and temporal domains changed the seafaring ways of 
working, as well as the ways of accessing work. The similarities across these 
cases relating to generational shifts in relation to training, access to employ-
ment and the intensification of the labor process are indicative of deeper and 
more general transformations of the dominant models of labor and produc-
tion. With the seamen of Corral, I learned that the arrangements between 
local, regional, national, global and transnational relations are manifold 
and can be difficult to track (Díaz Crovetto 2010; 2015). Therefore, as a 
heuristic device, I focused on the experiences arising from the life histories 
of three generations of seafarers. Through this I learned that local, regional, 
national, international and/or transnational projects and processes of devel-
opment usually leave their mark on life trajectories and concrete communi-
ties. In the following section, I discuss the gaps arising between generations 
as they affect skills, working conditions and community relations.
Some Remarks on Access and Work Conditions  
between Generations at CSN
A generational perspective on work, access to employment, and institu-
tional and on-the-job training highlights the shifts that have taken place 
in the dominant models of the state and in the conduct of local industry. It 
also makes evident that many of these changes are not only local and that 
it is crucial to explore these local phenomena in relation to other places 
and broader processes. For the study of Volta Redonda, three generations 
of CSN employees were considered.8 People over 55 years of age and who 
worked until the privatization of the company constitute the first gener-
ation. The second generation is between 30 and 55 years of age and is 
composed of workers who began their working lives before CSN’s privati-
zation.9 Finally, the third generation consists of people who entered the 
company after privatization and are between 18 and 30 years of age. Such 
diverse work experiences are reflected in the accounts we gathered from our 
interviewees.10
It is relevant to mention that in order to place the aforementioned work-
ers, CSN had four major stages of planned expansion. The first relates to 
the beginning of the industry with a production level of 270,000 ingots. The 
second corresponds to the 1954 plan with a level of production amounting 
to 680,000 ingots, while the third was divided into two phases: the first 
phase, in 1960, with 1 million ingots and the second phase in 1962 with 
1.4 million ingots. Finally, the fourth and most ambitious plan was divided 
into three phases, starting in the 1960s. This plan included the construction 
of Furnace N°3, of different areas for the production and termination of 
steel, and brought total production up to 4.6 million ingots. On the other 
hand, as outlined below, the plan envisaged significant changes in the size 
and composition of the workforce and the conditions of work, as well as 
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changes in the administration of the company (Dinius 2011; Piquet 1998; 
Morel and Pessanha 1991).
It is also relevant to state that Escola Técnica Pandiá Calógeras (ETPC) is 
still arguably the most important educational center in Volta Redonda, and 
has been responsible for educating a great part of all three generations of 
workers. It was founded in 1941 and was envisaged as part of the original 
plan for the city in order to provide basic courses for the workers involved 
in the construction of the production plant. It was also intended to gener-
ate the technical teams that the plant would require once production got 
underway. It is interesting to observe the changes ETPC underwent over 
time, since they coincide with significant points experienced by the different 
generations of workers in our sample.
As a rule, the first generation is composed of people whose parents came 
to Volta Redonda to work. As former bishop and social activist Waldyr 
Calheiros pointed out, these workers were “following the smoke that came 
from the chimneys”. Having access to a stable job (that was frequently also 
a job for a lifetime) was the magnet that drew people to the city. The work-
ers from the first generation offered a great variety of stories about the moti-
vations that drove them and the ways in which they gained access to a job in 
the plant. From their accounts, it appears that gaining access was an almost 
random event that depended in part on previously acquired skills (i.e., being 
a truck driver, a fireman, etc.) that could be useful in a specific department 
of the General Services Area of CSN. The physical qualities of the prospec-
tive workers were an important consideration given the characteristics of 
the tasks involved in the various steps of steel production; for example, hav-
ing strong hands and a strong body that could withstand heavy work was an 
asset. Besides, the plant needed a large number of employees to fulfill a great 
number of tasks. Another feature that would improve workers’ chances of 
obtaining a job in the plant was the existence of family or friendshipties 
with company employees. Such contact might well facilitate access to work 
at the steel plant. In short, previously acquired skills, workers’ physical con-
dition and family and friendship ties could facilitate work access. During the 
first period of expansion, the level of technical training required by the plant 
was quite low, and people were trained in the plant through on-the-job and 
institutional training. For this generation, perhaps the most important con-
nection between workers and CSN was the capacity of generating livelihood 
possibilities and its associated perks: housing and other company benefits 
that enabled the employee and his/her family to permanently settle in close 
proximity to the plant. For this generation, becoming a steelworker entailed 
assurances formalized by CSN job registration; thus, becoming a profes-
sional was firmly tied to becoming a CSN employee. As a consequence, at 
that moment the majority of the CSN workers were trained by ETPC.
The second generation is marked by the important status CSN placed 
on technical abilities, and in doing so, ETPC assumed a vital role in the 
formation of the workforce. This free and widely recognized institution was 
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known to provide an excellent education and trained a considerable number 
of people, most of who were employed by CSN. Another segment of CSN 
workers of this generation were those who wanted to improve their situa-
tion but could not access ETPC due to limited capacity within that institu-
tion. These workers studied by their own means in other private educational 
centers. In many cases, these workers studied while they were working in 
less-qualified positions at CSN, and some of them went on to become engi-
neers or high-profile technicians within CSN. Nevertheless, whether train-
ing took place at ETPC or in another educational institution, completing a 
technical course had a favorable effect on a worker’s chances of promotion 
and achieving better working conditions at CSN.
It is worth noting that the majority of the members of the second genera-
tion became CSN employees during the military dictatorship that controlled 
the state between 1964 and 1985. This was a time of conflict and harsh 
management practices that had the effect of prompting workers to ques-
tion their working conditions for the first time. Previously, worker demands 
had focused on issues such as the construction and allocation of housing by 
CSN rather than work conditions. This particular generation experienced 
two important phenomena that marked their daily work practice, training 
and careers. First, there was the restructuring process that introduced new 
models of production and management (mainly related to Toyotism and 
Five S Models), both in order to increase the total production and product 
quality. A second key event relates to the privatization of CSN in 1993 and 
the period leading up to this event when the plant was preparing for its 
future sale. The outsourcing of maintenance service within the plant took 
place before privatization and was in response to the crises experienced by 
steel production worldwide, and by CSN in particular. All of this can be 
attributed, particularly in the latter instance, to the second world oil crisis 
at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. Privatization also took 
place in a context in which the Brazilian state promoted the privatization of 
other state companies, and which in turn reflects broader global trends that 
favored privatization of state assets and enterprises (Dal Forno and Mol-
lona 2015).11 This generation also experienced the effects of a gradual rise 
in outsourcing, which came to represent an alternative route to accessing a 
job at CSN. In fact, it was easier to gain access to an outsourcing company 
than to CSN directly, especially for those who did not have what was con-
sidered a good level of formal technical training. This second generation 
was the last to get high salaries for many different positions, and it was 
also the last to have access to other social benefits (i.e., to be assigned to a 
CSN housing plan). The erosion of benefits, salaries and work stability as a 
result of restructuring, outsourcing and privatization constituted the central 
claims and principal foci for the strikes that started in the 1980s, before and 
after the company’s privatization. Additionally, the implementation of new 
phases of the company’s expansion12 meant that workers, technicians and 
engineers of this generation were engaged in labor challenges of adopting 
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different technologies in the production and administration areas in order 
to improve the competitiveness of the company. This resulted in processes 
of concentration and intensification of work. Later, after the restructuring 
process, employees knew that the situation at CSN would not improve; in 
fact, they would not even be “as good as before”. In fact, in contrast with 
employment possibilities in other industries in the area, work conditions at 
CSN were declining. As a consequence, many CSN employees did not want 
their children to follow their own professions, as neither the wages nor the 
work conditions seemed to be competitive in relation to other possibilities in 
nearby manufacturing cities. These workers also developed the perception 
that there is a marked division between a time in the past and work condi-
tions which are no longer current in the present.
In sum, as I understand it, two key aspects define this generation. First, 
by restructuring different aspects of CSN, management, production and 
maintenance, a process of “technification” took shape within the company 
(Mangabeira 1993) where all job positions became technical, and every-
body had at least a technical degree. In most cases, this technical focus was 
interwoven with processes based on the automation of the production line. 
Such processes were also related to a broader industrial development project 
in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Thus, to supply the regional demand for tech-
nicians, a range of training centers began to offer technical training in dif-
ferent areas of expertise. Moreover, it is noteworthy that many among this 
generation of workers who became CSN employees were children of previ-
ous employees of the plant. These employees had better income and wanted 
to improve their children’s future. Hence, children of previous workers 
aspired to obtain the available technical or engineering jobs.
It was at the point of completing the major expansion program (D Plan) 
in 1985 that CSN began outsourcing the workforce on a significant scale, 
especially in the maintenance sector. Those directly employed by CSN were 
therefore concentrated in production and administration. The second gen-
eration, however, had internalized the goal of productivity as a core value, 
which was inspired by earlier models such as Toyotism and especially the 
Five S Model, also derived from Japanese sources. In the Five S model, 
training was directed at controlling not only the machine but also the envi-
ronment surrounding the steelworker, setting patterned orders to be inter-
nalized by the worker, and centered around notions of  hygiene based on a 
symbiotic relationship between bodies and the workspace. The Five S model 
is defined by a disciplinary gaze directed at spotting order and disorder. At 
the same time, automation intensified the individual workload while reduc-
ing the number of workers. Therefore, as an outcome of the aforementioned 
changes, this generation experienced moments of massive dismissal before 
and after privatization (Lima 2010).
The third generation tended to choose technical careers from the rich vari-
ety of academic and professional courses offered today in Volta Redonda.13 
Such careers are no longer directed necessarily towards CSN, as they once 
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were, but to many different manufacturing units found in the region today. 
The increased diversity and number of training courses are not only a con-
sequence of the new requirements for employment, but they also reflect the 
wider job opportunities that exist not only in the city and at CSN, but in 
the region as a whole. Interestingly, since the 1980s many of the courses 
offered have been oriented towards the needs of outsourcing companies. 
Also, as the city has expanded, the gap between job opportunities at CSN 
and the number of economically active individuals—especially among the 
young—is growing so large that access to CSN is becoming more restricted. 
Despite the fact that wages at CSN are today perceived as being much lower 
than in the past, and in comparison with other industries in the present, a 
job at CSN is still considered desirable for a large number of young people, 
especially those working in unfavorable conditions. This is partly because 
technical positions are still seen to offer better pay and better prospects than 
commercial activities. In this sense, outsourcing companies still represent 
concrete and imaginary possibilities for granting access to CSN.
Today, CSN continues to offer many training programs. After being train-
ees, some of the students are selected to work inside the former public steel 
industry. In some cases, CSN is seen as a survival strategy, and in others, as 
an in-between work possibility prior to finding a better position elsewhere. 
The perspective of growing old and retiring at CSN is usually absent in the 
third generation employee’s life plans. But taking into consideration that 
this generation has created ties with the city, and that some in this genera-
tion live with their parents, it is fairly common for them to prefer to work 
in Volta Redonda and earn less than to take up other job opportunities in 
Figure 4.1 Generations at CSN, Volta Redonda.
GENERATIONS EMPLOYMENT, ACCESS AND LABOR CONDITIONS.
FIRST
GENERATION
Labor skills learned prior to employment in the sector.
Importance of physical skills (força braçal).
Family and friends working at CSN ease hiring.
Professional category earned through employment (i.e. one 
becomes a steelworker when hired as such).





Work intensification (one person, several functions).
Medium to high wages.
Outsourcing of some work areas (mainly maintenance).
THIRD
GENERATION
Mandatory technical knowledge (every worker is at least a 
technician).
Low wages compared with other sectors.
Low levels of work stability.
Precarious working conditions.
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the region but further from home. As we can see, this generation feels that 
they are part of Volta Redonda, with well-established family and friendship 
ties. As one former ETPC student told us: “this city is still a great place to 
live, study and work; you have good public health, and it is still a safe city 
to live in. You have all that you need”. The different aspects of work and 
access to work for the three generations of CSN employees are summarized 
in Figure 4.1.
Final Remarks
Initially, technical training for CSN workers was offered only by ETPC, 
which with time solidified its prestige as an important educational center. 
During the second generation, other centers and training possibilities 
appeared, but an ETPC student was still considered almost automatically 
a CSN worker. CSN also used the ETPC as a center for continued training 
of the labor force, passing on “know-how” linked to different models of 
production that were introduced over time. After the privatization of CSN, 
ETPC began to charge for all courses, and the natural link between EPTC’s 
training and hiring at CSN was broken. Thus, with the exception of schol-
arship holders, those interested in joining CSN had to make considerable 
financial commitments, either at ETPC or at a different technical school. 
Today, EPTC is locally recognized not only as a technical school, but also 
as a good school with high tuition fees. Many middle class families choose 
to enroll their children there in order to prepare them for university. The 
old link between the sites of education and of production is now largely 
severed. Between the three different generations of CSN employees, there is 
a noticeable shift concerning the high level of skills demanded by the indus-
try and also in the form of knowledge acquisition through work practices. 
The latter shift evolved from basic “know-how” to a more sophisticated 
technical emphasis of knowledge. There were also political and administra-
tive changes, such as the changes that followed privatization and then in 
response to new circumstances, helping to spread to other local businesses 
the capital that had previously been concentrated in one large entreprise. 
Additionally, Volta Redonda’s city hall assumed a new responsibility: the 
social distribution of the capital generated through taxes and other indirect 
sources of revenue coming from CSN. This caused city hall to incorporate 
once more a parental role—i.e., “taking care” of its citizens—that is evoca-
tive of the paternalistic past. Only this time, this new form of “care” would 
not be overseen by CSN.
One ethnographic example of this paternalistic shift, which the research 
team encountered during our research, occurred during the 2011 Christmas 
celebration. On the first days of December we witnessed the preparation 
of the city’s Christmas decorations. The public lights are so elaborate and 
abundant, that power cuts are typical at this time of the year due to the pro-
pensity for electric shortages that follow the overcharged public electrical 
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system. But the apex of these decorations centers on the city’s main square 
where a replica of Santa Claus’s village is built and where for two weeks, 
thousands of toys are given for free to the children of Volta Redonda, along 
with popcorn and bottles of water that were freely distributed to the public.
To conclude, a concise presentation of indicators on training and access 
to employment among different generations of CSN workers points to cer-
tain similarities, such as work intensification, “technification” and a ten-
dency towards decreased income. These similarities, in turn, can be read as 
evidence of global processes related to changes in the mode of production 
and in industrial operating practices and strategies. Specifically, in the case 
of the different generations of CSN workers, the transformation of employ-
ment requirements relates to work stability that are mediated by diverse 
educational possibilities and are marked by a desire to get a better liveli-
hood conditions. And, with the passing of each generation, the possibility 
of working at CSN has granted the possibility of living in the city of Volta 
Redonda.
Notes
 1 The chapter is based on field research funded by the FP7 Collaborative Project 
(Grant Agreement No. 225670) MEDEA- Models and their Effects on Develop-
ment Paths: an Ethnographic and comparative Approach to Knowledge Trans-
mission and Livelihood Strategies and presented at the project’s international 
conference held at the University of Barcelona on 23–24 February. The research 
was carried out by a core team that was based in the Laboratory for Studies 
about Globalization and Development of the Department of Anthropology at 
the University of Brasilia. During that time, this laboratory was directed by 
professor Gustavo Lins Ribeiro, and it undertook all of the research regarding 
MEDEA Project in Brasil. The team that studied Volta Redonda was oriented by 
the Work Package 9 and 10 to deepen understanding concerning livelihood strat-
egies and work experiences through generations of CSN workers. The team was 
formed by Gonzalo Díaz Crovetto, who acted as coordinator and researcher, and 
by the researchers Raoni Giraldin and Rafael Lasavitz. The reflections presented 
here are grounded in the work of systematization and presentation of anteced-
ents and results (Díaz Crovetto et al. 2012). However, the present text and any 
errors within are my complete responsibility. I’m thankful for the effort put forth 
by the researchers and the comments that I received from professor Ribeiro.
 2 As Ribeiro (2008) pointed out, large-scale-projects are usually built in areas with 
low population density.
 3 This differs from a sistema-vila-fabrica-operaria (Lopes 1988), in that the system 
I describe here incorporates the different classes that compose the factory (work-
men, technician and engineers) from the outset.
 4 There is interesting bibliographical material about Volta Redonda and CSN; 
Lima (2010) presents a review of the available bibliography. Especially impor-
tant are the works of Morel (1989), Lask (1991), Lopes et all (2004), Dias 
(2010), Graciolli (2007), Dinius (2011) and Mangabeira (1993). Of course, the 
histories of Volta Redonda and CSN are quite complex, and here I present suc-
cinctly only a few points of those—specifically, that which allow me to situate 
some of the nuances of the workers’ work experience.
 5 The workers involved in the construction of Brasília are known as candangos.
72 Gonzalo Díaz Crovetto
 6 For example, according to a report from the PNUD in 2004, its IDH was esti-
mated at 0.815, placing the city in third place among the cities of the state of Rio 
de Janeiro.
 7 The welfare policies also intended to suffocate the power of the anarchist and the 
communist movements by tightening surveillance over them and bringing labor 
unions closer to the state.
 8 By considering three generations, it is possible to better illustrate the continuities 
and ruptures from the first to the last, whereas the second can be thought of as a 
liminal stage between them.
 9 As this generation suffers major changes in contrast among the others in terms 
of working conditions and employment, I discuss this one more than the others.
 10 Overall, we interviewed 60 people. The interviewees were chosen among employ-
ees occupying different positions within CSN and belong to various generations. 
Besides these workers, we also interviewed a few educators and technical for-
mation and university students. Additionally, we established various informal 
conversations with union participants, cultural groups, church groups and social 
groups, among others.
 11 The process of privatization of state companies started at the final period of mili-
tary government during the 1980s and was continued with the democratically 
elected government (Matos Filho and Oliveira 1996).
 12 There were four: 1) Plan A was established in 1946, 2) Plan B in 1954, 3) Plan C 
in 1960 and finally, 4) Plan D, the biggest expansion plan, in 1978.
 13 Today the city has a public university, two private universities and an endless 
number of technical training centers.
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The Fiat Car Factory in Melfi: The New Integrated Factory 
and “The Green-Field”
The opening of the integrated FIAT factory in Melfi (Basilicata) in 1994 
represented a profound transformation of the Italian automobile industry, 
with the introduction of highly innovative approaches to production and 
work. The factory represented the first Italian experimentation of the so-
called Japanese model introduced by the Toyota Motor Company of Japan, 
based on Taichi Ohno’s project. During the mid-1990s, Fiat experienced a 
deep corporate crisis, with a significant drop in sales both on the internal 
and international markets, in large part due precisely to Japanese competi-
tion. Two pillars of the new Japanese model, applied in Melfi’s newly con-
structed factory, were explicitly aimed at overcoming the Fordist production 
model. First, a “just in time” production strategy that inverted the pro-
duction cycle, putting on the market only the automobiles for which there 
was already a demand, and thus eliminating stocks and reducing the costs 
of production. The second pillar was the so-called “total quality model”, 
which rested on greater expertise and awareness of the workers, and aimed 
to enable corrective responses to defects at the point of production and 
on the assembly line. This new model also foresaw improved technology, 
with increased automation of the productive process (Ohno 1993). More 
generally, however, the new integrated factory (the Italian translation of the 
Japanese model: Revelli 1989; Cerruti and Rieser 1991; Bonazzi 1993), was 
seen as a factory able to launch faster production with less bureaucracy and 
enhanced quality control. In sum, it was seen as a leaner form of produc-
tion that benefited from decreased interventions by mid-level professionals, 
a more agile management structure and greater participation of workers in 
the decisional processes, leading experts to describe the latter through the 
metaphor of the “crystal tube” (Bonazzi 1993).
The process of modernizing production proposed by Fiat was, however, 
impracticable outside of a “green field”, that is to say a setting with no 
tradition in manufacturing or trade union organization. Most significant 
was the possibility of implementing a new kind of job contract through the 
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establishment of a new company, SATA,1 which established conditions of 
work based on lower salaries, more intense work shifts, and a greater per-
centage of women workers than other FIAT factories (18 percent of the total 
workforce in the SATA factory).
The opening of the Melfi factory is understandable only if one takes into 
account the complex PR operation put in place by Fiat, amplified by the 
role of local institutions, in which the notion of “green field” was used by 
the Fiat publicists as a symbol of the new industrial plant (Ricci 1993). 
The term was disseminated by the press to signify the company’s intentions 
to create a completely new corporate and work organization, involving a 
young (under the age of 32, in line with national law providing tax incen-
tives to those hiring young workers), more highly educated workforce than 
in the past (workers with a high school degree). The “green field” label was 
also an accurate description of the vast stretch of agricultural land on which 
the factory was built. On a symbolic level, the label was reminiscent of local 
history, or the efforts of famers who worked hard to achieve an abundant 
harvest, and the well-being and sense of comfort that such a harvest meant 
for farming families in the years to come. The green field was thus a recog-
nizable and understandable referent for the local inhabitants, closely aligned 
with a value system within which a prosperous harvest assuring survival and 
existential serenity were closely linked.
At the time the region of Basilicata was highly underdeveloped from an 
industrial point of view and suffered from very high levels of unemployment 
(especially female), in part explaining why the factory was welcomed with 
great enthusiasm by local administrations. Such enthusiasm should also be 
contextualized in relation to local and national history. Industrialization had, 
up until this point, been relatively scarce and sporadic. The period following 
the earthquake of 1980 stands out, as it involved a large public financing 
plan for the affected areas (Basilicata and Campania), which, however, ulti-
mately failed (Cuoco 1980; Becchi 1990; Barbagallo 1997). At the national 
level, Fiat embodied the dreams of thousands of workers who emigrated 
from the South after the Second World War, to work in the large Fiat fac-
tory of Mirafiori in Turin. For this reason, the “landing” of Fiat at Melfi was 
greeted with only very limited expressions of criticism, which came mostly 
from the most radical left-leaning local political groups. Such critique went 
basically unheard, for better or for worse, muffled by majority opinion, 
which from the very beginning considered the arrival of Fiat as a promising 
occasion for work and for the development of a relatively depressed and 
industrially backwards area. Indeed, approximately 9,000 new work posi-
tions were opened up by Fiat and its satellite industries. However, a more 
critical lens reveals that the opening of the factory was in reality an example 
of industrialization without development (Hitten 1970), or of development 
without autonomy (Trigilia 1994), in that car manufacturing does not gen-
erally provide enough stimulation or have a propulsive effect on the larger 
local industry. Nor was it able to generate local management skills.
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The unconditional acceptance of the Fiat operations, both in terms of the 
characteristics of the industrial plant and the forms of work, was reflected 
in the absence of any true negotiation with the labor unions, which occurred 
before the construction of the factory and in fact approved exhausting work 
schedules, high levels of productivity, and reduced salaries compared to the 
factories in northern Italy. On the whole, this was a deal that saw very 
uneven forces at play, with a strong imbalance in favor of Fiat, which man-
aged to create a working class under unequal and subordinate conditions 
compared to workers within the same Fiat factories in the North. In fact, 
with the launching of the factory, when the first workers were sent to Mira-
fiori in Turin for training and preparation, they were warmly welcomed by 
the older workers in the North (many of whom were of southern origin) 
but also with an awareness that a redefinition of both the rights and the 
security of workers was taking place in Melfi. This awareness resulted in 
the Melfi workers being labeled by the Northern Mirafiori workers as “the 
blacks of Basilicata”. Indeed, from the very start, the “amaranth overalls”,2 
admired as emblematic of a link with the Fiat myth that was seen as very 
positive in the context of the delayed or absent development of southern 
Italy (D’Aloisio 2003), were seen outside Melfi as representing the tough 
and penalizing working conditions of the plant. At the same time, the post-
Fordist model promised the arrival of a new kind of worker, different in 
terms of their skills and the range of their responsibilities. These qualities 
were less attributable to notions of “class”, and related instead to an indi-
vidualism that was increasingly achieved both in terms of the forms of work 
and the ever less collective articulation of demands for improvements or 
basic rights. This new working class, favored in terms of the local context 
and subordinate from a national point of view, formed the heart of the 
industrial operation. Quickly nicknamed the “fiatists”3 of Melfi, they were 
simultaneously the objects of curiosity and of admiration in the local con-
text, outside of the factory.
An Anthropological Point of View
From an anthropological perspective, the opening of the Fiat factory in Melfi 
provides an opportunity to interpret cultural changes resulting from what 
is a significant event of modernization, specifically the introduction of new 
forms of industrial work (i.e., heavy industry) in an area with a peasant past 
and, since the 1970s (Ginsborg 1989; 1998) with a growing public service 
sector. On the one hand, the establishment of the factory responded to pro-
cesses of economic change on an international scale linked to a general crisis 
in the automobile industry, Japanese competition, and the need to modern-
ize the manufacture of Fiat cars. On the other hand, the factory inevitably 
brought about profound changes in local socio-economic structures, creat-
ing a new working class and transforming the organization of work, as well 
as daily life, social and gender relations, and family arrangements.
80 Fulvia D’Aloisio
An anthropological approach aims to elucidate the complex intersections 
between global processes and local transformations and, through ethno-
graphic methods, to analyze the effects of larger and external economic trans-
formations on daily life. As noted by Kilani, this objective is pursued with 
an awareness that the terms “local” and “global” do not indicate realities 
in and of themselves but rather, suggest the ways in which anthropologists 
correlate different levels of reality in the construction of the anthropological 
object (Kilani 1994; Appadurai 2001). In Italy, an analytical framework to 
better understand enterprises and work at different levels and in different 
ethnographic contexts is being pioneered by influential authors such as Cris-
tina Papa (1999), whose work has been developed further by other scholars 
interested in local industrial realities (Ghezzi 2007). According to Papa, the 
anthropology of the enterprise constitutes a specific field of investigation 
concerned with the dynamics of global capitalism and their effects on local 
realties. From this perspective, the enterprise is understood not as a closed 
reality, limited to its internal dynamics, but as a window through which to 
analyze the interaction between global and local dynamics, which find their 
own particular articulation within the enterprise. In France, where this line 
of research has existed for quite some time, Sélim (1996) has highlighted a 
resistance amongst anthropologists to making the enterprise the object of 
study, considering this to be a domain more closely associated with soci-
ologists and economists. Already in the 1990s, Sélim argued that the char-
acteristics of the global market were headed towards an increasing loss of 
social guarantees and a more aggressive commoditization of work, with a 
consequent weakening of workers’ participation in management strategies 
(Sélim 1996; Althabe and Sélim 2000). According to Sélim, the enterprise 
represents an ideal observatory of diverse logics and multiple points of view, 
more or less divergent with respect to the ideology of the enterprise; a field 
of diversity that allows us to explore larger transformations of the enterprise 
and of work at the micro-level.
The focus in this chapter on the work of women allows us to extend the 
investigation of these diverse logics. Historically, high rates of local female 
unemployment and more generally the subordinate role of women must 
necessarily first be contextualized within the framework of the lag in the 
economic structures of southern Italy when compared to northern Italy, and 
more broadly, of Italy with respect to Europe. Indeed, Italy continues to 
have one of the lowest rates of female employment in Europe.4 The work 
role of women in southern Italy, in areas like Melfi characterized by agri-
cultural pasts and scarce industrialization, has long been marked by job 
instability and invisibility. Women’s work was in fact mainly characterized 
by agricultural labor carried out for the most part when substituting for the 
men during periods of war and emigration. Another feature contributing to 
the invisibility of women’s work has been the labor conducted “under the 
table” that has served to supplement the income of male heads of household 
(Signorelli 1990; 1993). Employment in the public service sector, in local 
administration and services, has always been characterized by favoritism 
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and nepotism; this dynamic has more generally characterized the manage-
ment and allocation of public resources in Italy and especially in the South 
(Banfield 1961; Piselli 1981; Signorelli 1983; Gribaudi 1999; Zinn 2001). 
For this reason, work in this large new factory represented a host of novel 
characteristics for local women regarding their labor, that is to say as legal, 
recognized, visible, and subject to non-discriminatory hiring. Many female 
workers described their experiences, having applied to the job “by chance,” 
and being utterly surprised to then receive notification that they had been 
hired, clearly implying that obtaining work without using some sort of 
introductory channel was an entirely new experience with respect to local 
tradition.
This chapter aims to analyze how the Japanese production model, in its 
Italian incarnation of the integrated factory, influenced the meanings of 
work and identity and the self-perception of workers, particularly from the 
perspective of women or, more accurately, from a gender perspective. The 
particular focus here consists of an analysis of the so-called “double bur-
den” (Balbo 1978), or the dedication of women to both family and work 
(Ginatempo 1993; Oppo et al 2000.; Facchini 2008), the subsequent trans-
formations in social and family roles, and life strategies aimed at balancing 
the timing and forms of familial and work organization (Fine-Davis et al. 
2007; Naldini and Saraceno 2011). More than 20 years on from the launch-
ing of the factory, it is now possible to step back and observe the broader 
effects of this industrial operation. Beginning with the place of the factory 
in the context of the global crisis, we can see the implications of the trans-
formations concerning the organization of work, the meaning and value 
associated with the working class, and the setbacks in the lives of female and 
male workers of the Fiat factory, and more generally of large-scale industry.
Metalworker Women of SATA in Longitudinal Perspective: 
Identity, Work and Livelihood Strategies
The case of the Fiat factory in Melfi can be analyzed from a longitudinal 
perspective or through two phases of field research, through consideration 
of three key aspects: identity, the meaning of work and subsistence strate-
gies. The first phase of the research was carried out from 1999 to 2002; 
the second began in 2011 and is still in progress. These periods reflect two 
very different moments in the life of the factory. During the late 1990s, the 
factory had been open for only six years, and the memory of an event that 
marked a break with the past and that had generated great expectations of 
change was still very much alive. Now the factory is experiencing a phase of 
decline, constituted by a period of manufacturing instability that began in 
September 2011 and continued until February 2014, characterized by more 
or less lengthy interruptions in the work cycle, with recourse to redundancy 
payments (or short time compensation programs). Subsequently, the plant 
commenced production of new models (the Jeep Renegade and the 500X) 
and the compensation programs were brought to an end.
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Work identity depends fundamentally on working women’s own percep-
tions of their roles, but it also draws on images that are constructed exter-
nally in the local context and in the wider national domain. The meaning 
of work on the other hand refers to the sense and values attributed to a job, 
to a role, to status and levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction derived from 
such work. When we locate these meanings and values in the context of 
subsistence strategies we are able to understand whether and how levels of 
pay, as well as the symbolic value of the work, are inscribed in the organiza-
tion of women workers’ lives. More specifically, it is possible to delineate 
different scenarios according to the roles and tasks they carry out in the 
factory; these are necessarily particularized by the existential trajectories of 
each woman, but there are also strong common elements shared by them.
In the early years of the factory plant workers were locally perceived as 
having a higher status than other workers (and an even more elevated sta-
tus when compared to the unemployed). Indeed a job with a permanent 
contract, guaranteed and protected, marked a break with more unstable 
forms of work that were common in the area and were a feature of the 
earlier experiences of most of the workers. For women workers to thus 
legitimately enter the workplace with full rights and responsibilities, and 
furthermore to do so in a place of work that was traditionally male, rep-
resented a significant gain, especially where they assumed roles with heavy 
responsibilities, for example, as sprayers, dolly drivers, and quality control-
lers. At the same time, however, the women assembly line workers expe-
rienced, in equal measure as their male counterparts, all the hardship and 
repetitiveness of this kind of work (as also discussed in classic studies such 
as that by Walker and Guest 1952), which despite the new organizational 
model, remained essentially unchanged. Thus, aside from the organizational 
innovations introduced by the model, the so-called integrated factory drew 
a sharp distinction between the arduousness and monotony of assembly 
line work and the work of new professional figures, particularly in quality 
control. For the latter, a stronger identification with their work was pos-
sible; the responsibility of the job brought more gratification, and the sense 
of motivation and satisfaction was more intense. Consequently, the sense 
of work and work identity took shape very differently within the factory, 
on the one hand reproducing traditional working class forms of alienation 
associated with the Fordist model in the most menial tasks and, on the other 
hand, opening up new possibilities for satisfaction and upward mobility, 
higher levels of income and job satisfaction for the more highly-qualified 
workers, such as quality operators or productive roles out of the assembly 
line (D’Aloisio 2003, 2014)
For women, the need to reconcile rigid shifts and the toil of the assembly 
line with the demands of family life was met in the early years by the deploy-
ment of an effective syncretism between neighborhood and work networks. 
Women workers who lived in close proximity to one another and who were 
employed in the same UTE (Technological Elementary Unit) established a 
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system of support and reciprocal exchange. It was common not only to 
travel to work together in the same vehicle, but also to exchange the perfor-
mance of small daily tasks, such as temporarily taking care of a neighbor’s 
or fellow worker’s children: fixing one another’s hair, going shopping in the 
city with the same car, all of which resulted in evident savings in terms of 
time and money. As such, “traditional” support within neighborhoods, very 
much the object of many anthropological studies in the 1970s and 1980s 
carried out in small peasant communities (Banfield 1961; Davis 1989), and 
consisting of reciprocal material and immaterial help was not affected nega-
tively by the anonymous relations of the big factory. On the contrary, social 
networks were transformed towards fulfilling needs that arose from the dif-
ficulties posed by factory life. Positive effects, in this case, were experienced 
both on a material level through the exchange of goods and services and 
on a relational level with an enhanced possibility of sharing the rhythm 
and style of factory life. That said, factory jobs also created tensions and 
difficulties in the relations of factory workers with workers from other sec-
tors and more generally generated tensions with the rhythms of village life 
(D’Aloisio 2003). The situation of the factory is very different now, 22 years 
from its inauguration and 15 years from my first ethnographic field trip. In 
terms of commercial and residential characteristics the town has grown, 
and a new neighborhood of single-unit family housing has been developed; 
many of the homes belong to workers who were able to take out mortgages. 
A more thorough analysis reveals, however, that the dream of transforming 
the working class into a middle class remains unfulfilled, even in the years 
of greatest growth of the automotive industry. This vision thrived in Melfi 
at the time of the factory’s inauguration, somewhat behind national trends, 
but now appears to be disintegrating.
In this regard, the Fiat merger with Chrysler in 2009 represents an impor-
tant moment in the so-called “Marchionne era” of Fiat history, which refers 
to the period initiated when Marchionne became the general manager in 
2004. According to a number of scholars, contrary to what was portrayed 
in the Italian press and in some of the literature,5 this was a necessary move 
for Fiat, which found itself forced to leave the confines of the European 
market for its survival (Berta 2011). Above all, with restructuring and the 
acquisition by a US firm, Marchionne led a profound reconfiguration of 
the relations between the corporation and the trade unions (Volpato 2008), 
in the direction of a strong diminution of representative rights and factory 
democracy.6
As has been documented in the literature, the current Fiat crisis began 
many years ago. According to several economists (see in particular Comito 
2005), among the multiple causes of the crisis of Italian big industry is, 
foremost, the nature of public intervention, of which Fiat was one of the 
principal recipients. The significant weight of such intervention was due 
not so much to the resources made available, sometimes even in too much 
abundance, but rather to the characteristics of the interventions that were 
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restricted to offering financial support and were completely lacking in terms 
of economic and industrial policy content. It should also be added that such 
allocations, which were often granted on the basis of political connections 
and clientelism, were not driven by long-term policies aimed at encouraging 
innovation. Currently, different factors suggest that the crisis is deepening, 
even after the merger with Chrysler, as is evident in the Fiat brand’s loss of 
its lead position in the Brazilian market and further losses in Europe, where 
Fiat car sales have struggled stagnant market conditions more than their 
competitors (Berta 2011).
In the period we are considering (2011–2014) there was a marked sense 
of confusion, worry and uncertainty among the working class of Melfi. 
The labor unions foresee a period of redundancy payments of at least two 
years, as Fiat has continued to delay the launch of new automobile models 
and has not declared a business plan until 2014. Reductions in workers’ 
incomes with the “cassa integrazione” (a temporary economic support from 
the Italian government) vary from 20 to 50 percent, according to periods of 
stops on production. The long period of “cassa integrazione”, since 2011 to 
2014, has very strongly sapped all the workers, but during the first months 
they were happy to see their hard work time reduced.
From an “etic” perspective, the workers interviewed 10 years ago have 
experienced improvements in their overall standard of living over the last 
decade: some have renovated their homes with lavish furnishings and acces-
sories; others have finally become home owners by taking out a mortgage. 
All dress fashionably and have well-groomed hair and nails; they go on vaca-
tion in the summer and flaunt the occasionally flashy item of expenditure 
(e.g., birthday parties in clubs), made possible in some cases through loans 
on income or financing from the bank. Precisely due to this evident increase 
in overall living standards (which often coincide with rising levels of debt), 
workers’ worries about the future are evident. The signs of the heavy toil 
of factory work shows clearly: data from the FIOM trade union (National 
Metalworkers’ Federation) show that the number of workers suffering from 
work-related conditions has increased enormously over the last few years. 
The women in the FIOM sample complain about problems related to their 
backs, their necks, tendons, etc.7 Such suffering has increased their aware-
ness that they have paid for their status as workers on coveted permanent 
contracts entailing hard work and physical pain. Alongside these observa-
tions, interviews carried out 10 years ago suggested a relatively short-term 
vision of the future, beginning with the awareness that even a factory like 
Fiat could experience periods of crisis. Now this crisis has clearly arrived 
and women workers have quickly set up defense mechanisms in the form 
of small-scale activities, which help supplement their incomes. One woman 
sells catalogue cleaning products; another returned to her work as a beauti-
cian, working from home (and on a cash-in-hand basis). Yet another woman 
helps her parents in their pizzeria, while another works as a cleaner for 
a business. Thus, the temporary stoppages in production and recourse to 
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redundancy payments has resulted in the re-emergence of precarious and 
clandestine labor that characterized the work experience of these women 
before they entered the factory. In the past, these activities were aimed at 
guaranteeing survival in the absence of work and a proper income, whereas 
at present they aim to supplement an income that has diminished signifi-
cantly and is subject to new threats and uncertainties. In economic terms, 
this means that there is a parallel informal economy operating alongside the 
“official” jobs of women workers. In social terms, there seems to be a recov-
ery of a culture of “making do”, an ethic of working hard, and a capacity to 
creatively put together various skills and abilities so as to slip into the small 
spaces of the labor market: a modality that is typical of the local subsistence 
strategies that were in place before the changes brought about by the intro-
duction of the Fiat factory into the area.
It is difficult to estimate the significance of these new complementary 
forms of informal work, both in terms of their nature and the extent of their 
diffusion, and in terms of their future relevance. That said, the import of 
these forms of employment is once again both economic and cultural. From 
an economic point of view, informal jobs are a defense mechanism against 
the threat of downward mobility as a consequence of stagnant or declining 
incomes. From a cultural perspective, we may well be observing a form of 
“female pragmatism” in the sense of the term as it used by Signorelli (1990, 
1993). In other words, pragmatism understood not in terms of an abstract 
“natural” attribute, but rather as the cultural correlation to historically 
determined material conditions. In this instance, these conditions affect 
women in rural areas of Southern Italy characterized by high levels of infor-
mal agricultural work. This means that in this current historical phase and 
under the new working conditions characterized by insecure employment in 
the factory, there is a re-emergence of the ability and willingness to combine 
small jobs and diverse sources of income. This should not be equated with a 
simple “survival” of the past, but should be understood as a re-signification 
of economic and cultural behaviors that draw on past local experience that 
proves to be useful in the present. They are perceived as strategies for the 
future precisely at a time when working in Fiat is losing some of its origi-
nal connotations of stability and safety. Work is thus transformed among 
the Fiat employees as well, towards more flexible and unstable forms of 
employment, very much in line with the characteristics of global work (as 
highlighted by Beck already in the early 2000s). The possibility of fragment-
ing work and assembling it in response to particular objectives, different 
phases of productivity and market trends is reinforced. But above all, the 
vulnerability of workers has increased as they find themselves in a context in 
which the rules are uncertain and unknown and in which historical media-
tors such as trade unions are absent or have diminishing influence which 
means that: “without a collective counterweight, more than ever dependent, 
they [the workers] work within flexible webs, whose sense and whose rules 
are by now indecipherable to most of them” (Beck 2000: 123)
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Consequently, the meaning of work has undergone profound changes. 
Notwithstanding the slowdown of production, which translates into three 
working days per week, the speed of the daily production line has increased, 
such that toil and stress are still very present and tempered only by the 
shorter working week. From interviews and discussions with employees, it is 
clear that this new work regime embodies an effective compromise between 
a working class with decreased organizational capacity and a company that 
needs to continue to push production forward, even when confronted with 
reduced market demand. To all this should be added, as is clearly recounted 
by the workers, an environment of rigid and pressing controls by manage-
ment and bosses as well as changed union relations. More specifically, the 
management personnel have become progressively less open to dialogue and 
mediation with the result that, with each problem that arises or each need 
that is expressed by the workers, the response is increasingly: “these are the 
conditions, if you don’t like them, you can leave”. It is widely understood 
that the fear of losing one’s job and the lack of alternatives make this an 
effective and convincing message. At the same time, the role of the union has 
radically changed, both in terms of new norms that result in the exclusion of 
an entire section of the organized workforce (the FIOM, the most active and 
vocal union in the factory) and a generalized system of clientelism, which is 
already widely diffused within the factory and has produced deep mistrust 
among many workers and a loss of credibility of their representatives. The 
sighting of union organizers freely roaming the factory even if they were 
not engaged in the work process was frequently invoked during conversa-
tions with workers, as was the impression that the union organizer was 
simply a mediator in individual cases. Many workers express a sense of dis-
affection, of disappointment, of concerns about new job instabilities. These 
views reflect the increasingly difficult conditions of work at the factory and 
the growing loss of confidence in what the future might hold. Indeed, at 
this critical stage of the company’s trajectory there is a return to a short-
term vision of the future among workers who are unable to predict events 
beyond a fairly immediate point. Such short-term perceptions were simi-
larly described by a number of Italian scholars as typical of the unemployed 
youth or those with unstable jobs, especially in the South (Leccardi 1996; 
Cesareo 2005; Buzzi et al. 2007). This short-term vision of the future now 
characterizes a working class that is no longer young, living in a relatively 
underdeveloped area with high unemployment. These workers experienced 
a phase of employment stability but must now rethink the present, ham-
pered by the impossibility of imagining an alternative work out of the Fiat 
factory. From being the bearer of certainty and stability, employment at Fiat 
now presents a new uncertainty that reaches beyond the workers themselves 
to the local community as a whole. “If Fiat falls here, everything will fall”, 
was the comment of many merchants and long-term residents of the town, 
who were acutely aware that incomes from Fiat are an element of stability 
and a driver of the larger economy. Without them, the local economy would 
certainly suffer.
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Conclusion
The case of the Fiat factory, observed over a period of 22 years, illustrates the 
ascent and decline of an industrial project, the future of which is now dark. 
The factory was born out of the prospect of reorganizing Italian automobile 
manufacturing through the importation and tradition of an exogenous (Jap-
anese) organizational model. Local conditions of increased productivity and 
containment of costs were not sufficient to turn the company around. After 
only 21 years of activity the company is experiencing faltering production 
and new forms of work instability. Launched through merger operations at 
the global scale with the acquisition of Chrysler (2014), Fiat has seemingly 
shifted its interests away from Italian factories, increasing the risks of expo-
sure of Italian workers to the effects of outsourcing (in part already a reality 
with plants in Poland and Brazil).
In the 1990s, the opening of the plant in Melfi was welcomed as a 
dream of economic and modernizing liberation, driven by the largest Ital-
ian mechanical engineering company, a protagonist of the post-Second 
World War economic boom and of the country’s modernization. However, 
the factory disappointed the high expectations of the local population and 
institutions who had placed such great hopes on a relatively futile myth. 
New forms of work introduced by the factory divided tasks into those that 
demanded high levels of skill and worker responsibility more typical of so-
called Post-Fordism, and other tasks that were characterized by their heavy, 
repetitive and alienating nature, which were continuous with the older 
Fordist assembly line. Ten years ago women workers expressed a stronger 
or weaker identification with their work depending on the particular tasks 
they carried out. However, this identification was always set within a clear 
sense of awareness of having left behind work of a more precarious nature, 
work that was invisible or poorly paid, which had characterized the work 
experience of their youth. It is important to note that the new relationships 
arising from factory work did not eradicate neighborhood relations, includ-
ing small-scale subsistence activities and the exchange of help and services, 
or the sharing of shopping. Such exchanges continued to be based in part on 
face to face relationships and pre-existing neighborhood networks and were 
partly inspired by new needs linked simultaneously to consumption and to 
saving, driven by working conditions and an assured income.
The current decline throws a heavy shadow over the future of the Melfi 
factory and more generally on the place of Fiat in Italy. Women workers 
today seem to have achieved a new status, become more sophisticated in 
terms of consumption, and more flexible and modern in terms of lifestyle. 
At a family level, new conditions have made it easier for couples to separate 
and for new families to emerge, not least as a result of women’s greater 
economic autonomy. Faced with the possibility that all of this may disap-
pear, women seem able to reorganize and resort to improvised strategies to 
supplement their income by taking on small jobs and undertaking work that 
is paid “under the table”. At present, such strategies seem to be effective in 
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making up for the loss in income caused by faltering production; from a 
longer-term perspective, they also appear to represent a kind of partial reas-
surance in the face of a new and different phase of uncertainty.
Over a period of 21 years, women workers have seemingly passed from an 
older model of work instability, characterized by invisibility, a lack of guar-
antees and low incomes to a new uncertainty, whose cloudy future masks a 
still unknown destination. Generally, the Melfi workers’ experience can be 
situated within a global panorama of a progressive, relentless “disappear-
ance” of the manufacturing industry and the manual labor class in the face 
of a growing service economy, typical of the post-industrial era. However, 
as clearly pointed out by Mollona, “old-fashioned” industry has certainly 
not disappeared. If anything, this subject begs further ethnographic inves-
tigation so as to better understand the forms and paths that industry and 
its workers will take in the future (Mollona 2009). In the Melfi case study, 
fieldwork reveals a process of cultural hybridization, which mixes historical 
memories, prior personal experiences of work instability and the ability to 
combine subsistence strategies and existential readjustments. In this process, 
the past merges with the present and proves to be a valuable resource in the 
efforts to reorganize life strategies in the face of a tough future. Memories 
of a peasant past, of fathers and grandfathers who labored in the fields to 
earn a day’s work, of emigration (to the north of Italy or abroad), and of 
the very difficult living conditions of migrants, also appears in a number of 
interviews as a cultural reference driven by a new need, or by the necessity 
of facing the possible tragedy of losing one’s job.
An ethnographic approach reveals points of overlap, cultural syncretism, 
processes of hybridization between the organizational company model and 
forms of work on the one hand, and, on the other hand, local practices 
and cultural horizons. Ethnographic investigation thus allows for a deeper 
understanding of the problematic developments surrounding the Fiat fac-
tory in Melfi which, over the course of 21 years produced, at the local 
level, at first a turning point in terms of job security and stability and then 
gradually a transformation towards the current darker phase of uncertainty 
and instability. In the face of such change, new hybrid cultural processes 
become strategies of self-defense and a means of coping with present condi-
tions, frequently drawing on their own and their families’ histories to pro-
vide a framework for the present and the future. Ilaria, a single 38-year-old 
assembly line worker who is struggling to finish her college degree, 
pointed out that her family had managed to survive by drawing on their 
resourcefulness:
My parents never starved to death. My father built coffins, he worked 
in an airplane factory, then he studied and became a hairdresser, he 
learned to work on trees . . . my mother worked as baby-sitter, a cashier 
in a super-market. They were migrants, and so I’m not afraid of moving 
either.
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This phrase reminds us that in the recent past this has been a place charac-
terized by uncertain work, of carrying out several different jobs and differ-
ent kinds of work, of the need for mobility in the search for work. Perhaps 
this memory will help the Melfi workers in the task of constructing a cul-
tural horizon that will help them face the crisis.
At the global level, the last vestiges of the Italian myth of Fiat as a giant 
manufacturer—revived in Melfi in the 1990s in what was an already critical 
phase—can be seen as an expression of a more general transformation of 
global industry, set within the crisis currently faced by Western economies. 
In this context, workers in industrial manufacturing are transforming their 
identities, their work arrangements, and their life strategies according to 
ever less self-determined trajectories that are not, however, without forms of 
resistance, mediations and the search for diverse and original local solutions.
Notes
1 The acronym SATA stands for Automobile Society for Advanced Technologies.
2 Amaranth (reddish-rose) was the color of the Melfi SATA workers’ overalls, 
entirely different from the traditional blue coveralls that have long been symbolic 
of the metalworkers. The choice of a different coverall, of a more sportive design 
and vivacious color, explicitly inspired by a casual youthful look, was the sign of 
an intended break with the past, a symbol of a new working class, born in the 
spirit of post-Fordism and the new integrated factory. In recent years the overalls 
have again been modified, this time to a sky-blue, standardized across all the 
plants. Officially, the change was motivated by economic reasons, but one might 
legitimately surmise that under new conditions and following a massive strike 
which took place in Melfi in the Spring of 2004 (Ferrero and Lombardi 2004); 
maintaining such a different overall, which had become famous in the mass media 
and the literature, no longer made sense (see also Carrieri et al. 1993).
3 “Fiatist” (Fiatisti) is an invented term that, in Italian, denotes protagonists of 
“Fiatism,” a movement with particular characteristics, and specific rules, behav-
iors and ethic.
4 The 2011 ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics) reported that in 2010 
the rate of Italian female labor force participation was at relatively low levels and 
experienced a rather slow increase compared to the EU average. At 46.1 percent 
in 2010, the Italian indicator was 12 percentage points lower that the European 
average. In the South, rates of female unemployment were twice as high as those 
in the North (15.8 compared to 7 percent), accompanied by an inactivity rate 
that was 24 percentage points higher (63.7 compared to 39.6 percent: source 
ISTAT 2011).
5 A section of the literature celebrates this industrial operation, highlighting that the 
Chrysler actions did not cost Fiat anything, and that instead the merger paid off 
with the inputs received regarding technological know-how and new management 
thus achieving “a brilliant and extremely rapid rescue operation, an out-and-out 
blitz (. . .) that would otherwise have been absolutely unworkable and impractica-
ble in an Italian reality” (Varvelli and Varvelli, 2009: 12). There also exists, how-
ever, and equally authoritative literature, as delineated below, that is more critical 
and attentive in its evaluation of the actual results of the operation, which were in 
fact far from positive. This literature also carefully situates these results within the 
history of the company and its relationship with national policy.
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6 Two crucial events occurred in the restructuring of relations between the company 
and the labor unions by which Marchionne considerably modified the organiza-
tion of work with an eye to company “governability”: a new agreement for the 
Fiat plant at Pomigliano (Naples) in June of 2010 and then for Mirafiori (Turin) 
in the fall of the same year. The next year, with law 238/2011, the exclusion of 
unions that refused to sign the agreements with the company was ratified. This 
meant, in substance, the elimination of union representatives from FIOM, the left-
wing union with the greatest number of subscribers and votes within the company, 
and which had long embodied the voice of opposition. Its exclusion walking hand 
in hand with the introduction of greater work instability and flexibility, both in 
terms of overtime and in terms of stoppages of production, the start of a more 
intense work rhythm (e.g., the new Ergo-Uas work time system), and the contain-
ment of strikes.
7 Results from a national survey supported by the FIOM trade union in 2008 (Source: 
Fiom-Cgil 2010) shows that, from a sample of 358 workers who responded to a ques-
tionnaire administered in SATA, more than 95 percent reported having backaches, 
muscular pains in the shoulders and neck, muscular pains in the arms and hands. 
More than 29 percent declared having never missed a day due to illness. In addi-
tion to these results, the first investigation conducted by FIOM and INCA (National 
Confederate Assistance Institute) between 2009 and 2010 on hidden professional 
maladies, revealed considerable problems in identifying professional illnesses on-site, 
combined with the low levels of reporting of professional illness by workers.
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Introduction
Employability is a highly debated concept. It became prominent during the 
Lisbon process as a core element of the European Commission’s strategy to 
make the European Union (EU) one of the most competitive knowledge-
based societies in the globalized world. The Europe 2020 strategy for more 
growth and jobs sees employability as a precondition to achieve the targets 
of an increased employment rate. Against this backdrop an extensive litera-
ture has emerged critiquing the relevant merits of employability. Focused 
at a macro-level, most of the debate has considered questions relating to 
how to achieve and implement employability. A number of studies have 
also sought to locate, in an empirical sense, the concept of employability 
with aspects of qualification, training and career development, yet very little 
research has been conducted at a micro-level. Significantly, understanding 
of what employability means for employees or how it may (or may not) be 
achieved by individuals, remains underdeveloped. In this chapter, employ-
ability is deconstructed at the micro-level.
The analysis addresses the question of what employability means for the 
individual worker and how this may be achieved in daily life. The main 
argument presented here is that employability should be understood beyond 
the individual struggle to find new employment or to remain in employ-
ment, as it also addresses broader challenges about personal identity. 
Employability should not be conflated with a person’s working life; rather, it 
should be understood as influenced and shaped by broader life experiences. 
Consequently, to be employable means more than being well trained as it 
encompasses “change competence”, what I call the successful management 
of change, the ability to cope with change and new challenges, and the abil-
ity to develop an interest in, and enthusiasm for, new forms of knowledge 
and capabilities, which, I suggest, requires a basic level of self-confidence—a 
capability that is acquired in the life world.2
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Furthermore, this chapter reveals the extent to which employability 
should be understood as a gendered concept3 analyzing how employabil-
ity is constituted and achieved over the entire life course. The argument is 
developed through an actor-oriented analysis of the practices contributing to 
employability making use of Bourdieu’s conceptual tools of field, actor and 
habitus. Empirically, it draws upon biographies of redundant steelworkers 
from West Germany4 and the UK collected in 2002–05.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, in the literature review, the 
conception of employability is discussed, notions of masculinity and gen-
der are presented, and Bourdieu’s concepts of the field, habitus and capital 
are exposed. Following a presentation of the research design, I will explore 
the biographical accounts of steelworkers who have recently experienced 
redundancy and who were struggling in relation to employability and 
employment. The analysis is structured around the key concerns that assist 
or constrain the search for employability, namely masculinity, identity and 
change competence. In conclusion, the role of labor market institutions in 
West Germany and the UK is evaluated arguing that they do not yet succeed 
in enhancing employability as they reproduce traditional gender roles, and 
formation of identity through employment.
Employability: Debates on Policies/Employment,  
Gender and Bourdieu
The concept of employability became popular as one of the original four pil-
lars of the European Employment Strategy (EES): employability, entrepre-
neurship, adaptability and equal opportunities. At the EU summit in Lisbon 
in 2000, the EU set targets for 2010 of 70 percent in employment and 60 
percent female participation in the labor market, and employability was seen 
as one possible way to facilitate this. In 2003, the EES was reformed, and 
employability then disappeared from the list of priorities, becoming an indi-
rect although still important goal; it is now part of the Europe 2020 initiative, 
the EU strategy for growth intending to increase employment rates to bring 
them up to a level of 75 percent. In 2008, the need to increase employability 
was underscored as part of the European Commission’s European Economic 
Recovery Plan (European Commission 2008). The objective of employability 
is to ensure that people can develop the right skills to take up job opportuni-
ties in a fast-changing world, to “acquire human capital in order to improve 
their competitive position on the labor market” (Lefresne 1999: 466), and 
“maintain the ability to participate in the processes of recruitment, selection 
and career progressing” (Gore 2005: 341–342; see Heyes 2013). Research 
on employability has analyzed what qualification and skills enable employ-
ability, emphasizing soft skills (Marks and Scholarius 2008; McQuaid and 
Lindsay 2005). However, it is unclear how these soft skills are achieved. 
Is training a sufficient instrument? Is the reform of labor market policy 
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towards more activating labor market policy an adequate prerequisite, or 
does employability comprise a still more complex approach?
The concept has thus some substantial weaknesses. First, it has often been 
(mis)used to threaten workers with the need to be responsible for their own 
capacity for securing an albeit insecure job, or in other words, for becom-
ing so called self-entrepreneurs (Voß and Pongratz 1998) by marketing and 
reinvesting in their own labor power. As employment could no longer be 
guaranteed, only the prospect of employment, in the form of employability, 
became a political objective. Hence, in politics, employability has for a long 
time only been perceived as a problem that has primarily concerned disad-
vantaged groups within the labor market, blaming the victim as individuals 
are seen as being at risk or as unemployed because they do not possess suf-
ficient levels of human capital (Coffield 1999). In this sense, unemployment 
is considered to be an individual responsibility, where the unemployed are 
somehow handicapped and hence excluded from the world of work (Stuart 
and Greenwood 2006).
The second concern is that employability is a gender-blind concept 
(Gottschall 2000). As yet, no far-reaching analysis linking the concept 
to existing gender analysis has been made. But much can be learned 
about employability by linking it to debates about gender arrangements. 
With West and Zimmerman (1987) I argue that gender is interactively 
produced (what West and Zimmerman call “doing gender”) and can 
then be understood as an (institutionalized) practice, “a configuration 
of practice” (Connell 1995: 84). This is important to note in order to 
understand that gender identity is a relevant element in creating (or more 
likely, hindering) employability. Gendered practices have an influence on 
employability, particularly where the gendered division between work 
and the household is concerned. Pfau-Effinger (1999) distinguishes five 
different gender arrangements found across Europe that reflect the nego-
tiated gendered division between work and household: (1) the family 
economy model, (2) the male breadwinner/female home-carer model, (3) 
the male breadwinner/female part-time-carer model (4) the dual bread-
winner/state-carer model where the state is regarded as more competent 
in providing care than private households, (5) the dual breadwinner/dual 
carer model (Pfau-Effinger (1999: 63ff). Although the labor markets in 
the UK and Germany represent different systems—liberal and corporat-
ist capitalisms (Esping-Andersen 2000) according to Pfau-Effinger both 
countries can be classified as primarily characterized by the strong male 
breadwinner model, enacted by institutions like schools, taxation sys-
tems and parental leave policies, which favor women staying at home 
to care for the children (Lewis and Ostner 1994; Crompton 2002). 
While it is middle class political and social values that inform the male 
breadwinner model, it is also a suitable ideal for the working class, as 
“In Britain and Germany it became part of the badge of working class 
respectability to keep a wife” (Crompton 2002: 25). Even if a pure male 
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breadwinner model didn’t work out for the working class, post-war gov-
ernments built up institutions on the assumption that male breadwinner 
models were the norm (see Daly and Lewis 1998: 9 for the UK and for 
West Germany see Pfau-Effinger 1999: 68). Although for some, attitudes 
to gender roles may have changed, the extent of the persistence of gen-
dered models is astonishing (Crompton 2002). Even unemployed young 
(middle class) men see themselves as the breadwinners, or at least aspire 
to become so in the future. Against all predictions, waged work remains 
central to young men’s identities, and older notions of masculinity persist 
(Halford 2005).
A recent study by Charles and James (2005) shows that in regions that 
have been historically influenced by heavy industry, such as the areas 
associated with steel industry, such as South Wales or the Ruhr area, the 
male breadwinning ideology persists, although it may be perceived as old- 
fashioned (Charles and James 2005). The normative expectations that men 
will fulfill the role of providers prevail even where women are de facto the 
main breadwinners.
It is worth recognizing that while women’s participation in the labor mar-
ket has increased, this has not led to changes in the domestic division of 
labor or in the allocation of caring responsibilities (Duncan et al. 2003: 316, 
compare also Speakman and Marchington 1999; Singley and Heynes 2005; 
Pilcher 2000; Crompton et al. 2005). As Yeandle suggests, with the increas-
ing employment of women in the UK and Unified Germany, there occurs a 
shift away from the male breadwinner/female carer model, towards a sixth 
model, that of the dual breadwinner/marketized female domestic economy 
model (Yeandle 1999).5
Recently, Bourdieu’s work has inspired research in economic sociology 
(Svendson and Svendson 2004; Widick 2004; Florian and Hildebrandt 2006) 
and related fields (Swartz and Zolberg 2004), yet labor studies remain a ter-
rain that has been little explored by Bourdieu’s disciples (with the exception 
of Willott and Griffin 2004). Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s theoretical perspec-
tive offers a very helpful tool, both to understand and to link all the above-
mentioned phenomena. In particular, the conceptual devices of field, habitus 
and capital are relevant to the questions raised here. To define a social field, 
one needs to know the object that actors contend for in a particular field. 
According to Bourdieu, actors struggle over the monopoly of naming what 
constitutes social reality in a field (Bourdieu 1989; 1985).6 Involvement in a 
field shapes the habitus and because of the habitus players are disposed to 
recognize and play the field. Meuser stresses that habitus is gendered in such 
a way that even if individuals lose capital in a field, the gendered habitus is 
not put into question. Life within or with a habitus produces security, and 
people try to sustain this security, thus reproducing the habitus. In a study 
on skilled workers and managers, Meuser showed men’s strategies where 
the structures to which the habitus referred are being eroded. By a process of 
“normalization”, disturbing factors are integrated into the normative order, 
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often by resorting to claims based on a biologically founded gender order. 
For example, at times when the role of the breadwinner is threatened by loss 
of income or by the additional income of wives, the order is still sustained 
through the intervention of an opposition between breadwinning as a male 
responsibility and childbearing as a female responsibility. Another strategy, 
that of “nihilization”, implies doubting stated facts, such as not accepting 
women’s labor market discrimination, referring to structural rational eco-
nomic reasons for their disadvantaged position (Meuser 1998).
Narratives of Work and Unemployment: George and Walter
The following discussion draws on biographical interviews conducted with 
steelworkers in West Germany and the United Kingdom.7 I focus on two 
biographical accounts, that of George from the UK and Walter from Ger-
many, which are supplemented by data drawn from other interviews carried 
out in these two countries. Of course, the discussion of two cases cannot 
claim to be representative, but it affords an insight into the complexity of 
the subject and highlights core aspects of the argument of this chapter.
Walter is German and was 45 years old at the time of the interview in 
March 2002. He was married and had two sons, who were 18 and 13 years 
old. Upon leaving school Walter’s only career plan was to work in a steel 
plant. The company (H) that he joined was within a short walking distance 
from his home. He joined H by chance: a friend of his had already been 
offered employment there, and he informed Walter about a vacancy. Wal-
ter applied and was hired. He was promoted to the position of assistant 
foreman, and later became shift manager, for which he received two years’ 
training. During these two years, apart from his apprenticeship, he feels he 
received the most systematic training of all his time at H. In 1995 the plant/
factory was taken over by another firm, and together with other workers, 
Walter was given the opportunity of moving to another production facil-
ity. But he decided that, for the sake of his family, he would not relocate. 
Although production at his plant was continuously being reduced, he did 
not think he would ever be made redundant. This was because the union 
had not indicated that it saw the final closure coming and because Walter 
had faith in the paternalistic nature of the plant, which he thought would 
prevent his redundancy from taking place. Walter had worked for H all his 
working life until he was made redundant due to restructuring. At the time 
of the interview, he had been unemployed for five months.
George is British and was 52 years old at the time of the interview in 
March 2002, and was employed as a manager for a trade union-based train-
ing organization. He has lived in the same steel community in South Wales 
all his life. He was employed with one and the same steel company since 
1974 until his redundancy in 2001. He had already experienced redun-
dancy twice before when he was dismissed because of restructuring. He 
had lost his job following his craft apprenticeship; he started two new jobs 
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as an unskilled laborer, while applying for several positions in his craft, but 
with no success. He started to adapt to production work, and worked in a 
number of different positions until he was able to undertake all the tasks 
included in an entire shift. His personal life was also full of challenges. He is 
currently married to his third wife. His first wife took custody of their twins 
when they divorced, against his wishes. George re-married, but domestic 
problems followed after his heart attack and his second wife left him. His 
third and current wife has a 16-year-old daughter from a previous marriage. 
George had two heart operations in 1996. In 1997 his first wife died and 
that same year his current wife discovered that she had cancer, which is now 
in remission. Then his father died in 1999. His son (one of twins from his 
first marriage) lived with his grandfather (George’s father) and was very 
close to him. Following the death of his grandfather, George’s son became 
depressed and committed suicide.
On the basis of these two cases, I would suggest that employability is 
linked to three factors: first, to the subjects’ concept of masculinity; second, 
to the dominant gender arrangements they live in, and third, to the extent 
of change competence they are able to develop. I will discuss each in the fol-
lowing sections more deeply.
Masculinity: Being a ‘Real Man’
Steel is a particularly useful identifier for a male professional [employment] 
career. Steel production is adventurous and dangerous; it interacts with the 
natural element of fire and serves as a base material for key consumer objects 
such as cars and aircraft. Steel stands for male values like mobility and 
dynamism, and its characteristics are often used metaphorically to describe 
masculinity (“firm as steel”). Maybe we could say that the steel industry is a 
male industry par excellence, in ways that are similar to what Thomas and 
Bailey claim for seafaring, in that “it epitomizes the hegemonic masculine 
image of a ‘hero’, working in a (predominantly) all male, physically danger-
ous environment” (2006: 133). Being employed in the steel industry is a 
social statement that identifies those working in it as a “real man”. Indeed, 
steelworkers almost identify with the product they are producing, and this is 
true for both countries. Just to give an example from Germany:
My motto has always been: a steelworker is born a steelworker, and he 
dies as a steelworker. It’s the same with miners. You are born a miner 
and in most cases, you leave the mill as a miner.
(Dieter)
To “be a real man” means to perform masculine roles in a specific cul-
tural setting. Being a real man is related to doing “real” work, which means 
engaging in blue-collar work. Although this type of heavy work is disap-
pearing, identification with that traditional type of worker is still very strong 
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(Hindrichs et al. 1997). A study by Lupton (2006) that compares blue-collar 
and white-collar jobs for men comes to a similar conclusion. As a librarian 
in Lupton’s study explains: “I know that my step-dad is a real man’s man . . . 
he sees white-collar jobs and managerial positions as women’s . . . whereas 
your blue-collar job is for men. [. . .] I felt probably not like a proper man 
as result of being a librarian . . . [. . .] A [librarian] is not an accepted role 
for men. It is not heavy, nor is it hard: it is white-collar, it’s something which 
doesn’t take any guts, any danger whatsoever” (Lupton 2006: 116).
When we look at the biographies, workers’ worries about the job crisis 
are less about securing employment, and more about the status of their 
male identity. The men fear losing their masculinity if they lose their jobs. 
On the other hand, the right kind of work reaffirms these gendered identi-
ties. As Walter notes: “Worse than everything is hanging around so use-
lessly. [. . .] The main thing is I want to work”. Walter’s attitude is shared 
by many of his colleagues. Sitting around makes them depressed. To give 
some examples: “I don’t like sitting around. I must do something. I am 
used to it”. “I can’t pause”. “To be honest, it is very important to me to 
work until I am 60 years old”. Therefore, the experience of redundancy 
leads to a feeling of superfluousness (see also Franzpötter 2003). However, 
just being active is not sufficient; the work has to be of a certain status. As 
Walter clarifies:
But I won’t take just any odd job. Today, now that I’m in this situation 
myself, I can understand people who are out of work but refuse to do 
some jobs. I mean, delivering bread or something, I wouldn’t do that. 
If I really can’t work in my trade, then the money has at least got to be 
somewhere near right.
A third aspect is important here: besides the issue of a man’s status on the 
labor market, traditional gender arrangements make him a “real man”, too. 
While he is the breadwinner, his wife stays at home caring for the children. 
He recalls:
I met my girlfriend when I was 22, and at 23 we got married. Three 
years later our first son came into the world, and then after a while, the 
second one. My wife is Italian and she’s two years younger than me. In 
her job she did what most Italians did then: she worked in a pizzeria 
where she used to live, and here she worked for a launderette. When our 
first son was born, she stopped working and never started again.
Having a job allows Walter to care for the basic needs of his family; his 
earnings mean that his wife can stay at home. This is also relevant for Jason, 
a British worker, who explained that his main concern in relation to redun-
dancy was to do with the distribution of responsibilities within the family. 
He said: “I didn’t think it was really fair on my missus, she’d be out working 
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and basically she was paying the mortgage and all that kind of stuff and 
I had nothing”.
This reflects the results of an analysis of job insecurity carried out in 
South Wales by Charles and James (2003). They found that redundancy is 
particularly difficult for men as it affects their role as providers within the 
household. Although regarded as old-fashioned, the provider role structures 
expectations of masculine identity, as expressed by one of their interviewees: 
“The man is the breadwinner. This is how you’re brought up anyway. If the 
man hasn’t got a job it’s not just the job insecurity, he feels less of a man, 
doesn’t he”. (Charles and James 2003: 547). And the picture is even more 
complex as illustrated by a study of seafarers on leave that shows that men 
can experience a loss of role and a threat to their masculine identities while 
still remaining the breadwinner, if they see themselves as losing power and 
authority when not performing their job in the public sphere (Thomas and 
Bailey 2006).
While breadwinning is the predominating role associated with men, it 
implies a traditional division of domestic labor. Furthermore, providing 
for the family includes a release from domestic duties at home. As Walter 
explained: “Sitting at home—what am I meant to do there? Great, then my 
wife comes and foists the vacuum cleaner on me: ‘go and clean up (. . .)’. But 
when it comes to it I should actually be providing for my family”. Domestic 
work is not considered to be an activity suited to men, and instead is closely 
associated with women’s work and women’s duties. This means that redun-
dancy does not question or challenge the gendered division of domestic 
labor because a “real man” should be earning an income as the breadwin-
ner in contrast to doing domestic work. So Walter would not take any job. 
Whatever job he takes on needs to be an appropriately “male” job, clearly 
illustrating how his gender identity hampers his employability by restricting 
his options.
Identity: A Field and Its Gender Dimension
The relationship between masculinity, home and work constitutes a field 
in the way that Bourdieu uses the term. The field we are investigating here 
then would be “a position in society” or more generally “(self-)identity”. 
Although this might not be a distinct, defined field as can be claimed for 
education, I would still like to call it a field as it is constituted by the struggle 
of involved actors creating the field. Clearly, Walter fulfilled his job as a way 
of achieving a position in society:
I’m actually quite happy with what I’ve achieved. I only had a second-
ary school education and then I developed into a foreman and quality 
controller, I’m actually really proud of that. I’ve never wanted to do 
anything else. Alternatives? I’ve never done my head in thinking about 
that, everything was all right as it was.
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But by losing the job, he also loses his self-identity. George is a contrast-
ing example, as he found new ways to define his masculinity outside the 
workplace. He committed himself to trade union activities and regained 
self-confidence and a position in society. As he explained, “Being a union 
official at the time, it was work that kept me going”.8
Drawing on these experiences, I propose that by enlarging the field or by 
extending the location of struggle over identity and social position towards 
other fields, it is possible to introduce greater stability into social positions.9 
The experiences of steelworkers in Sweden offer an interesting example. 
Here, redundant ex-steel workers were trained to become male nurses (Ran-
dle and Heinemann 2004) and, while huge resistance had to be overcome 
among the men to perform what they saw as a female profession that would 
threaten their identities, the men subsequently felt that their lives had been 
enriched by the experience arising from the training and performance of a 
new, caring profession. Thus, their male identity became less dependent on 
being a “real man” in the narrow sense espoused by Walter and George.
The extension of the struggle for oneself or for one’s identity towards 
different fields entails another advantage, that of gaining knowledge and 
capabilities that can be transformed into resources for employability in the 
field of working life. Employability, then, would mean not only to be skilled 
in relation to new challenges. Rather, it suggests that a man’s social position 
is not only defined by the workplace and instead arises from the interplay 
of societal fields. Identity in the steel sector could also become a ‘patchwork 
identity’ (Beck 1992). Employability, in a very broad sense, means build-
ing an identity through social fields so it becomes clear that worker’s rela-
tive adherence to—or flexibility towards—particular forms of masculinity 
affects their ability (or inability) to respond effectively to the crisis provoked 
by the loss of a job.
Change Competence
I define change competence as the ability to cope with change and confront 
new challenges, as well as having the capacity to develop new interests and 
engage with new knowledge. From the analysis of the biographies it is clear 
that there is something else, beyond the attainment of qualifications, which 
enables or hinders an individual’s ability to cope with redundancy in a posi-
tive way that precludes psychological or other forms of breakdown and, 
perhaps, results in finding new employment. It seems obvious that George 
was able to overcome unemployment, most probably because he has had a 
lot of experience dealing with crisis and change. George’s biography shows 
a propensity to persevere and a strength that dates back to his youth. Also, 
from very early on, George has been curious, as revealed in his statement 
about his decision to join the army: “I would join the Navy to get away 
from round here. At that time I wanted to see the world.” From an early age 
he learned to accept change and make the best of it. As he explained: “In 
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those days you had to take whatever you had, with a family to start looking 
after, you had no choice really”.
In contrast, Walter’s employment history has been characterized by sta-
bility. Walter claims that it was through the encouragement of the head of 
his craft guild that he had achieved advancement. Walter can be seen as 
belonging to what Loer (2003), in a study of the Ruhr area, called a “home-
buddy”, people who relied mainly on their community of relatives and 
neighborhood for problem-solving and for building a career (Loer 2003). 
Rather than formal qualifications, it was the recognition and support of 
peers (including supervisors) that helped him build a career. Embeddedness 
in his social milieu gave him a feeling of security that extended to the world 
of work. His refusal to take a new job at a plant located two hours away 
can be explained by his ties to the cultural milieu of the Ruhr area, such that 
a “strong region-specific social capital” (Skrobanek and Jobst 2006: 239) 
has impeded his mobility. Consequently, Walter seemed less well prepared 
to face the challenge of redundancy, having had few opportunities during his 
career to build the qualities associated with what I describe as change com-
petence. What these examples suggest is that, when considering the experi-
ence of steelworkers in the current context of global production and high 
levels of job insecurity, a great deal will depend on their life trajectories and 
their experience. If, like Walter, redundancy is a man’s first experience of 
change, the difficulties entailed by the loss of his job may well appear to be 
insurmountable. Like Walter, such workers will have no repertoire of expe-
rience from which to draw on in order to interpret their circumstances and 
elaborate effective strategies to deal with them. It is by having lived through 
troubled times caused by changes beyond their control that workers learn, 
and are thus better prepared to face the unexpected and confront the poten-
tial loss of work, identity and status, as George’s story eloquently shows.
Institutional Support Systems Enhancing Employability
In both the United Kingdom and Germany, institutional support systems 
were in place to address the employment crisis entailed by restructuring of 
the steel industry. In West Germany, social partners created so-called transfer 
agencies to absorb mass redundancies by providing advice for outplacement 
and offering individual training as preparation for new job opportunities 
(GIB 2004; Backes and Knuth 2006). The transfer agency drew up indi-
vidual employment contracts with workers who were under threat of redun-
dancy. The workers received a pay-check of 90 percent of their former salary 
in the steel company. During the period of “employment” at the transfer 
agency, workers were supposed to make use of their time to further their 
professional profiles and redirect them beyond the steel industry, whether 
through re-training or in searching for a new job. If a worker obtained a 
new employment contract, there was the option for the new employer to 
receive co-financing from the transfer agency in support of the worker’s 
salary. In effect, the new employees were given a trainee position in these 
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companies that was financed by the transfer agency. If after two years of 
employment at a transfer agency no alternative employment was found, 
workers had to leave the agency and apply to the local labor-exchange office 
for further work placement services and unemployment benefit, which is 
equal to 60 percent of the last salary. After 12 months, entitlement to unem-
ployment benefit came to an end, after which it was possible to claim what 
was referred to as “unemployment benefit 2”, which has replaced social aid 
in recent labor market reforms (Trappmann 2004). In the United Kingdom, 
it was the steel trade union, the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC), 
now called Community that initiated support through so-called Steel Part-
nership Training, now called Communitas, established in 1997. ISTC took 
the decision to facilitate the development of training and learning opportu-
nities, and Communitas was conceived to fulfill this role. Its main objective 
was to provide training and support at a local level, sometimes directly but 
more often by facilitating provision of learning opportunities for workers 
through training projects that enabled partnerships across local employers, 
colleges and other educational providers (Wallis and Murray 2002).
These institutionalized support structures in both countries aimed at 
increasing workers’ employability record by mobilizing workers in case 
of redundancy. But as this research has shown, critical factors influencing 
employability occur prior to redundancy. George has found new employ-
ment because of his personal predisposition of curiosity and due to the 
change competence he gained during his professional life. Walter has 
remained unemployed because of his inability to build his identity on any 
basis other than blue-collar work. For workers like Walter, employment is 
linked to social expectations about being a breadwinner, and these expecta-
tions, particularly the ability to provide for their families, constrain their 
ability to respond to new and critical events, such as the loss of their jobs. As 
long as there are no alternatives available to these workers through which 
they might recognize or appreciate masculinity from other perspectives or 
identify masculine practices in terrains other than those given by certain 
kinds of employment, men will continue to search for appropriately mascu-
line jobs at a time when blue-collar work is in decline in the older industrial 
centers of Europe. It is through changing gender arrangements that men can 
increase employability—support instruments that only look at the structural 
challenge of re-employment are doomed to fail.
Learning from this research, a second prerequisite for support structures 
would be to enable change competence. More instruments have to be found 
that enable experiences of change while being employed. We could consider 
the possibility of establishing a temporary exchange of workers between 
different sites of a company, or training organized through a company net-
work which would imply gaining an acquaintance with other companies’ 
work organizations, etc.10 The claim that there is a need for greater change 
competence in individuals’ lives, however, should not be read as an endorse-
ment of external flexibilization. Flexibility is only possible if all the risks of 
the modern market economy are not transferred to the individuals alone. 
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Labor market policy that only aims to mobilize workers, risks making those 
workers vulnerable and in particular, those who have little chance of finding 
alternative employment. However, the experience of change (and internal 
mobility) during regular employment, would prepare workers for external 
flexibility in case no other alternative exists.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown the connections that obtain between employment and 
identity and between displacement and biographical crisis. The role of mas-
culinity as a claim for social struggle over the field of employment has been 
illustrated, while the relevance of the gender order in enhancing or hindering 
employability has been unmasked. If an individual is responsible for his own 
employability or his un-employability, there is a need to recognize the impor-
tance of the broader contexts in which employability is achieved. And context 
is about social structures in working life and private life; it is not about quali-
fications alone but about change competence, about gender and identity. As a 
precondition for employability, participation in social life beyond the working 
life, a better work-life balance and a reconciliation of work and family life is 
needed, all of which responds to the challenges of a modern, post-industrial 
world. This inclusive conception calls for a wider understanding of the cur-
rently narrow definition of employability in relation to labor market change.
Notes
 1 This chapter is based on the project “Learnpartner: Learning in Partnership: 
Responding to the Restructuring of the European Steel and Metal Sector”, 
funded by the European 5th Framework Programme under the title HPSE-
CT2001–00049 (see Stuart 2005). The research was carried out at Sozial-
forschungsstelle Dortmund and the University of Leeds.
 2 Change competence is not to be confused with flexicurity, the new European labor 
market regulation paradigm aimed at loosening job protection while enhancing 
employment and income security (Wilthagen 1998, Mufels and Wilthagen 2013).
 3 The chapter thus seeks to contribute to recent calls for more gender-sensitive 
research in industrial relations (Edwards 2005), especially the need to gender 
“men” (Hanson 2002).
 4 In our case, it is important to distinguish between West and East Germany, as 
the gender attitudes that prevailed in the former GDR differ from those current 
in the West, as a legacy of state socialism. Female employment participation was 
the norm and public childcare was universally available.
 5 In the UK, dual breadwinner/state-carer model policies were failing due to the 
diminishing public expenditure for childcare that pushed towards privatized 
childcare solutions; in Germany, the absence of men’s participation in caring 
activities makes a dual breadwinner/dual carer model incomplete (Yeandle 1999: 
99f). An interesting example is provided by the Dutch Equal Opportunities 
Council’s attempt to stimulate men’s entry into private life by introducing a full 
working week of 32 hours instead of 38 hours. But the ambition failed: shorter 
working hours did not imply another division of domestic labor and caring. 
(Platenga et al. 1999:103).
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 6 To give an example, Bourdieu has shown for the field of education that in 
schools, it is not education that is (re-)produced or fought for, but social class (as 
in establishing the legitimacy of power and culture, ensuring good careers and so 
on) (Bourdieu 1988).
 7 Interviews were also carried out in Sweden, Norway and Spain, which are not 
treated directly in this contribution but nevertheless inform the analysis. In total, 
in all countries 80 biographical interviews were carried out with interviewees 
who have faced a situation of job crisis, whether because they were at risk of los-
ing their employment or because of having been made redundant. All interviews 
followed a common topic guideline, were taped, and afterwards transcribed. 
In the research design we focused on the narrative of a ‘told’ biography, with a 
strong interest in the ‘realistic’ content of the stories told. Following grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), we treated the life stories as accounts of 
fact, building categories and concepts arising from the interviews and assign-
ing data accordingly. Through constant comparison, categories were continually 
improved and refined. The analysis was driven by the objective of gaining an 
understanding of how individuals coped with job loss and how they found new 
jobs or, alternatively, what factors impeded their employability. Interviews were 
assessed with the clear aim of identifying those experiences that helped workers 
to find a new job or to build up employability.
 8 Factors leading to change in the field of male work-based identity, such as redun-
dancy or the increasing rate of female employment, might lead to a perceived 
discrepancy between the normative ideal of a man and the experiences of indi-
vidual men. As a result we see a growth of the fitness industry that offers new 
bodily repertoires for performances of masculinity. At the same time that there is 
evidence for an increase in health problems among men (Böhnisch 2003; Thiele 
2002) and a new backlash vis a vis feminism (McRobbie 2009).
 9 Another study has shown that men gain higher levels of satisfaction from life 
if they reduce their working hours and spend more time on other activities and 
interests. However, the study also highlights the extreme difficulties men faced 
when deciding for and living with part-time jobs. Not only is such a change 
evaluated as a downturn in their careers, but it is also the case that the tradi-
tional concept of masculinity is challenged (Schwerma 2004) as a breadwinner 
and provider and hard working man.
 10 Much stronger support structures have been proposed in a paper by Kruse 
and Trappmann 2004. There we talk about “fields of intervention” defining 
social fields in which better support before and after redundancy could enhance 
employability: these include the life world, the working life, the period of direct 
displacement, after displacement and trade unions (Trappmann and Kruse 
2004). Similar analyses has been made by Knuth, who calls for increased speed 
of placement on the labor market in order to animate labor mobility (Knuth 
2002: 327).
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Introduction
This chapter addresses the ways in which day laborers attempt to cope with 
precarious employment conditions in the context of informal shipbuilding 
activities in Perama, a suburb of western Piraeus. I focus on how workers 
conceive of their involvement in local labor processes and in the social rela-
tions that emerge from, or are consolidated through their efforts to make 
ends meet.
The Greek shipbuilding industry is centered around the Perama region, 
which accounts for 87 percent of the country’s shipbuilding and ship repair 
activities. It is strategically located at the crossroads of important maritime 
routes, between the Black Sea and the Suez Canal, the Black Sea and Gibral-
tar and is close to the route between Gibraltar and Suez. There are approxi-
mately 850 small-scale enterprises employing a largely casual workforce. 
Currently, the area is undergoing a devastating deindustrialization process 
due to global competition, organizational weaknesses, technological lags 
and the absence of state policy regarding the shipbuilding industry. The 
unemployment rates for the economically active population have reached 
worrying levels and were increasing long before the advent of the recent 
economic recession, which hit the Greek economy in 2010. Currently, the 
sector employs fewer than 1,000 workers while in 2008 more than 6,000 
workers were employed. Yet, it must be noted that the structure of employ-
ment in the area makes it impossible to reach accurate figures for the number 
of workers employed in the sector. The ethnography of this sector portrays 
a harsh and insecure context within which workers look for jobs regardless 
of the employment conditions, for example, where health and safety meas-
ures are absent, and earnings are below the minimum wage (what is locally 
described as a “broken wage”) and workers have no job security. In a con-
text of limited and unstable availability of work, re-employment depends 
on workers’ acquiescence to the employer’s (often demanding) practices and 
the contacts each worker has created through local social activities.
The destructive consequences of deindustrialization are clearly exposed 
in the accounts of workers in the shipbuilding industry. One informant 
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explained that “the area is to the workers what the heart is to man. If it 
stops ticking, he dies”. Considering that in most local households at least 
one member currently is or has been employed in this industrial activity 
(Vlachos and Lazopoulos 1997), it becomes clear that changes in the sector 
will have widespread and profound repercussions for the local community, 
in both material and social terms. Furthermore, the ethnographic data show 
that, as far as local workers are concerned, socially meaningful relationships 
and webs of significance are created in relation to the workplace (Pardo 
1996), both in and out of work in the context of a very adverse labor mar-
ket. Shipbuilding workers devise survival practices and attitudes that can 
be useful in coping with the harsh conditions by extreme situations (Procoli 
2004) in the past or in the present where the gradual downsizing of local 
industrial activities accelerated the economic recession.
The experience of being in and out of work in the area of Perama is pri-
marily defined by the structure of shipbuilding and ship repair, characterized 
by two key procedures: contractors bargain for the repair of a part or the 
whole of a ship and potential employees negotiate for their employment on 
a daily basis. Depending on market conditions, the relationship between 
bosses and workers is mediated by commitments stemming from formal and 
informal contracts that are devised in the context of an employment regime 
based on subcontracting1. The vast majority of workers are employed casu-
ally in non-standard forms of employment and it is therefore difficult, if not 
impossible, to accurately establish the number of workers in this sector. At 
the same time, there are many who work in jobs other than those they are 
specialized for, while others try to find jobs in other sectors or occupations 
as day laborers. In the rare case where formal contracts are agreed, bosses 
and workers comply with the National Collective Working Agreement, 
signed on an annual basis. However, the most usual employment arrange-
ments do not follow the National regulatory labor framework, and, instead, 
they are based on informal arrangements, such as oral ones.
In Perama, the economic recession occurred in the last years under the 
supervision of international economic organizations, following a longer 
period of deindustrialization2 that started in the mid 1990s3. These cir-
cumstances contribute to the integration of the majority of workers under 
very unfavorable terms and conditions, with a majority of them in infor-
mal economic activities (Mingione 1989; Benton 1990; Vaiou and Chatzi-
michalis 1997:35). Informal sector work is crucial, sometimes this may be 
the only kind of work available to support and strategically rearrange the 
conditions of their social reproduction (Goddard 1996). It also serves as a 
basis for the creation of cultural capital that sustains a person’s symbolic 
“value” that also constitutes the basis for exchange, whereby economic 
capital that can be transformed into other forms of benefits or disadvan-
tages (Berger 1995: 45).
Despite recent trends that result in worsening conditions for workers in 
the sector, these patterns of employment have a longer history and are a 
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more enduring feature of the area. They are not simply an unprecedented 
consequence of globalization and the pressures that global markets impose 
on local agents, as the local labor market has always been part of the fluctu-
ations, the recessions and recoveries of global shipping capital4. The casual 
structures of employment preexisted today’s crisis and casual work co-exists 
with strategies to hire a minimum number of full-time (core) workers. The 
novel element of local employment patterns is one of scale, related to the 
fact that the casualization of labor is now an everyday, familiar misfortune 
for a growing number of workers. This is because the current recession has 
had a broad impact, affecting the entire economy, and therefore affecting a 
very large sector of the workforce and their families.
Solidarity, “Rabbits” and “Sneaks”
The scarcity of jobs and the hierarchical character of the labor market have 
intensified competition among workers, who are compelled to engage in 
antagonistic games of competition that have become more central in the 
current recession. Charalambos explained that competition between con-
tractors has harmed the relationships among workers and the struggle to 
secure profitable deals with ship-owners puts pressure on workers to sell 
their labor power cheaply. He feels that people in the area distrust each 
other and are skeptical about the other workers’ motives and intentions. 
These, he suggest, respond to the need to compete for jobs, whether one 
is employed or unemployed. Consequently, workers’ efforts support their 
bosses’ interests in making their business competitive and workers have to 
excel to maintain the reputation of the company for which they work.
Tasos sees himself as a representative of the contractor and therefore has 
to be productive and, above all, punctual. He knows he is an experienced 
craftsman, but he must demonstrate his skill and dexterity to his co-workers 
and to his boss. But he works alongside other craftsmen who also must do 
likewise. Productivity thus emerges as the sole criterion of performance and 
the focus for competition among metalworkers. So Tasos pushes himself 
and his assistant, constantly urging his “right hand” as he calls him, to be 
quick and to prepare the tools needed faster than the other workers. He is 
aware that completing a task in a shorter time is good for him and for the 
enterprise. In fact, he believes that being productive is at the heart of the 
circulation of money and thus of his own existence as worker, contributing 
to a constant supply of jobs. For him, as for other a workers, competition 
is both unavoidable and necessary to survive. Productivity, so central to the 
competitive process of workers and firms, becomes an aspect of personal 
status and self-esteem (Cohen 1985), while workers’ worthiness is identified 
with the notion of “egoismos” (selfishness)5.
Nikos, who used to work full-time in the local shipyards, believes that 
Greeks are by nature selfish and strive constantly to demonstrate their good 
character. He argued that “egoismos” is more than a way of behaving; it is a 
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value inherent in “our people”. He told how the foreman of a shipyard where 
he worked was struggling to find the solution to a problem when Nikos took 
the initiative and proposed a solution that reduced production time consider-
ably. He received no reward and was not given any credit for his innovation 
as the foreman considered that it was an integral part of his normal duties. 
Instead, he was aware of his colleagues’ jealous eyes “on his back”.
Despite the negative effects of this divisive setting, the majority of work-
ers in the area see this as an inevitable condition of work. For Nikos, this 
practice is harmful as far as work and social life are concerned and is an 
aspect of a view that is frequently expressed locally, that the “big fish eats 
the smaller one; but they do not care so much about the quality of the 
food”. Petros, a local foreman, is one of the “big fishes” in the zone. In his 
view, competition has the effect of disorganizing working class struggles 
because everyone is exclusively concerned with their own interests. Petros 
recognizes the ambiguities of workers’ positions regarding work: on the one 
hand, those who do not perform competitively cannot survive and on the 
other, those who do behave competitively are benefiting their bosses. In this 
way a competitive value is created, but on the wrong basis.
The value of competition is best illustrated by the notion of the “rab-
bit”. Petros explains that almost every “shop”6 in the zone recruits a rabbit. 
I came to realize that the “rabbit” is the fastest worker, who is indispensable 
to the enterprise because he provides the benchmark from which others are 
measured. The rabbit unleashes a competitive struggle that spreads across 
the workforce, increasing individual productivity and production. One of 
Petros’ duties is to identify and recruit “rabbits” to place them in each part 
of the labor process. Petros sees the rabbits as a means to increase produc-
tivity and to counter the tendency of workers to slow down in the absence 
of a suitable stimulus. But potentially at least everyone can be a “rabbit”, in 
the workplace and in everyday interactions in the light of widespread fear of 
losing one’s job and the difficulties faced in securing a weekly wage.
Another category to emerge during fieldwork is the category of “sneak”. 
This refers to a person who acts against established ethics and practices by 
resorting to what are seen as unfair interventions. The category of the sneak 
includes ship-owners, politicians, trade unionists and all those who in one 
way or another are seen to “sabotage” working class interests and solidarity.7 
Although the category is stigmatized, metalworkers believe that everyone can 
become a “sneak” under certain circumstances, and especially in the cur-
rent conditions of recession. The best example of a “sneak” is someone who 
accepts a job with what is called a broken day’s wage, which means he is 
willing to sell his labor power at a rate lower than the legal minimum wage.
Mass redundancies and job shortages have made a mockery of workers’ 
struggles according to Panagiotis, the ex-president of the trade union. Pana-
giotis explains that although rules do exist in Greece, these are ignored by 
employers and employees. In the local discourse, the law is a mere idea, a 
fantasy that disguises the real illegalities incurred by all. Contractors fully 
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exploit the economic crisis when searching for labor, seeking personal agree-
ments with individual workers rather than following the law and signing 
up to collective agreements and thus recruiting workers who agree to lower 
wages. Panagiotis explains that before the economic crisis, these practices 
were not widespread because work was readily available and workers could 
somehow secure proper work conditions and pay in line with the national 
minimum wage agreement. For him, however, asymmetrical working condi-
tions were almost always the local rule. “Sneaks” have always existed, even 
during periods of abundant employment, although no one would readily 
acknowledge that he is a “sneak” or that he violates the ideal of work-
ing class solidarity. Because the area is constantly experiencing recessions, 
much of the local workforce appears to comply with the ideals of working 
class comradeship while trying to address their own interests. Panagiotis 
remarks: “That is the way it goes in the system we live in. To change the 
system, we have to change ourselves first and this is the most difficult issue 
here, as unemployment entails not only low wages but, above all selling 
out our class consciousness”. Those who sell their labor for “crumbs” are 
considered to undervalue themselves as workers and human beings. They 
become “sneaks” ’ to get a place in the paradise of the daily wage,8 but this 
does not ensure the conditions of their reproduction as workers since they 
are not the only “sneaks” in the area. For Sotiris, the term divides work-
ing class men in the existing working conditions. He had become isolated 
because he refused to engage in the sneak’s strategies to secure a job.
Sotiris, a tube maker, worked alongside many who had accepted lower 
wages. Fellow workers were reluctant to admit this but, while out with a 
co-worker he had invited for a beer, his friend admitted that none of their 
colleagues were properly paid. All had made “under-the-table” agreements 
with the boss, accepting lower wages. Sotiris was not totally surprised. The 
violation of the national minimum wage agreement is the outcome of job 
insecurity and of rising unemployment. Consequently, metalworkers pro-
vide a source of cheap labor and local firms almost constantly recruit them 
through local social networks. In the face of uncertainty, workers seek to 
persuade contractors that they are worthy of employment. Sotiris says that 
as workers,
We are not different from the immigrants who have overrun our coun-
try. In many aspects I feel like a foreigner, although I have worked here 
for over ten years. When I mention this to my co-workers they reply: ‘so 
what?’ They do not feel responsible for the status they have established 
in the zone, and they do not realize that by this practice they both facili-
tate and perpetuate their exploitation. Instead of making the contrac-
tors’ life difficult, they help them.
Giorgos is an ex foreman who lives in Perama and has worked in the area 
for 33 years. He gave up the offer of a permanent position because he was 
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not a “sneak”. His boss hired workers for lower wages and failed to provide 
the required safety equipment. Despite frequent inspections, the contractor 
was never convicted.9 For Giorgos, the category of “sneak” is inextricably 
linked to corruption, which is widespread in the area, given the difficulties 
entailed in controlling the scattered work sites that extend from the port of 
Piraeus to the western end of Perama bay.
Giorgos says that he is not happy because he did not fully manage to 
abstain from a system that rewards the insidious, the cunning and the mali-
cious. It is too late for him now, as he is approaching retirement age. He man-
aged, however, to avoid as much as possible the status of self-exploitation 
and humiliation and the stigma of a sneak; in the last analysis, he explains 
that this is the blot one should try to avoid.
“Getting by”, Risk and Precarity
In Perama it is particularly difficult to track the ways workers are involved 
in the Marxian processes of relative or absolute surplus value, given the dif-
ferent contracts and the blurred formal and informal conditions of employ-
ment. As a metalworker said,
The smaller the business is, the more difficult the inspection becomes; 
nobody talks. When the job is short-term it is still difficult to be offi-
cially visible. So, ‘broken wages’ and accidents go together even if the 
union inspects regularly the workplace. The accident can happen any-
time, any hour, an oversight can cause a fatal accident or any other kind 
of accident. But it isn’t only that, people do not just die while working 
on the ship, there are people crippled and diseased by the nature of the 
work etc. In essence, for these workers nobody speaks up.
Casual labor affects the vast majority of workers. Due to the structure of 
employment and to currently low levels of demand, workers look for a way 
out not only in the local market but beyond, in a search for jobs that may 
help to increase their income. Thus, it is usual for workers to have several 
jobs and generate income through these various jobs that are in a way related 
to the specialties required by the shipbuilding sector. This practice consti-
tutes an alternative way of improving the terms of social reproduction as 
well as of enhancing choice regarding specific kinds of casual employment, 
depending on the prevalent conditions. To the degree that employment is 
qualitatively downgraded through precarious contracts and the expansion 
of opportunistic subcontracting (Holmes 1986), the critical assessment of 
survival needs weighed against the conditions of a job informs workers’ 
decisions to either accept or turn down job offers. Indeed, many informants 
for whom issues of safety and security were a priority might choose to turn 
down work offered by particular contractors, regardless of the financial dif-
ficulties they are faced with.
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Local employment patterns have rarely been based on a full-time work 
model. The local contracts or “contrata” are agreed orally (Watson 2001) 
or, more rarely, officially among the parties involved. Thus, the region 
is financially embedded in the global division of labor whereas the local 
division of labor is based on the circulation of information, on everyday 
encounters, visits to workplaces in search for employment and on work-
ers’ relations with local bosses. Consequently, the distribution of informa-
tion10 is the key strategic element in the hierarchical organization of the 
employment structure. Long-term practices of barter and exchange, pro-
viding favors, services and mutual support, are part of the local social and 
historical background, playing a crucial role in coping with daily prob-
lems. Social networks conveying information about jobs are central to the 
management of everyday life, in addition to which social relations pro-
vide the means to obtain supplementary income and livelihoods, whether 
through casual wages or food supplies from workers’ places of origin in 
the countryside and other resources made available through family net-
works. These forms of provisioning work towards making ends meet by 
drawing on different sources, like the market, the state, the community 
or the domestic group.11 Workers therefore attempt to expand their social 
contacts through family, friendship and neighborhood relationships, as 
well as the trade union.
For example, Nikos, an ex-subcontractor, often recruited kin to work in 
his business. Many friends asked him for assistance in finding employment, 
both in Perama and in Piraeus, because they were aware that he had an 
extensive social network.12 Through Nikos, I met Kostas and Mata. Kostas 
was forty-five years old and was employed as a foreman. Mata was a forty-
year old accountant who was out of work. Mata’s brother, Alexandros, used 
to be sailor in the merchant fleet. He used to “travel”, as Mata says, before 
doing his military service. As soon as he met his wife-to-be he stopped 
“traveling” and found employment on “shore”. Mata helped her brother 
get a position doing odd-jobs in the enterprise where she worked. Later, 
Mata’s husband hired him as an assistant in the shop where he worked as a 
foreman. While there was work in the zone all was well. Alexandros built 
his own house above his sister’s flat and the family grew with the birth of 
two children. When the zone began to decline, he faced serious problems: 
his brother-in-law could no longer hire him and he faced increasingly pre-
carious conditions. Alexandros desperately needed a permanent job, espe-
cially since his wife could not contribute financially to the household and he 
was not eligible for support from the Unemployment Office, because he had 
been unable to accumulate the required number of working days in order to 
qualify. After seven years of working on the mainland he decided to return 
to sea. Sailors also faced tough conditions, given ship-owners’ preference 
for foreign—and cheaper—seamen. His family supported him again and 
his godfather, who worked in a shipping company, helped him find work 
on a merchant ship for a couple of months and eventually he got a full-time 
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contract. Mata is happy with this, as she considers that her brother is a good 
worker and breadwinner.
The good breadwinner is a widely recognized category among Perama 
workers. In discussions held at the trade unions’ headquarters, Tasos 
explained that a good breadwinner must pay his debts, be frugal and save 
as much money as possible. He will then be able to face future economic 
problems which, considering the current recession, are very likely. Most 
workers aspire to being good breadwinners and Tasos considers that he 
qualifies as such because although he experienced long periods of unem-
ployment, his household has never lacked the basic necessities. This he 
attributes to his sound management of money and his ability to safeguard 
his savings. Nikos, also a metalworker, also prioritizes his savings. He is 
42 years old, married to Evangelia and has two children. The family live in 
the Ikariotika area of Perama since their parents, like so many other work-
ing class people in the zone, are originally from Ikaria. Nikos started work 
at 16, to contribute to the family’s income. By his 20s he had obtained a 
ship engineer’s diploma and went to sea on a merchant ship. However, he 
decided to stay on the mainland when he became engaged to Evangelia at 
the age of 24.
In Nikos’ view, the zone and Perama are going through the worst reces-
sion he can remember. For him and his family there are difficulties in cover-
ing daily expenses, taxes, children’s expenses and so on. They live in their 
own home, which they received as Evangelia’s dowry. Despite this, and 
although he has a wide social network in the zone, the situation is becoming 
harder. Whereas he used to work on a regular basis—almost every month— 
nowadays he might be unemployed for up to three months. In-between 
jobs he tries to generate an income, drawing on his extended network. For 
instance, he set up a metalwork business with a close friend, using another 
friend’s “shop” in Perama as their headquarters. Although they were suc-
cessful initially, the business closed after a couple of months as a result of the 
recession. Furthermore, neither had networks that extended beyond Perama, 
which placed them at a disadvantage as far as building the company was 
concerned. Nikos decided to return to Ikaria to seek work in the construc-
tion industry but found that there, too, there were declining demands for 
workers. So he returned to Perama and to his trade.
Whenever possible Perama workers try to maximize their opportunities 
for finding employment, although this usually entails illegal contracts that 
deprive them of the stamps they need to access pensions. Furthermore, these 
jobs can be demanding and entail high levels of risk. For example, workers 
may join a “mission”, whereby contractors recruit a crew that is sent to 
work on a ship in another harbor. While the same hierarchy and conditions 
of work apply as in Perama, the work on these missions is harder and, above 
all, is fully deregulated. On a mission workers cannot escape the foreman’s 
gaze and they are forced to work as long as the boss requires and full dereg-
ulation is possible because in the majority of cases the repair is carried out 
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while the ship is at sea. This means that workers are exposed to many dan-
gers, exacerbated by the inadequacy of health and safety measures. Nikos is 
well aware of this but is eager to join a “mission”, even if it is for a couple 
of months, with a view to making good money. Each time Nikos sails to 
carry out one of these deadly and illegal jobs his wife wonders: “Will I see 
him again?”
Conclusions
The dominant relations of production in the Perama shipbuilding industry 
combine with market pressures to create very limited and irregular demands 
for labor in which local contractors play an important role as mediators 
between production and market processes. Workers must try to make the 
right choices and carefully manage their labor and their resources. Casual-
ized labor conditions in the industry mean that shipbuilding workers are 
continually in-between employment and unemployment. During the golden 
era of shipbuilding, they could meet their needs through work and through 
mobilizing their social relations and engaging with local power relations. 
Now they are faced with the consequences of long-term decline and dein-
dustrialization that began in the mid-1990s, exacerbated by the current 
economic crisis. Forced to enter a highly informal economic context, they 
handle— though not always successfully— the conditions of their existence 
through their social networks. Consequently, peripheral workers coexist 
with core workers, informal production with formal production, registered 
employment with unregistered employment, collective struggles with indi-
vidual ones, legally built houses with illegal ones, employed people with 
their unemployed counterparts, social solidarity with individualistic inter-
ests, vulgar exploitation with bonds of comradeship, competitive emotions 
with strong networks of friendship, making a living with lethal accidents 
during work.
These processes are not a new phenomenon in the area, as Perama work-
ers have long been exposed to the vagaries of international shipping capital, 
global tonnage demand and global supply, EU and governmental policies. 
So Perama workers have experienced the effects of remote power structures, 
even in times of affluence, before the current economic recession. They 
experienced the risks and instabilities of the market economy, along with 
the tragic irony of the negative effects of “flexible” post-industrial capi-
talism, which now dominates labor relations. They are, and have always 
been, employable, struggling in the labor market through their skills, abili-
ties and work experiences. They have always been adaptive and responded 
to the fluctuations of the market because they have no choice. They have 
undertaken risks when trying to earn their own living in a harsh and inhu-
mane environment. However, in the last decade there has been a gradual 
transformation towards permanent insecurity and poverty, with irreversible 
consequences.
118 Manos Spyridakis
Perama workers are subjected to the rules that govern unequal labor rela-
tionships, conscious of their desire to achieve social reproduction negotiat-
ing their labor power on their own, developing their own code of values 
through which they perceive their survival, social relationships and their 
connection with wider hierarchical institutions and arrangements. From this 
point of view, the ethnographic case of Perama provides an opportunity to 
highlight the fact that although agents are seemingly integrated passively 
into power relations, they perceive these relations and their participation 
in them from their own perspective, one that is informed by past and pre-
sent conditions of existence. They reproduce the disciplinary power they are 
subjected to by managing their accumulated personal experience and their 
personal and social resources to improve the conditions of their life. In this 
sense, it is important for future research to investigate the power of those 
who are seemingly powerless.
Notes
 1 Subcontracting has been a historical feature of the regional economy almost 
since the emergence of the local industrial activities involving casual and non-
standard forms of employment for workers. From the perspective of local bosses, 
it is a very profitable form of employment since the flexibility it introduces pro-
vides the opportunity for rapid adaptation to changing market conditions, while 
also reducing costs and risks. According to Holmes, there are, broadly, three 
subcontracting categories: capacity subcontracting, specialization subcontract-
ing and supplier subcontracting (Holmes 1986). This system relies heavily upon 
extended social networks through which information about employment availa-
bility is diffused throughout the region. The information circulates among work-
ers and coincides to a great extent with the local social process of work. The local 
informal system of production is at the same time part and parcel of the local 
social relationships and of the network within which they are embedded. The 
informal aspect of employment relationships structures the ways through which 
the information is disseminated, that is, within a silent and secret framework, 
a “conspiracy of silence” (Vaiou and Chatzimichalis 1997: 64). Subcontracting 
relies heavily on this kind of recruitment in order to minimize labor costs. This 
explains why it is in the interest of local businessmen to create a large local web 
of acquaintances and connections in order to have alternative sources of labor 
available. On this issue, see also Zlolniski 2006.
 2 A typical example is the closing down of many textile industries previously 
located in Piraeus as well as many small-scale shipbuilding and repairing indus-
trial units, fertilizer, plastic and metalwork plants, flourmills and foundries 
(Trade Union of Piraeus 1995).
 3 According to a document of the Piraeus Shipbuilders’ Association addressed to 
the Ministry of Development regarding the constitution of a ship constructors’ 
record in the region, the following dimensions are characteristic of the situation: 
“A basic fact has not been considered, that the small-scale enterprises which we 
represent are businesses which act periodically and not continuously. And this is 
due to the fact that repairing a ship is not a stable production process, since the 
ships are not always in need for repair, nor are they constantly being constructed. 
Our companies, when there are no active repair contracts, are not operating, are 
not active, and are not employing workers. When they are active, at specific peri-
ods of time, they employ workers with a fixed-term employment contract. The 
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workers’ union has repeatedly stated that the workers in the zone area have the 
opportunity to earn 100 up to 150 number of day wages per year. It is not pos-
sible, therefore, to employ workers with an open-ended work contract, since that 
would not allow us to continue our operation and, in any case, is not consistent 
with the nature of our activity” (Piraeus Shipbuilders’ Association 1997).
 4 For a more detailed account on the issue, see also Spyridakis 2006.
 5 On this idiom, see also Herzfeld 1985.
 6 It is the name of business in the local idiom.
 7 The rules of proper work, in all its aspects, are not only violated by workers 
and contractors. State officials responsible for inspecting the conditions of work 
constitute another category of sneaks in local representations simply because, 
although they are aware of the illegal practices in the zone, they do nothing 
about it, as is also the case in other ethnographic contexts. For workers, state 
officials represent the ethic of corruption and unwillingness to challenge illegal-
ity. From this point of view, they constitute a group that constantly deviates from 
its duties and thus helps to perpetuate illegal wages in the zone.
 8 Another dimension of the practice of wage hunting through the cultural category 
of ‘sneak’ is the recognition of self esteem achieved by taking money for the com-
pletion of a certain task. As Willis puts it, “Though it is difficult to obtain stat-
ure in work itself, both what work provides and the very sacrifice and strength 
required to do it provides the materials for an elemental self esteem. This self 
esteem derives from the achievement of a purpose which not all—particularly 
women—are held capable of achieving. The wage packet is the provider of free-
dom, and independence: the particular prize of masculinity in work” (Willis 
1993: 150).
 9 Before the arrival of the inspection committee, the boss was warned in advance 
by someone working in the office which bore the responsibility for legal com-
pliance. A few moments before the committee’s arrival, the contractor, in col-
laboration with his foreman, would distribute crash helmets to the workers and 
would instruct them how to behave in front of the inspectors. Giorgos claims 
that this example is the norm in the area and believes that he was fired from the 
‘shop’ because he often commented on this issue.
 10 In this line of argument Narotzky, referring to Spain, stresses that “the domi-
nant model of economic development now incorporates the importance of “non-
economic” social relations that are deemed increasingly necessary for the local 
establishment of dynamic entrepreneurial practices and flexible relations of pro-
duction” (Narotzky 2004: 57).
 11 Provisioning includes complex connections between agents in material, social 
and cultural terms (Narotzky 2005)
 12 This kind of interaction has a multidimensional character, not only economic. 
As Mackee states, ‘It is important to stress that the unemployed families evalu-
ated the type of help available not so much in terms of its quantity, extensiveness 
or frequency, but commented more on the spirit in which it was given’ (Mac-
kee1987: 103).
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In my earlier work on Poland and the Netherlands I have made extensive use 
of two longer life stories, one told by Maria van de Velde in Eindhoven, the 
other by Krisztof Zadrozny in Wroclaw. Against the background of other 
life interviews I held in these settings, those two exceptionally rich stories 
helped me to understand in more subtle and complex ways the antagonis-
tic intimate experiences and immediate struggles that were characteristic 
of—but can never be “read off”—the historical dynamics of class in the 
places and times in which these histories were lived and narrated. These 
were working class stories grappling with the locally lived contradictions of 
the pre and high welfare state period in the Netherlands (1950–90), and the 
“transition” from “really existing socialism” to really existing capitalism in 
Poland (1985–2005), respectively.
Both these stories expressed lives unfolding within the proverbially high-
pressure relationships of export-oriented mass manufacturing in the light 
electrical sector. Perhaps more than any other industry, this particular sector, 
since it emerged in the late 19th century, has been emblematic of “emerging” 
and “catch up” regions. In this context of perceived local backwardness, it 
has been surrounded by hopes and ideologies of modernity, welfare, security 
and middle class consumption. However, in order to secure competitiveness, 
it often rooted itself deeply within local histories and relationships. In fact, 
more often than not, the relational logics embedded in those prior histo-
ries were magnified, thus turning the promised modernity into an uncom-
fortably lingering past. Despite its futuristic glamour, electrical production 
remained mostly based on a big component of low to middle skilled labor, 
often highly feminized, strong on kinship ties, weak on formal organization 
and by definition exposed to ruthless competition from emergent sites with 
even more exploitable proletariats in the making.
I have never before, in any publication, set these stories in relation to 
each other. They were part of what I thought of as separate projects: one in 
Western Europe, which I carried out in the early 1990s, the other in post-
socialist Eastern Europe (now called Central Europe) conducted in the late 
90s and early 2000s. They were also part of apparently separate analyses. 
What could a socialist/post-socialist case study of industrial privatization 
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and restructuring after the fall of the Wall have to do with a solidly capital-
ist and Western story of female exploitation and urban-industrial patriarchy 
in the 1950s? Yet in retrospect the stories, while discontinuous in time and 
place, are closely implicated in each other and in ways that are, on closer 
scrutiny, of surprising contemporary anthropological significance.
For one, the Whirlpool “white goods” manufacturing complex in Wro-
claw, probably the biggest in the sector in contemporary Europe, was an 
indirect offspring of the Philips large domestic appliances’ sector once head-
quartered in Eindhoven. Exposed to fierce competition from cheaper Italian 
manufacturers, in the 1970s Philips sought to move up the ladder of added 
value, and sold this typically “mid-tech” business to the Italians. Italian 
capital, similarly moving up in the 1990s, sold its mass-production inter-
ests to the US-based Whirlpool. Whirlpool then became the holding around 
which the entire sector began to consolidate within a re-unified Europe. In 
2002 it took over the “Polar” plant in Wroclaw, then one of the biggest 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), from a failing French investor, and 
made it the prime European production site for refrigerators, dishwashers, 
washing machines and so on, marketed under various labels including the 
old Italian ones. Thus, apparently disconnected in time and territory, these 
were in fact different sites within one European/global rhythm of capital-
ist accumulation, a rhythm deeply entangled with a particular combination 
of “low to middle tech” electronic technologies, consumer products and 
competitive markets. This was set in motion by capital of an increasingly 
oligopolistic and transnational nature, in the end traded on the Amsterdam 
and New York stock exchanges, and hence becoming thoroughly tuned into 
the global value regime. It is noteworthy that oligopoly in a sector as com-
petitive as this one does not imply major curbs on market competition and 
hence a relaxation of pressures.  Rather, it means that there is a small num-
ber of hands-on actors who dictate these pressures.
But what is most fascinating from the point of view of an anthropology 
of class is that both stories were narratively framed around what I gradu-
ally came to understand as an involuntary and perhaps somewhat com-
pulsive conversation, waged both intra-personally, privately and sometimes 
publicly—not necessarily with a steady voice—on value, or more precisely 
on personal worth and worthlessness. This alludes to an overwhelmingly 
urgent contemporary anthropological issue: the question of what is believed 
to generate value, the competing folk theories on value and its opposite 
(including those usually represented as “expert theories”), the proponents 
of those theories, and the struggle among them. While being very different 
stories about very different local relations, both addressed deep concerns 
about the possibility of lives being made worthless and hence devalued in 
the context of particular regimes of value and accumulation.
Ideas of personal worth and worthlessness are in contemporary academic 
language often evoked through the lofty concept of “dignity”. Dignity 
is a key concept of Catholic-Christian social teaching and theology, as it 
is of other religions. The coupling of “cultural value” and “dignity” has 
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historically been offered, not only by conservatives, as a more wholesome 
and ethical rival to the liberal and Marxist notions of “value and interest”, 
rejecting the latter’s connotations of pragmatism, individualism, material-
ism, conflict and struggle as supposedly inescapable facts of modern life. 
“Value and dignity” were also important notions within the ethical social-
isms of Proudhon or Polanyi. The “protection of personal dignity” within 
mutuality is also a core idea of anarchism, which is presently being resur-
rected among the anthropological Left. Although both my informants, were 
Catholic, one of them a schooled Catholic social activist, rather than using 
the Catholic vocabulary, they spontaneously coined their thoughts in this 
more down to earth language of “worth and worthlessness”, which seems 
a perhaps intentionally unstable hybrid of value theory and market-speak. 
While appreciative of the ethical foundations and prefigurative aims of these 
pre and non-Marxian approaches, I suggest that a more analytic and rela-
tional understanding of the origins, meanings and functions of these two 
compulsive conversations on value and worthlessness might well take its cue 
from some Marxian reflections.
Investment bankers these days often talk about themselves with a charac-
teristic lack of modesty as “the discoverers and un-lockers of value”. They 
also speak freely about “high worth individuals”, the ones that magazines 
such as Forbes and Fortune report on. These are people with “heavenly 
bank-accounts”, as Frank Zappa would say. But beyond the dollars, the 
bankers’ notion of “high worth individuals” also suggests that these are 
people worthy of unrestricted attendance to their needs and wishes by the 
“discoverers of value”. Worthlessness, in contrast, is what describes, mostly 
in acerbic and strident tones, not only the bank accounts of the plebs but 
also, and often in the form of a resolute critique, the kind of social relations 
and practical moralities that are attributed to them: undependable, nonre-
ciprocal, undeserving, volatile, lumpen, less than solid and with unpredict-
able edges: scrap metal rather than gold.
Terence Turner has reminded us recently that Marx built his critique 
of political economy not only on the labor theory of value, but in no less 
measure on a value theory of labor under capitalism (Turner 2005). Value 
under capitalism, Marx argued, was not measured by exchange prices on 
the market or the application of units of labor power, although the latter 
was certainly the ultimate source of all value. Rather, value in capitalism 
was realized only if and when products embodying the cost of “socially 
necessary labor time” plus the fixed and variable costs of the capitalist could 
actually be sold with a profit on the market. The value theory of labor 
demands that living labor can only be allowed to reproduce itself as “valu-
able” living labor if it reciprocally allows capital a degree of exploitation 
and competitiveness that, in the end, does not compare unfavorably to the 
degree of exploitation and competitiveness realized elsewhere in the sys-
tem. Thus, the value that investment bankers will claim to have discovered 
has already been produced. Marx used the example of the Yorkshire hand-
loom weavers after the introduction of machine driven looms in Lancashire. 
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These machine looms doubled the productivity of labor in the area around 
Manchester. From now on, Marx argued, the value of the labor power of 
handloom weavers in Yorkshire was only half of what it used to be (Marx 
1976: 125–31). It is this unrelenting value regime that is at the root of what 
Marx called “the dull compulsion” of market-enforced discipline. It is also 
the origin of alienation.
However, as Marxist anthropologists know, market discipline and the 
resulting alienation are neither merely abstract categories nor are they 
always-anonymous forces weighing down invisibly but tangibly upon par-
ticular working people. Under capitalism, sometimes very visible impostors 
are delegated to promote the further alienation of control over one’s life. 
Global regimes of value are often locally enacted with the help of visible 
financial actors, hands-on managerial power, local status and kinship hier-
archies, national political elites, bureaucracies and legal protocols, etc. Cap-
italism, for Marxist anthropologists, was always already a thickly layered 
structure, perhaps even more so than was envisaged by Marx himself (see, 
for example, Barber et al. 2013; Carbonella and Kasmir 2014; Carrier and 
Kalb 2015; Kalb 1997; Kalb and Halmai 2011; Narotzky and Smith 2006; 
Sider 1986; Wolf 1982). Hence, the value regime of labor, while ultimately 
determined globally by the pressure of the system of relationships itself, 
also tends to announce and implement itself through manifold empirical 
local agents and social forms. Sometimes it seems more directly induced 
by the nebulous forces of the hidden hand, while at other times it comes 
embodied in visible and tangible drivers. The former is perhaps more char-
acteristic of highly advanced locations that are shielded from the greatest 
pressures arising from global competition by oligopoly, or of very peripheral 
ones where little local capital accumulation takes place. The latter seems to 
obtain rather often in the zones in between, those in which sectors such as 
electrical consumer goods usually appear to represent the royal road to the 
future. My suggestion is that local vernacular narratives of worthlessness 
are deployed in both obscuring and revealing what is being alienated, how 
and why, and on whose behalf.
These stories of “worthlessness”, while thus affiliated in their deeper exis-
tential concerns and in their global placement within a certain industrial 
value regime linked to the spaces and times of a certain “backwardness”, 
arose from very different local political conjunctures, actual industrial epi-
sodes and social relations. They also reflected very different relationships 
of gender, and were indeed told by a man and a woman. In particular, 
they made non-identical connections between pasts, presents and futures 
and had hugely contrasting repercussions for the possibility and nature of 
agency. Closely read, one might sense that the one would perhaps incline 
towards a certain depressive neurosis while the other may have a feel of the 
paranoid. The neurosis and the paranoia were about the possibility of being 
or becoming “worthless” in a context of less than abstract capitalist value 
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extraction. In what follows I will place these stories in the context of what 
are the “critical junctions” (Kalb 2005, 2011) of their emergence and social 
meaningfulness. I will come back to this.
Worthless Histories
During my interview with her (see Kalb 2005, Kalb 1997), Maria van de 
Velde regularly exclaimed, “this is my own history, but it is worthless! My 
kids always tell me ‘shut up mother, the past is the past and today is today’ ”. 
After a short initial hesitation, she was visibly impatient to tell me a host of 
small stories, stories of growing up as a working class girl in the Eindhoven 
of the 1950s, stories of “her people”, stories that to me as an anthropologist 
were of fascinating significance but that to most others might have appeared 
unconnected, confused even, and without much point. I became puzzled by 
how precisely the imagined “worthlessness” of her own history connected 
with what I increasingly started to see as a systematic, hegemonic, although 
always shifting regime of exploitation of daughters by an unspoken alliance 
of parents and local industrialists on behalf of capitalist as well as parental 
accumulation. The contradictions of class on which the whole local elec-
tronics boom was based were steadily displaced onto relationships of kin-
ship and gender. It turned the working class family into the site at which the 
actual contradictions had to be managed, contained, made inhabitable and 
grown habitual and, ultimately, therefore, rendered “unspeakable”.
Maria grew up under the industrial conditions that I tried to capture 
with the term “flexible familism” (Kalb 1997, 2005). Mass production 
departments in the Philips plants (1890–1960) relied heavily on girls’ labor, 
just like the Foxconn plants in Malaysia or Guangdong do now. Over time 
Philips had succeeded by way of state-sponsored selective immigration, psy-
chological selection, social policy and corporate urbanism, to shape work-
ing class family structures around its own accumulation imperatives (Kalb 
1997). That meant that families tended to be very large (major neighbor-
hoods had average families of over 10 people), and have a disproportionate 
number of girls of working age. Fathers were rewarded with jobs, status 
and a certain security for the family as a whole, including housing, health 
insurance and a pension, in exchange for bringing in a number of unskilled 
but well socialized and highly disciplined, hence exploitable daughters. 
This regime changed over time in its particularities. As Philips’ mass pro-
duction departments were increasingly spread to low wage/high population 
sites first in the Netherlands and Flanders, then Europe and finally, since 
the 1960s, to the global south and east, local production in Eindhoven 
became ever more skill and education intensive. Over time Philips families 
were allowed to climb the ladder of added value more or less in synch 
with the production processes, run from the headquarters of what was an 
increasingly global corporation. For example, Philips was heavily involved 
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in adult and professional education (as well as in primary and secondary 
education), which partly explains the good name Philips had and kept. But 
in the early 1950s there were still considerable levels of mass production 
in the Eindhoven premises. And girls like Maria, whose unskilled father 
worked as an archivist in a Philips warehouse, were exposed to the intri-
cately complex despotic and gendered regimes of production and repro-
duction, on the shop floor, at home, in their leisure time, on which Philips’ 
profitability was based.
I proposed the concept of flexible familism precisely in order to highlight 
an ensemble, a key set of interlocking relationships that in characteristic 
ways shaped not just families and the local industrial relations of the corpo-
ration but also the city and the region (1997). I called this ensemble a “criti-
cal junction” in order to emphasize the multi-scalar and intersectional nature 
of the connective mechanisms and relations. The concept of critical junction 
was intended to do broadly similar work as the 1970s structural Marxist 
concept of “articulation”, but without the baggage of extreme rationalism 
or Gallic logic chopping as Eric Wolf once called it (1982). The aim was 
also to provide a stronger sense of the spatiotemporal connections and the 
actual path-dependent trajectories of development that were rolled out as 
accumulation was pushed on to higher levels of value creation. I also used 
flexible familism to mark a contrast with Fordism. Fordism signified mass 
production for a national market, high male wages, mass private consump-
tion and a family-oriented life. These were what Gramsci in the early 1930s 
described as the characteristic hegemonic moments of Ford’s 10-dollar a 
day regime in Detroit, and for him it exemplified how capitalist hegemony 
in advanced locations was secured (Gramsci 1971: 277–316). He then con-
trasted this with how such hegemony in less advanced locations in Europe, 
in Italy for example, could not be attained by purely market-based processes 
and the wage. Productivity, revenues and popular purchasing power were 
insufficient to achieve this. Instead, hegemony had to be forcefully imposed 
by repressive counter-revolutions of a conservative or fascist kind: “passive 
revolution”.
Philips and Eindhoven were different from both of these situations, 
although they did embody a revolution from above, albeit in a weaker sense 
of the term. Philips was hegemonic, like Ford, but in a female-dominated, 
low wage, export-oriented production process. The crucial mediating mech-
anism here was neither high consumption nor state repression. It was the 
working class family that was set up as its key hegemonic mechanism. The 
firm did so by thoroughly integrating the social reproduction of workers’ 
families into the rhythms and cycles of its own accumulation. It employed 
family heads, fathers, and took on more children-workers from within fami-
lies as demand rose, selectively, but also temporally dismissed workers that 
mattered less for the status of working class households—girls—as down-
turns hit the firm. All the while it kept intricate control over an extremely 
hard working and indeed from the point of view of capitalist accumulation 
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highly valuable and reliable working class. Corporate housing policy was 
the essential enabling condition for that. Philips families acquired access to 
affordable and modern company housing, with controlled rents that the cor-
poration could and did temporarily reduce if the business cycle demanded 
such a measure, as occurred in the early 1930s.
In a sense then this was indeed a managerial revolution from above with 
“social policy” as its hegemonic banner, facilitated by a state in crisis that 
was therefore willing to furnish massive loans for housing construction. But 
it is important to stress that Philips learned about the possible functions 
of the working class family from the existing peasant-worker relations in 
South East Brabant, which it found when it started there, in the 1890s. For 
a generation, until 1925, Philips’ lamp production grew on the basis of these 
organic regional relationships and it was only with the massive expansions 
into radio set making around 1930 and the associated migrations that it 
decided to turn its knowledge about local family mechanisms into a large-
scale managerial device.
The family thus became a complex overlapping set of relationships of pro-
duction and reproduction, set up as such by industrial management. Flexible 
familism thoroughly shaped the properties of the associated urbanism and 
the everyday ideologies and politics that reigned (for a detailed analysis see 
Kalb 1997). The straightforward upshot was that Philips made parents com-
plicit in girls’ exploitation in ways that were never openly talked about—
indeed it remained a local secret overlaid with ideologies of company care 
and family care—in exchange for a certain durable loyalty the corporation 
offered to families, including housing and income, plus a set of implicit and 
explicit guarantees for parental social status and jobs for the next genera-
tion. Here was one of the largest concentrated sites of electronics production 
in the Western world—40 thousand workers in one local complex in the 
1950s—but socialism and unionism remained thoroughly tamed forces, even 
in the conflictive 1930s and 1960s. More than that, politics understood as 
the public discussion and shaping of social forms was a very small domain 
indeed. The secret thus remained a secret, and not quite a public one.
As with so many of the older women I talked with in Eindhoven, Maria 
van de Velde, youngest daughter of a family of nine, had a very contradic-
tory relationship with her parents (see Kalb 1997, 2005 for a full account). 
Her father appeared in her stories as simultaneously intimate and intimi-
dating, his behavior regularly bordering on violence, and he was nervously 
imagined as having been capable of rape and incest. Her mother was nice 
to her youngest daughter and made her nice suits for the Saturday night 
dances. But Maria recognized in retrospect that precisely because of her 
mother’s attention she had always been ready to exploit herself more than 
she was capable of enduring. Nor did she trust her mother’s perennial “ill-
nesses”, which forced her to take over responsibility for household work. 
Of her lovers, including the one who became her lifelong husband, she was 
often just as uncertain as she was about her father.
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The coming of Philips to this peripheral region of peasant-workers had 
intensified “traditional” patriarchy and sex segregation, while it simultane-
ously produced the modern experience of youth clustered together by the 
hundreds in production departments, workers’ neighborhoods and leisure 
spaces. Contradiction reigned. Local moralists described and deplored the 
“immoral” distractions of love and consumption and recommended keeping 
the sexes separate as well as religious. Philips battled the mixing of the sexes 
within production in order to secure super-efficiency. And parents, dependent 
on girls’ earnings, sought to manage nerves, anxiety and discontent, while 
collectively pushing up the local marriage age for girls as compared to other 
Dutch cities. All the while boys and girls were uncertainly seeking intimate 
and reliable bonds, which always appeared to them as a possibly illicit escape 
from conservative paternal domination. This conservative domination was 
popularly believed to be religious and traditional in origin, derived from 
conservative “values” and ideas of gendered dignity, rather than modern 
and industrial and derived from the valorization of capital within a global 
value regime of electrical production. Class contradictions were displaced 
onto families, generations and gender, and hence exploitation and solidar-
ity, intimacy and intimidation were bundled into an inseparable relational 
whole that was fraught with fragility and insecurity for local women. While 
local industry was churning out the consumption items of the future—lamps, 
radio sets, television screens—it was also producing “worthless histories”.
In the early fifties Philips was the quintessential foreign currency earner 
for an overpopulated Dutch nation-state deeply dependent on foreign pur-
chases of food and raw materials. Flexible familism, and a whole city geared 
towards sustaining that relationship, helped to secure the necessary hard 
currencies. “Worthless histories” were the gendered underside of the valori-
zation of the unprecedented mass of capital sunk into an urban-industrial 
complex geared to electronics production.
Worthless Poles
The second “critical junction” of value and worthlessness that I want to 
address was broadly situated within the same regime of accumulation around 
electrical consumer goods in Europe, but constituted very differently with 
regard to gender and politics. That was not just because of the differences in 
time and place, this being post-socialist Wroclaw, Poland. It was also because 
the forces behind alienation and human devaluation here were thoroughly 
public and expressly political, not abstract and hidden-hand like, nor so con-
fusingly intimate as in the Eindhoven case. The site was also much more equi-
tably gendered. Instead of silence, there were strong public counter-voices, 
institutional ones such as the Solidarność labor union and its increasingly right 
wing political alliances, and individual ones, such as Krysztof Zadrozny’s.
Originating in the socialist buildup of domestic industry, electrical pro-
duction in Wroclaw, as in Eindhoven, helped to urbanize rural people in a 
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relatively underdeveloped part of Europe and offered them a way to educa-
tion and modernity. Unlike Eindhoven, which rose full speed to the highest 
ranks of added value in the sector, Wroclaw under socialist auspices took 
the low-to-middle tech road of the “white goods” sector. White goods were 
a useful and achievable form of import substitution for the COMECON 
market and offered thousands of jobs to both men and women with primary 
(still represented by more than 50 percent of employees in the 1990s), sec-
ondary, vocational school and university backgrounds.
As in Eindhoven, however, the modernity achieved seemed somehow 
failed and hollow. It failed in the 1980s because of socialist stagnation and 
collapse. And it failed in the 1990s—2000s because of the appropriation of 
value by transnational capital, facilitated by privatization and a new politi-
cal elite that was keen to set itself up more as what Lenin would have singled 
out as a “comprador” regime for international capitalists than as anything 
else. Here, in a sense, was a secret too, although it was a public secret rather 
than a private one, while often just as misrecognized: sovereignty, parlia-
mentary democracy and the rule of law served to transfer factories that by 
1990 were de facto and de jure worker-controlled, first to the banks, then 
to the state, and finally to the circuits of transnational capital. So-called 
successful democratic transition brought freedom of speech, the vote and 
travel, but also condemned local workers to lifelong stagnation (Ost 2005; 
Kideckel 2009; Kalb 2009, 2014). What exactly was alienated from them 
was infinitely more complex and overwhelming than is described by that 
straightforward material fact.
Socialist forms of industrial organization tended to delegate quite a bit 
of tactical power to worker constituencies as compared to capitalist forms 
(Burawoy 1985; Verdery 1996). In Poland, splits in the political and intel-
lectual landscape were deeper than anywhere else in “really existing social-
ism”, which served to further reinforce informal workers’ power. Between 
1976 and 1980 this ultimately led to the formation of the mass labor move-
ment Solidarność, which mobilized more than 10 million people in Poland 
between 1980 and 1982, a quarter of whom were in fact Communist party 
members. The “Polar” factory, with a lot of young workers in the late 
1970s, was a hotbed of rebellion. Zadrozny and his family and friends were 
key actors in the making and development of the local Solidarność cells. 
Zadrozny also became one of the local heroes of the resistance against the 
military coup of December 1981, but was captured and imprisoned in 1982.
The contradictions of Communist military rule, as it shifted from central 
planning towards a socialist market mechanism paradoxically meant that 
the claims for worker self-management that had been made by the now 
outlawed Solidarność Union were eventually granted (Kalb 2009). Prop-
erty rights though were shared between the firm and its worker-controlled 
board on the one hand, and the state on the other. In some regions, such as 
Wroclaw, clandestine Solidarność groups immediately took up these legal 
openings offered in 1984 and reconstituted themselves around the workers’ 
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councils. By 1989, Zadrozny and his family and friends had rebuilt a net-
work of worker activists that for all practical purposes was running the 
“white goods” plants and all the social functions attached to them—housing, 
pensions, leisure, poor relief, health, etc.—with massive local support.
In the years after 1989, a traumatic split occurred between democratic 
intellectuals now increasingly in control of positions in a state that was 
incorporated as a periphery in the global capitalist system and worker con-
stituencies that were in de facto and de jure control of industries in several 
regions, including Wroclaw (Ost 2005, Kalb 2009). Workers in Wroclaw 
and elsewhere were demanding a privatization that would allow for worker 
cooperatives, but the liberal state elite was adamantly against putting labor 
unions in control of major assets. A long political silence followed while 
the state began unleashing shock-therapy on an economy that had lost 
its COMECON links but had not yet gained any access to the markets of 
Western Europe. As a consequence, industries first became indebted to the 
state-owned banking system, then were practically bankrupted, then split, 
and subsequently consolidated via new loans under the wing of the Treas-
ury, and later sold to transnational investors. Privatization was thus, first 
and foremost, a state-orchestrated appropriation. The whole process took a 
decade. At the same time new legal and financial protocols reduced activist 
worker councils and labor unions to defensive struggles in trying to secure 
their very own factory communities. In Polar, for example, they were forced 
to make large investments of their own funds in new production lines in 
order to survive. By 1993 the cooperative movement had failed catastrophi-
cally. By 2000 worker management had been dismantled by legal process 
and through the concessions demanded by the state and the new interna-
tional owners. None of them, however, failed for lack of support on the 
ground or for lack of good arguments. By the late 1990s there was still a 
palpable moral sense of popular ownership, but the legal reality had been 
thoroughly transformed.
From the standpoint of transnational capital there was a specific logic at 
work here. Polar was an attractive option for Whirlpool because local wages 
were some 70 percent below any of the standards obtaining for semi-skilled 
work in the European West or South. Furthermore, it was located in Poland, 
the post-socialist EU accession country with the largest home-market, and 
bordering Germany; also, white goods were simply too big to be profitably 
made in China and then shipped to Europe. The local plant, however, while 
viable within the wider value regime, was exposed to fierce competition. 
Also accounting for the management, marketing and technology rents it 
would have to pay Whirlpool for, it was forced into an efficiency drive that 
drove up productivity by 700 percent in a few years. A low wage, despotic 
and increasingly hierarchical production regime emerged that combined, as 
Zadrozny concluded, “the worst of socialism and the worst of capitalism”.
While Maria van de Velde in Eindhoven talked about her “worthless his-
tory”, Zadrozny and his fellow activists were exposed to a dominant public 
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discourse emanating from the mouthpieces of liberal politics and to some 
extent from international capital, that loudly claimed that “Polish work-
ers were worthless”, in Zadrozny’s straightforward summary (Kalb 2009). 
In the first decade after 1989, while the liberal state was crushing worker 
sodalities, expropriating collectively claimed industrial assets and repressing 
wages and unionism, workers and peasants were systematically depicted as 
ossified remnants of an Asiatic socialist despotism, a version of Homo Sovi-
eticus, and therefore a huge civilizational liability for Poland’s desperately 
sought middle class status within the West (Buchowski 2006, Kalb 2009). 
Workers and peasants were energetically debunked on the grounds of an 
educational deficit, habits of alcoholism and lack of initiative and respon-
sibility. Humiliated, their only role for the new Poland they had helped to 
establish, often at great personal risk, was hard work under an unforgiving 
regime of capitalist supervision.
Solidarność unions, thus abandoned by their former liberal allies, inverted 
the verdict. They claimed the nation’s recently gained sovereignty as their 
own exclusive achievement, pictured the new liberal elite as traitors of the 
nation and shifted to a nationalist position that celebrated Poland and the 
Poles against the ongoing liberal cosmopolitan “theft from the people” (see 
also Kalb 2011).
Zadrozny was keenly aware that the liberal-capitalist alienation of newly 
won sovereignty had been forced upon them via a double dispossession. 
Material assets had been alienated surreptitiously by obscure legal-financial 
means and in political backroom deals. At the same time, but now in full 
daylight, the reputations of workers had been relentlessly attacked and 
devalued by narratives about “worthless Poles”. Transnational capital had 
acquired Polish assets “for nothing” he concluded, while capital and the 
state were claiming that they were doing this “for the people”. Zadrozny 
emphasized (in 2006) that “we cannot undo what was done. But it would 
be psychologically important to find out whether this company was sold for 
less than its real value. Then it could become easier to enforce something 
now, like better wages. It is all a question of honor. I myself never believed 
that this was how it had to be, that Poles are such that they cannot do this 
or that . . . it was a big mistake to say that Poles were worthless” (Kalb 
2009, 2014).
Capitalist value regimes, the reputations of the Polish state elite within the 
new European neoliberal order, and the value of Polish labor, both in terms 
of its dignity and as market exchange, had been massively at odds. There was 
no doubt that Polish workers had dramatically lost out. The forces which 
they were up against were far more coherent than the Communist Party, the 
generals or the Soviets had been in the 1970s and 1980s. While the old ene-
mies did control the national state, by 1989 they were transparently out of 
synch with world time and global value regimes; neither could they anymore 
rely on their local cadres. Capitalist global-national-local levels, however, 
worked perfectly in unison. Zadrozny and his cohort of freedom fighters for 
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a democratic labor-based Polish sovereignty now actively helped to launch 
a broad neo-nationalist mobilization against transnational capital and the 
cosmopolitanized state class. In the end they succeeded to put the Kaczyn-
skis in power for a couple of years in the mid-2000s, the “terrible twins”, 
in the expression frequently used by The Economist. And, with wider alli-
ances, and now emboldened by Hungary’s Victor Orban, they brought Lech 
Kaczynski back to power again in 2015. But while post-socialist conserva-
tive identity politics had a field day and European liberals and multicultural-
ists were shocked in anger, little changed in the global position or bargaining 
power of Polish labor. What they did get, though, were much increased child 
benefits and a definite end to “the Poles are worthless” narrative.
Conclusion
In Capital, Karl Marx strove for an abstract analysis of the workings 
of capitalist value regimes, arguing that abstract modeling was the only 
way to get to an empirically concrete understanding of “the real” because 
under capitalism the real tended to show itself in inverted ways. This is a 
necessary insight but not a sufficient one. In my two accounts here I have 
therefore emphasized that the actual pressures of global value regimes on 
concrete labor are often delegated to local actors, relationships and histo-
ries. These relationships and histories, including their insertion in or cap-
ture by global systemic processes of value generation, can be described by 
the notion of critical junctions, a notion that serves both an exploratory 
and an explanatory function not unlike the more rationalist idea of “artic-
ulation” in the Marxist anthropologies of the 1970s. Local vernacular 
narrative themes of worth and worthlessness in the context of global value 
regimes serve to both obscure and reveal the relational mechanisms of 
alienation, dispossession and devaluation of labor upon which capitalist 
valorization is based. The analysis of the critical junctions that structure 
such regimes in concrete territorial cases becomes necessary and indeed 
possibly sufficient, in order to show what such notions obscure and reveal, 
and why.
My two accounts show a woman and a man whose lives have unfolded 
within the rhythms of industrial accumulation associated with electrical pro-
duction, and who see their life and labor confronted by forces that appear to 
reduce them to an ontological “worthlessness”. This common experience is 
happening for very different and very particular reasons springing from the 
very different logic of their time, place, gender and politics. But there is a 
more general cause, too, located within the rhythms of accumulation of the 
sort of industries that seek out similar relatively “backward” locations, such 
as the electrical/electronics industries are prone to do. Finally, it is also hap-
pening for universal reasons that are located within the global value regime 
in general. An effective analysis tries to bring all three of these perspectives 
into play.
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Jonathan Friedman (1998), with a nod towards Ingmar Bergman, once 
aptly quipped that instead of searching for Geertzian “webs of meaning” 
anthropologists should look for the “tissue of lies” by which societies both 
get by and do not get by. The two narratives of worthlessness that we have 
discussed here do reveal one exact origin of alienation in these two cases: 
respectively, parents who embody a collusion of intimacy and intimidation, 
solidarity and exploitation, in the Eindhoven case, and liberal comprador 
elites that sell “the people” out in the Wroclaw and Polish case. But the nar-
ratives only reveal the most observable actors within their specific critical 
junctions of value production. They are therefore necessarily partial and 
inevitably obscuring and confused. Both expose the reigning local myths of 
enlightened liberal progress as a tissue of lies, the former doing so privately 
and uncertainly, the other publicly and assertively. But both also fail to 
understand their perpetrators, not as sovereign moral forces, but as depend-
ent actors within a wider relational field that exerts pressures and sets limits. 
The same phenomenal property of capitalism that forced Marx to penetrate 
a concrete abstraction through a theory that makes use of the notion of 
abstract concreteness prevented Maria van de Velde and Krysztof Zadrozny, 
symptomatically, from revealing the further reaches behind their alienation.
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9  Post-industrial Landscape: Space and 
Place in the Personal Experiences of 
Residents of the Former Working-
class Estate of Ksawera in Będzin
Kazimiera Wódz and Monika Gnieciak
Introduction
Over the course of several decades the global capitalist economy has been 
reshaped by restructuring processes that have been described as a transi-
tion from an economy based on a factory system and mass production to 
an economy based on knowledge/information and signs (Castells 1996; 
Lash and Urry 1994), or from Fordism to post-Fordism (Scott 1988; Amin 
1995 et al.). The effects of these worldwide transformations are particu-
larly clear in the regions and towns whose origin and development were 
connected with mass production. Currently, the old industrial regions of 
Europe and the US are grappling with serious economic problems, sub-
jected as they are to the pressures of global competition and post-Fordism’s 
focus on flexible specialization, just-in-time production and the populari-
zation of various forms of subcontracting that have scattered worldwide 
in accordance with the logic of minimization of transaction costs (Scott 
1988).
The problems are becoming increasingly pressing, especially in those 
areas where declining industries are not being replaced through any major 
investments, where new jobs in the sector of services, especially special-
ist services requiring high levels of qualification (such as financial, legal, 
consulting, educational, public-relations services, etc.) are unable to make 
up for losses related to the liquidation of plants that once provided employ-
ment for hundreds or thousands of employees, including those with limited 
qualifications. Forced by external economic conditions, the processes of 
deindustrialization exert a negative influence across the lives of residents of 
former workers’ estates that had been located near a place of work such as a 
factory, a steelworks or a mine. The decline of a plant is often seen by those 
affected as the beginning of a personal and a family drama, a struggle for 
survival and the emergence of identity dilemmas connected with attempts to 
cope with a new reality. This new reality, ushered in by the crisis of Keynesi-
anism and the welfare state, is determined by a new, emerging symbolic 
order based on the doctrine of neoclassical economics and the economic 
practice of deregulation (Harvey 1989).
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This chapter draws on research in Ksawera estate in the town of Będzin1 
(Silesian Voivodship) in southern Poland and formerly strongly associated 
with the “Paryż” coal mine until its closure in 19952. The aim of this study 
was to reconstruct residents’ memories and emotions related to changes 
linked to the industrial decline of the region. The research was based on 
individual interviews with residents on a workers’ estate and group inter-
views conducted with former workers of the “Paryż” mine. The analysis 
highlights the dynamics of memories, visions of space and the changes that 
have taken place over the last 16 or so years since the mine was closed in 
1995. The main aim of the chapter is to reconstruct the representations of 
places connected with the respondents’ biographies, locating the analysis of 
transformations of the space of the post-industrial estate within the context 
of an emotional geography. This constitutes an interdisciplinary field link-
ing the sociological perspective with an emphasis on the emotions associ-
ated with a sense of a certain space, with the subjective shape of feelings 
and mental reconstructions of places and landscapes (Davidson and Mil-
ligan 2004). The process of liquidation of the “Paryż” mine has resulted in 
deep transformations in everyday life, its rhythm and qualities. Many places 
have changed their spatial status, their functions and, often, their owners. 
Structural and spatial changes have affected the way residents used to per-
ceive, value and describe their close surroundings. The importance of place 
is always connected with its emotional associations, whether of anxiety, dis-
tress, a sense of loss or love.
Place and Memory
In the classic representation of space and place made by Yi-Fu Tuan, space 
symbolized freedom, a multitude of possibilities as well as alienation and 
loneliness; place, however, referred to something intimate, known, safe and 
constant (Tuan 1987). This approach was slightly modified by the influ-
ences of the critical school in geography. While for Yi-Fu Tuan place is a 
profoundly positive term, in the writings of David Harvey (1993) or Tim 
Cresswell (1996) it is both a product of, and a tool for, establishing social 
hierarchies of power, exclusion and constraint. The importance of place is 
established by virtue of a social contract in which the voice of the stronger 
and the more privileged drowns the voices of minor groups and communi-
ties who are therefore excluded from the processes of making sense. The 
social importance of place is thus a product of uneven negotiations, which 
are never complete and never free from dispute or controversy. Moreover, 
unlike space or landscape, place must be experienced and “lived”. Owing 
to the practices through which place is experienced, it is significant as a 
never-ending process rather than a constant state, part of the ongoing social 
production of sense.
Researchers dealing with topographies of memory indicate that many fea-
tures of place share common ground with the concept of collective memory 
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(cf. Halbwachs 2008; Nora 1997). Place brings back memories and serves 
as a symbolic and material implementation of the past, since “The preserva-
tion of recollections rests on their anchorage in space” (Wachtel 1986:216 
after: Alderman and Hoelscher 2004: 348), although the durability of his-
tory it entails is relative and unstable. Obviously, many material objects are 
capable of evoking memories but the power of place is unique. It affects 
our senses in many different ways (through sight, sound, smell, touch and, 
sometimes, taste), becoming a convenient source of memory (Cresswell and 
Hoskins 2008). The experiential character of place links it to social remem-
bering and is connected with practice; this way places are linked with indi-
vidual and/or social dimensions of memory. In fact, as Casey points out “We 
might even say that memory is naturally place-oriented or at least place-
supported” (1987: 186–87). Reading about certain events or viewing their 
representations in a museum is one thing—actually being in a place of his-
torical interest is quite another matter.
Places of memory are more than monumental representations of impor-
tant national events. Many of our evocations of the past are part of “col-
lective memory”, which is constructed and transmitted through a number 
of diverse cultural practices. What is thus commemorated is not synony-
mous with events in the past. Instead, the very process of commemoration 
defines what is significant and worthy of being remembered. There is thus 
a complex process whereby: “Memorials are important symbolic conduits 
not only for expressing a version of history but casting legitimacy upon it 
as well. They give the past a tangibility and familiarity—making the history 
they commemorate appear to be part of the natural and taken for granted 
order of things” (Dwyer and Alderman 2008: 167).
Places of memory are very distant from the clarity and durability associ-
ated with the senses, as variable as everyday pressures, ideologies and gov-
ernments, and are far from being stable and anchored in the axiological 
order. Although they may represent history, they are not a natural expres-
sion of the past. Rather, they also reflect contemporary events, problems and 
social tensions. (Dwyer and Alderman 2008: 168). The creation of places 
of memory is a central process in the development of social memory and 
integral to formation of cultural identities as well as political communities 
(Agnew and Duncan 1989). Regardless of the range of struggles with the 
sense, form and location of places of memory—local, regional or national, 
they are often connected with more general disputes over who has the right 
to represent the past.
In the last decade or so, there has been a remarkable increase in the num-
ber of studies on the connections between place and memory. The most 
important reasons for the revival of interest in collective memory include the 
process of de-totalitarianization of Central and Eastern European countries 
that involves a profound process of de-semiotization and re-ideologization 
of public space, expressed in the destruction and erection of statues, the 
re-compositions of museum exhibitions, and changing the names of streets 
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and squares. This revival has been accompanied by a multitude of studies 
on heritage, museums and places of memory reflecting the political charac-
ter of actions on a living organism of the national/state/local past (Edensor 
2005a, 2005b, 2008; Till 2005, 2006, 2007; Dwyer and Alderman 2008; 
Rose-Redwood et al 2008; Alderman and Hoescher 2004). Underlying the 
intense interest in social memory there have been in-depth reflections on the 
character of modernity and on the pace of social (and spatial) changes that 
don’t entirely erase the traces of other visions, practices, and experiences:
Modern imperatives to swiftly bury the past produce cities that are 
haunted by that which has been consigned to irrelevance. Accordingly, 
the contemporary city is a palimpsest composed of different temporal 
elements, featuring signs, objects and vaguer traces that rebuke the ten-
dencies to move on and forget. The urban fabric retains traces of failed 
plans, visionary projects, and sites of collective endeavour and pleasure 
that have been superseded by more modish projects.
(Edensor 2008: 313)
The political and economic transformations which took place in the years 
after the Second World War had an impact on the area under research: 
successive governments—communist between 1945–89, and liberal since 
the 1990s—had their own vision of how to administer big industry. For 
the communists, the Zaglebie area, with its industrial base, was the symbol 
of the socialist (meaning working-class) homeland. The advent of capital-
ism denoted the introduction of deindustrialization, dismantling large-scale 
places of work to be replaced by banks, call centers and supermarkets.
Paryż/Zawadzki/Paryż Mine
The Ksawera estate was formed as a company-owned worker’s settlement3 
closely connected to the neighboring industrial plant. The “Paryż” coal mine 
was established between 1876 and 1890 as a modern mining and processing 
plant set up by the public limited company of the French Italian Association 
of Dąbrowa Coal Mines. After the Second World War the mine was nation-
alized and as indicated in the mine’s monograph in response to the social 
and political activity of the pit and strong leadership there, the authori-
ties requested that staff rename the plant to better reflect its place in Pol-
ish landscape and renounce the identification of the plant with the French 
capitalists that had exploited it. So, the plant was renamed, from Paryż 
to Generał Zawadzki (Rechowicz 1974: 121–122). Aleksander Zawadzki 
was born at Ksawera, and the story of his house will recur in this analysis. 
The change of names was a political measure that was part of much more 
extensive actions aimed at legitimizing the new authorities, both those of 
the mine and those of the country. Having the “Paryż” Mine renamed as 
the “General Zawadzki” mine anchored capital, assets and property within 
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the boundaries of the Polish People’s Republic. As Connerton has argued, 
the naming of place is highly symbolic not only as markers of place but 
also because “when names are assigned to places, those who do the naming 
are often particularly aware of the memories they wish to impose” (Con-
nerton 2009: 10–11). Renaming of public places is strictly correlated with 
the decline of governments, revolutions, conquests or rapid processes of 
forming new collective identities built under the pressure of current events.
Several decades on, following the downfall of communism in Poland in 
1989, we see that “history” has come full circle. As the residents of Ksawera 
reminisce, this time the return to the earlier name of KWK “Paryż”, was 
defensive, as one of the steps taken in order to save the plant from liquida-
tion. This second change of name was meant to restore the memory of the 
history of the mine, capture its origins before the Polish People’s Republic. 
The changed name, evidence of the new and, in the view of residents of 
the post-mining estate, frankly worse times, gave rise to some complica-
tions, evident in generational differences. For example, the respondents in 
our study who would have spent all their adult life working in the “Gen-
eral Zawadzki” Mine still use this as the “true”, and post-war, name. The 
younger residents, often former miners’ children, tend to use the name of 
KWK “Paryż”. A woman teacher, resident in Ksawera explained:
They renamed it to “Paryż” later (. . .) but the younger generation of 
twenty-five year olds, who no longer remember this “General Zawadzki” 
Mine, tend to remember the “Paryż” Mine and they won’t know [where 
this name came from—authors’ note].
The actions taken to “defend” the mine were not successful; the plant 
has not been in operation for 16 years. But the mine is still present in the 
respondents’ memory. A job in the pit provided the basis for family life; it 
structured the social relations within the estate, legitimized the divisions 
across the estate’s class structure and shaped the community and everyday 
life. The mine remained at the center of everyday life after work, dictating 
the rhythm of everyday activities, organizing the spaces of leisure, funding 
holidays and trips and cementing friendships and neighborhood relation-
ships. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the residents’ memories, or the stories of 
the past, refer directly or indirectly to the place of work. Despite the fact 
that there are now shops and non-mining businesses on the premises of 
the former mine and a new housing estate, built to a higher standard, was 
erected nearby, in the stories told by older people the mine is still present 
although it no longer exists in physical form. A former mine worker who 
lost her employment when the mine went into liquidation said:
I would rather prefer it was still in operation [the mine—the researcher’s 
note]. Life on the estate used to be different then. You would see people 
(. . .). Everybody used to start at 7 am, loads of people, it was bustling 
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then. So very different! Everybody used to know each other, they would 
wait for one another and walk together to work in groups or bunches. 
And now it’s so quiet.
Ruins and “Ghosts of the Past”
A recurring theme in our respondents’ statements is loss, what they were 
deprived of in the process of transformation, and, incidentally, of what the 
surrounding space keeps reminding them. The ruins of the infrastructure of 
the former mine, such as the crèche (Figure 9.1) nursery school, canteen and 
restaurant (Figure 9.2), the shabby and derelict “Zagłębianka” sports com-
plex (Figure 9.3), the desolate platform of the “Będzin Ksawera” railway 
station (Figure 9.4) with no station building and no ticket office, Aleksander 
Zawadzki’s birthplace, regularly visited by schoolchildren during the Polish 
People’s Republic period, and now in the process of being demolished. These 
are the places the residents of Ksawera would privilege in their stories, as 
evidence of their recent prosperity and a sad marker of the estate’s decline.
In the descriptions of the space of the estate, various temporal orders min-
gle as former functions overlap with current uses of places. Time has lost its 
linear character, and the past interweaves with the present such that memo-
ries can oust reality. Ruins play with the mechanisms of memory, enhancing 
multiplications and intertwining the senses, reflecting complex landscapes 
of space place and affect: “[T]rauma and discontinuity are fundamental for 
memory and history, ruins have come to be necessary for linking creativity 
Figure 9.1 The ruins of the crèche facilities, Ksawera Estate.
Figure 9.2  The former mine infrastructure: the canteen and restaurant buildings, 
Ksawera Estate.
Figure 9.3 The derelict swimming pool of the “Zagłębianka” sports complex.
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to the experience of loss at the individual and collective level. Ruins operate 
as powerful metaphors for absence or rejection and hence, as incentives for 
reflection or restoration” (Settis 1997, after Edensor 2005a: 139).
Ruins are not “living pasts” as much as “allegoric re-presentation of 
remembered loss itself” (Stewart 1996: 90). For Tim Edensor ruins, or even 
places left behind by ruins, the “spaces between buildings” (2005b: 829) 
are places from which counter-memories of the society can be articulated. 
While developing official topographies of memories is part of the strategy 
which determines where and how things, activities and people should be 
placed (Berman 1982), there also appear places in the city where memory 
becomes revived, practiced and articulated in another way. Learning these 
memories is essential to see what has been made invisible, banished from 
social recognition (Gordon 1997). The city goes on endlessly, but through-
out its constant changes it ”leaves behind traces of previous material forms, 
cultural practices, inhabitants, politics, ways of thinking and being, and 
modes of experience” (Edensor 2008: 315). Traces of the past are clearly 
seen on the outskirts of towns where displaced memories have not been 
erased completely. Marginal urban spaces and their derelict streets “invoke 
Bataille’s idea that production always generates its negative, a formless spa-
tial and material excess which rebukes dreams of unity” (Edensor 2005b: 
833). Ksawera, an estate which used to be a node of communication, a des-
tination for hundreds of employees crowding its streets every day, has now 
Figure 9.4 Będzin Ksawera railway station.
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become a forgotten, desolate place excluded from the rhythm of city life. In 
the words of a former employee: “it’s just a ‘dormitory town’ nowadays”.
Another woman, the wife of an ex-worker who was forced to seek an 
income after the closure of the mine in 1995 pointed out:
When the mine was still in operation and the train went in between 5 
and 6 am, masses of people would get off, everything was thriving, 
there was a canteen, they used to buy in a baker’s, then the canteen 
was converted into a processing plant by a private proprietor, then he 
wound it up for some reason, I don’t know why, dismissed the staff and 
closed down the business, and the rest was demolished by some youths 
(. . .) Over there where you can see that run-down building there used 
to be a nursery school, and also a crèche. They belonged to the mine. 
That shabby part that is still used is the nursery school, and the part 
that is renovated is now a waterworks, that is where the crèche used to 
be. When the mine was in operation women could enjoy good working 
conditions. The woman could leave her child in the nursery school or 
the crèche. They were run by the plant. It’s all gone now. There is only 
one nursery school left.
For over a decade the “Zagłębianka” stadiums and swimming pool had been 
the pride and joy of the residents, their meeting place and an important space 
within their collective world. Now, the derelict “Zagłębianka” sports center 
is another focus of Ksawera residents’ memories. It is for them a symbol of 
transformation, trauma, being abandoned and neglected, at the same time 
that encapsulates the complications of property and the instability of the real 
estate market and the incomprehensible laws of the capitalist market. The 
period of transformation is remembered by our respondents as a time of con-
fusion, during which the facilities they used and needed lost their legitimate 
owner—the mine—and acquired a new one—municipal or local authorities 
or a private company administering the acquired facility, which were, accord-
ing to our respondents, led by not always clear logic. The following exchange, 
which took place in a group interview with former miners from the Ksawera 
estate, expresses the depth of sentiment regarding what has been lost:
Respondent 1: this is what hurts the most—Zagłębianka and the whole 
sports center, which is . . .
Respondent 2: Yes it’s over there behind the railway tracks.
Respondent 1: It’s not only you that it hurts, because it’s a huge area . . .
Respondent 3: This is tragedy. Three full size football pitches, tennis 
courts, swimming pool, volleyball, the area is fenced and is 
falling into ruin. When the mine fell down, it was over.
Respondent 2: There was a football team . . .
Respondent 1: I remember . . . there was Zagłębianka. It was called—
the so-called “Sahara”. It was just sand. And then when 
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the mine was set up, it was fixed. It was one of the bet-
ter stadiums in the region. The pitch was so good that the 
first league teams would come here. And then it was falling 
down slowly . . .
Respondent 1: We were ready to—we wanted to share the costs ourselves. 
They were taking care of the stadium too, they mowed the 
lawn themselves, trained. Practically all residents would go 
to see a match. And now it’s over.
Respondent 4: But it was first league . . .
Respondent 1: Women’s team won the national championship.
Respondent 3: Not only a match, there was a swimming pool; they would 
go to the swimming pool too. When the stadium was alive, 
and when there was a match, everybody would go with 
their families, kids, wives . . .
Respondent 4: Yeah, it was just nice to spend time relaxing there.
Respondent 2: In summer whole families used to relax by the pool (. . .).
Respondent 3: Nice area, it was destroyed completely.
Respondent 4: Just like the mine.
Another testament is provided by the wife of a former employee of the mine:
It is easy to forget. I remember us going out to the Zagłębianka stadium 
for a match, enter the stadium, the neighboring pitches, I mean the side 
pitches at the Zagłębianka stadium center, where we used to play foot-
ball or go to the swimming pool, this open air swimming pool in sum-
mer, well it is all gone now. Why is that? Was it because of the mine? 
I remember the time when they privatized it, a businessman invested 
some money in it—he must have had good intentions—unfortunately it 
failed and it is like that now.
According to the respondents, the sports complex fell prey to an incompe-
tent policy, the financial degradation of the mine area and utter lack of ideas 
about how to develop the extensive leisure infrastructure. In the interviews 
respondents pointed out that there was a new way of dealing with land, 
there was a commercialization of what had once been communal spaces, 
and which became a commodity aimed at bringing profits as a result of 
transformations. A woman teacher resident in Ksawera said:
They built a nice sports hall by the primary school. So what? The hall 
has been built and took this pitch where the kids used to play and 
there’s no pitch at Ksawera now, no place for the kids to play football, 
just like at Zagłębianka. And this hall is not for the kids from the estate, 
the hall is earning money out of rent from various institutions that use 
it under lease.
After the time of “our” steelworks and mine came the time of “them”, some 
unidentified administrators who are driven only by their own financial interest, 
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and they did not take care of the residents’ needs. The space ceased to be 
“ours” and instead became distant, “belonging to someone else”. A strong 
emotional content is present in the vocabulary used by the respondents: the 
mine was not “restructured” or “put into liquidation”, but it “died” just as 
the once “living” stadium did, as victims and witnesses of the decline of an era.
A particularly poignant marker of past prosperity and current depriva-
tion of the working class and its loss of social prestige is a place that was 
the home of Aleksander Zawadzki. All that remains is a strip of grass with 
what used to be a shed, now converted into a private residence. In the 1990s 
some unknown delinquents set fire to the house, and the plaque marking the 
importance of the site was stolen. As was the case with the mine, for some 
of the residents this house still “exists” and functions within the mind map 
of the estate, living the life of a phantom. A former miner, who retired in 
1987, explained that:
This is where General Zawadzki came from. Soon after the war he 
became Voivode for the whole region of Silesia and Zagłębie. As he 
came from this region the mine was renamed to include his name. There 
is still the house where he grew up. Just at the end of Ksawera. It was 
located behind the school, in Ściślicki Street. Now it is ruined, just ruins. 
There used to be a plaque, recently removed . . .
The difference between the official history included in the consciously built 
places of memory and the history told through stories and ruins consists in 
the fact that the latter does not mystify the past, does not present a smooth 
course of events, changes without losses and costs, ideologically seamless 
narrative in the sequences of events and causal relations. Instead they evoke 
unfulfilled fantasies, former desires and unrealized plans of the past. Cher-
ishing the memory4 of the place where the home of Aleksander Zawadzki 
was located supports a history understood in terms of human life without 
big politics. This contrasts with what we see as black-and-white history, 
to produce a history that is boiled down to ordinary life in the framework 
of a different social order, which does not mean flawed, immoral or unim-
portant. “Although elites have had more control over the establishment of 
places of memory in public settings, they cannot control how they are per-
ceived, understood, and interpreted by individuals or various social groups 
(. . .). Places of memory in a national capital, for example, are probably 
experienced differently by international visitors, by national citizens from 
various regions and social groups, and by the residents living in that city” 
(Till 2007: 297). According to a woman teacher who lives in Ksawera:
[And] I am always wondering, because every period, every history, 
every epoch has its own people. Some people did a lot for their times. 
Nobody’s perfect, it’s obvious that they might have gone astray, or did 
something wrong. I look at it in a bit of a different way, this man gen-
eral Zawadzki, did a lot for Ksawera. So I was surprised that so soon 
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they made him . . . (. . .) These older people do owe a lot to communism. 
Although you couldn’t buy much in the shops then and there were a lot 
of worries, but I remember those days as a child, that it used to be mer-
rier at Ksawera, families used to be tied more closely, they would meet 
up outdoors, homes were left, so to say, wide open. As a child I remem-
ber me and other children eating dinner, six plates, everybody eating this 
soup together. Now it’s gone.
Spatial Symbolic Representation of Capitalism
Residents of Ksawera cherish memories of the past removing whatever is 
unimportant or sometimes uncomfortable; it is part of the processes of 
social remembering, in which forgetting is the inseparable and constant 
reverse of memory. The capacity and power of memory have their limits and 
the turbulent times of the 1990s have left a lot to remember. The period of 
transformation is marked by chaotic ups and downs of businesses, new pro-
jects which were given up sooner than they were formed, and the instability 
of spatial elements, the functions of places, and generalized ongoing change 
of the map of the social world. A woman teacher explained
There used to be a cash machine in the building which houses the resi-
dents’ association; there was a cash machine for one year, and it was 
used mostly by older people, they had to open their accounts, a lot of 
them used it. They could withdraw money easily. It’s gone now. They 
removed it. Now we have this Netto store, a fantastic square next to 
the association [irony—author’s note], there used to be a fish processing 
plant which was liquidated it could have made a perfect site for a shop, 
but because of, as far as I have heard, the man who own the “Pszczółka” 
store and another one in the building, he is “well-connected”, and took 
pains not to let that shop be set up, as it would be a competition for 
him. So apart from groceries, a butcher’s, a green-grocers, a market 
square with some stalls, there is a hairdresser, three salons I think, there 
is nothing at Ksawera.
For the residents in our research banks, hypermarkets, concrete car parks (Fig-
ure 9.5) are the spatial symbols of post-transformational reality, as aggressive 
marks of the new space, in which they cannot see room for themselves. The 
crèche facilities, canteens, nursery schools and shops with a wide assortment 
and prices adjusted to working-class customers are replaced by facilities that 
alienate residents from their own space. A woman who had worked at the 
Paryż Mine and changed jobs several times after the mine was closed down 
described this process and reflects on the implications of the changes:
And you see, everything closed down here, all businesses, mines, steel-
works. And they opened supermarkets, but to go there you must have 
loads of money. How do you think you will make your living? Nothing’s 
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free. And everywhere these beautiful big supermarkets around. Pogoria, 
have you been to Dąbrowa Górnicza? Have you seen how much a pair 
of shoes is? I keep searching. I wouldn’t buy such expensive shoes. Who 
is it for? For some elites, I guess. An average, ordinary person won’t buy 
any because he can’t afford this jacket or something. They opened them, 
and there’s no manufacturing plant. If only there was one. Once it paid 
off to run some knitting business, they used to make some sweaters, 
knitwear and stuff, I don’t know. Today they will import everything and 
on top of that . . . And how is it made there when they export stuff to 
us here. Plus a margin. And here in Poland nothing happens. And there 
are lots of banks everywhere. We have so many banks here in Będzin 
that you won’t see anywhere else. There used to be just one. Just look 
over there, in Modrzejowska Street a new beautiful bank has opened. 
And over there where the bank is—I’ve forgotten the name- they have 
changed street names . . . You have two banks there. There’s one on 
the corner and another one just behind it over there. One bank next 
to another. When you go down up there where the Biedronka store is 
located you will pass a bank after another, everywhere banks.
Conclusions
Since the beginning of the 18th century, when industry was developing in the 
territory of the present-day Upper Silesian Industrial Area, the pit and the 
steelworks were the symbols of the region. The miner’s ethos and pride in 
Figure 9.5 The new urban landscape: the “Pogoria” hypermarket.
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working in the harsh conditions of the pit shaped the identity of the inhabit-
ants of working-class settlements long before the Polish People’s Republic 
was established. With the transition to the capitalist market, the biggest loser 
of the transformation proved to be the working class (Gardawski 2009: 74). 
According to David Ost, it is paradoxical that the decline of the working 
class and the degradation of their social world have their roots in the time 
of Communism, which presented workers with very particular conception of 
class. This conception—Ost says—although attractive for the working class 
had the effect of diminishing their position, and as a result the working-class 
movement became an exceptional power, but it did not simultaneously show 
concern for specific interests of workers. But it was this fascinating concep-
tion of class that caused the position of the working class to prove so weak 
and highly unfit to the post-communist conditions of market economy. Since 
the workers’ movement represented universal interests, it did not represent 
the interests of workers as such (Ost 2007:257). Workers, and especially min-
ers, so privileged during the period of Gomułka’s rule, had an ideologically 
reinforced sense of the unique character of their work and enjoyed a certain 
resource of political and symbolic capital (at the same time that they suffered 
from the absence of economic or cultural capital). After the system changed, 
the political capital of the working class was exhausted, and the only capital 
workers possessed was the only one to be fully disavowed (Ost 2007:56).
Visiting desolate factories and penetrating the remains of steel plants in 
search of the residues of the industrial past, Tim Edensor admitted being 
“haunted by the ghosts of a working class”. He cited Roger Bromley, who 
argued that this class has become a “ghost in the machine of contemporary 
British politics, the great ‘unspoken’ (Edensor 2008: 328). The experience 
gained in discussions based on international studies points to the parallel 
fate of Polish and British working class subjects as a result of rapid trans-
formation. Working-class communities share a sense of alienation, help-
lessness, and nostalgia for bygone times, a mixture of pride and bitterness 
connected with the loss of a former valued position. Our respondents’ state-
ments lack a clearly formulated critique of social transformations from a 
broader political or economic perspective. They distinguish, more or less 
clearly, between the macro- and micro-political issues at the level of per-
sonal experiences and lived disillusions. These can be linked with the spe-
cific conditions of systemic transformations in Poland, which originated in 
the postulates put forward by the working class and the intelligentsia.5 The 
market transformations were, after all, implemented with widespread sup-
port across the social spectrum. Revolt against the official policy and hypoc-
risy of public life under state socialism was common. However, tensions 
appeared between a rejection of an abstract vision of public order and the 
sense of attachment to some of the familiar and safe conditions of living in a 
concrete, everyday and intimate space. What is left is “discomfort with the 
reifications of old working-class culture and the disappointment over failed 
collective dreams” (Edensor 2008: 328). The transformation did not result 
in the disappearance of the working class, but it did accelerate the process 
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of its fragmentation, marginalization and social isolation. This “decline of 
collective dreams” may be interpreted from the chaos of estate spaces, ruins 
that contrast with trim apartment blocks or a modern sports hall next to the 
derelict swimming pool of the “Zagłębianka” complex.
Notes
1 There were over 30,000 Jewish people in Będzin before the Second World War, 
that is, about 80 percent of town population. Almost the entire Jewish community 
was exterminated by the German Nazis at Holocaust. However, this tragic episode 
in a history of Będzin was not the part of scope of SPHERE research concern-
ing analysis of post-industrial changes, which have occurred since the half of the 
1990s of the 20th century (when the mine has been closed). Hence, social memory 
of inhabitants of Ksawery has been examined only in terms of memory about a 
mine “Paryż”.
2 This article describes and discusses part of the results gathered within the 
SPHERE project: space, place and the historical and contemporary articulations 
of regional, national and European identities through work and community in 
areas undergoing economic restructuring and regeneration, 7th FP EU, theme 
8.5.21 Coordinator: Middle Eastern Technical University, Turkey, partners: Lon-
don Metropolitan University, UK and France, Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt—und 
Berufsforschung, Germany, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, Univer-
sity of Silesia-Poland. 
3 Factory housing estates were created in close proximity to industrial works as a 
place of residence of workers employed in a mine or steelworks. Built by the own-
ers of the works, the housing estates bound the life of employees and their families 
to the place of work. Successive generations inherited flats and the works enjoyed 
the stability of employment of skilled workers.
4 In their stories of the industrial past former workers, miners, steelworkers ideal-
ize history, smoothing over local conflicts and heroizing the hardships of working 
class life. This smokestack nostalgia (High and Lewis 2007) constitutes the com-
mon feature of the interviews collected in six post-industrial regions during the 
SPHERE research.
5 Workers and representatives of intelligentsia are the two social strata which 
actively contributed to the overthrow of communism in Poland. Within the ranks 
of the established in 1980, first, independent of the Communist Party, Solidarity 
Trade Union there were rank and file as well as management members who were 
representatives of these two classes. The postulates raised by Solidarity through-
out the 1980s aiming at democratization of the state, underlay the bloodless sys-
tem shift triggered off by the first free elections since the Second World War, which 
were held on 4 June 1989. This date marks the beginning of the social and politi-
cal transformation in Poland.
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The Politics of Resistance
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“There are three useless things in the world: male tits, women‘s hanky-panky 
and a trade union.”
(Péter Hunčík 2011)
The heroes of Péter Hunčík’s novel, The Border Case, live in a small town, 
the dominant type of settlement in Slovakia and most of Central and East-
ern Europe. These towns are the seats of state offices, regional markets and 
shopping malls. The inhabitants do not trust the formal institutions of the 
state. Indeed, the frequency of top-down transformations experienced in 
Eastern Europe has encouraged a heavy reliance on family networks and 
friends. Furthermore, with few exceptions, which are more likely to relate 
to sports or entertainment rather than recognizably political events, there 
is little interest in mobilizing or organizing around particular causes. Even 
workers living in larger cities share patterns of behavior with these townfolk 
that could be described as politically passive. In this chapter we argue that 
this set of attitudes and behaviors is associated with what we call a “post-
peasant” social setting.2
One of the origins as well as the outcomes of these attitudes of what 
looks like resignation lies in the fact that many workers in Slovakia and 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe have opted for casting protest votes in favor 
of the populist right, which mobilizes and is mobilized by feelings of anger 
through a process that is well described by David Ost (2005) in the case of 
Poland. We nevertheless believe that the wide support for the right—which 
we characterize as right wing despite claims of leftist orientations by some 
of the parties we are concerned with—can only partially be explained as 
effects of global neoliberal policies. We argue that wider 20th century devel-
opments under state socialism as well as the effects of the expansion of the 
market into everyday life after state socialism are critical in explaining the 
apparent passivity of workers and the ongoing success of populism. We 
argue that most of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) broke from an agrar-
ian structure relatively recently with the advent of modernization under 
state socialism, which had the unexpected effect of reproducing and even 
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strengthening many elements of rural life, including the central importance 
of kinship, the cohesion of small-scale communities and the importance of 
national and religious conservatism. These elements became crucial in post-
socialist development, including the recent “cascading” of market reasoning 
(cf. Gudeman 2008) into areas of life where the market had not been present 
before.
Post-socialist transformations relied upon, and have enhanced, what we 
call the post-peasant social setting. The specific outcomes of market expan-
sion and of the current neoliberal stage have to be re-evaluated in the light 
of careful examination of what has taken place in the everyday lives of 
East Europeans in the process of modernization. What we describe as a 
“post-peasant” political culture that has remained relatively isolated from 
the world of capitalism, was to large extent formed across the region dur-
ing socialism. We argue that market transformations after socialism drew 
on the small-holders’ nostalgia, observable in the popularity of pre-socialist 
ideologies of property and self-sufficiency. These ideologies and practices 
were reproduced or invented in the context of the scarcity economy under 
socialism, and was then rejuvenated after socialism collapsed. State socialism 
also created its own “populist culture” evident in the ideologies of peasant- 
worker unity, in support for folkloric representations of the nation and the 
production of both “urban peasant” and rural urbanites.3 We believe that 
this ambivalent state socialist modernization project played the key role in 
creating post-peasants.4 With the neoliberal market the post-peasant setting 
served as a shelter from the effects of the post-socialist withdrawal of the 
state as the key provider of social security.
Our approach to post-peasant populism moves away from the peasant 
family as an economic and structural unit towards emphasizing a “rural” 
morality, imagery and ideology that is ingrained in memories and expressed 
in narratives, rituals and symbols that are found in large cities as well as 
in towns, villages and hamlets. All socialist countries saw massive influxes 
of rural people into urban centers that did not become urbanites in any 
straightforward sense. The economy of scarcity under state socialism also 
contributed to shaping the post-peasant world, in terms of actual practices 
and relations based on kinship and moneyless exchanges, as well as narra-
tives about the essential nature of these practices and relations.
This romantic Gemeinschaft has been for long inspired by Herderian 
nationalism. Already at the beginning of the 20th century populism in much 
of East Central Europe came to be embodied in ideologies of peasantism, 
which emerged intellectually as reactions to both Russian populism and 
Western socialism (Kitching 1989). Peasantism, according to Ghita Ionescu, 
took peasants explicitly as the key social prototype and proposed molding 
the society and the state according to peasants’ conceptions of work, prop-
erty and administration. Peasantism blended these social-economic doc-
trines with a nationalist concern for the emancipation of the “people” from 
foreign domination. Finally, it claimed that the peasantry was entitled to 
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take a position of leadership within political society, “not only on account 
of its electoral preponderance but also because of its innate spiritual and 
national values” (Ionescu 1969: 99). In his analysis of the interplay of reli-
gion and politics in South-East Poland Buzalka argued (2007) that post-
peasant populism aimed to defend those who found themselves “the losers 
of transformations” but based its legitimacy on the established repertoire of 
state socialism while drawing on earlier well-established institutions, such 
as the Catholic Church. As a significant political force, post-peasant pop-
ulism developed after the decline of socialism and in direct reaction to the 
expansion of the market.
By presenting the history of post-socialist workers at the largest steel 
plant in Slovakia, located in the second largest Slovak city, we aim to illus-
trate the development of this model of post-socialist politics. In Košice, with 
a population of 240,000 in 2010, large-scale steel production started in the 
1960s as an element of socialist state industrialization. We also discuss the 
local history of workers at the steel plant in Podbrezová, a town of 4,000 
inhabitants in Central Slovakia. This steel plant has a long history, going 
back to the middle of the 19th century. In contrast to the socialist city of 
Košice that is re-inventing its equally powerful pre-socialist urban tradition 
along with nurturing its socialist, industrial working class legacy, the major-
ity of workers in Podbrezová have never left the mixed peasant-worker way 
of life inherited from their parents and grandparents.
Slovakia experienced its most dynamic industrial development in the 
period of “actually existing socialism” in the 1970s and 1980s. As a conse-
quence of the mass recruitment of workers seeking employment in the new 
plant, the predominantly peasant inhabitants of the region experienced pro-
found transformations, not least in terms of shifting to an urban environ-
ment. Košice grew in three decades from being a city of 70,000 to a regional 
center of 240,000 inhabitants, primarily steelworkers and their families who 
maintained contact with relatives in their village of origin and reproduced 
the patterns of solidarity learned in their place of birth in the city.
The Podbrezová plant was built in the 1840s and within the next few dec-
ades the region developed into one of the industrial centers of the Hungar-
ian Kingdom. Nevertheless, industrialization was not reflected in a parallel 
process of urbanization, so that factories are located within small industrial 
towns or villages. Several generations have continued to live in villages sur-
rounded by mountains and in close contact with the natural environment. 
An agrarian way of life helped sustain enduring kinship and friendship 
networks. Even those who left their region because of marriage or work 
generally remained in close contact with their relatives. Interestingly, the 
inhabitants of Čierny Balog near Podbrezová, where the major part of field-
work in Central Slovakia took place, appear to identify very strongly with 
foresters’ traditions associated with their environment—now understood in 
terms of cultural heritage—rather than with the industry that they see as 
complementing the foresters’ way of life.
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The legacy of the rural past has played an important role in post-socialist 
Slovakia. The representation of Slovaks as a rural nation began with 19th 
century nationalism and became incorporated within communist ideology 
through the notion of “the people”. The Slovak term ľud (“the people” 
differs from “občania”—the citizens) denotes both a sense of ethnicity and 
of the cultures of lower classes, as opposed to the lords and elites. The sus-
tainability of extended families and understandings of their important role 
in society formed the structural basis of both socialist and post-socialist 
politics. Backed by the strong position of the Catholic Church, broad fam-
ily relations supplemented the collapsing state welfare system and, thus, 
softened the negative consequences of post-socialist transformation and the 
recent economic crisis. As Frances Pine (this volume) argues, socialist ideol-
ogy and state practice devalued the private sphere as antisocial, bourgeois 
and individualistic, but for most people it became the sphere of trust and 
morality, and the center for practical kinship and social relatedness. The 
importance of the family as a source of emotional and economic support is 
reflected in housing patterns; nearly all the respondents from Čierny Balog 
near Podbrezová live in family houses divided into two or three sections 
(floors or attachments), providing space for separate households that are 
connected through kinship ties. Households are widely characterized by the 
circulation of goods, services (mutual help; e.g., shopping, care work), and 
common or shared domestic work (e.g., in the garden). Nevertheless, the 
circulation of goods and services is not limited to family members inhabit-
ing the same house but is rather a matter that involves broader family and 
friendship networks. For example, it is still not uncommon to build a family 
house with the help of relatives and friends. Close distances enable frequent 
visits to elderly parents and/or grandparents, to help them in the house-
hold or with gardening and to get a supply of fresh home-made food. Even 
today, all the respondents from Čierny Balog reported food growing and/or 
animal breeding as a supplementary source of livelihood, a statement that 
corresponds with our own observation of small plots or gardens at almost 
every house in the village. These provisioning practices (Narotzky 2005) 
reduce dependence on wages and monetary income more generally, cushion-
ing individuals and families from the fluctuations in the market for jobs and 
commodities and protecting them from the effects of the incursion of the 
market into everyday life. It also has implications for action and reaction to 
economic and political conditions.5
Post-Socialist Transformations
Despite the optimism prompted by the Czechoslovak Velvet Revolution of 
1989, the pro-market transformations first introduced in 1991 posed new 
dangers to the country’s development towards a tolerant, market-based 
society. The decisive intellectual leaders of the revolution conceived of the 
market as an economic expression of a genuinely free (civil) society. At the 
Workers and Populism in Slovakia 161
same time, other intellectuals who lost prominent positions they had enjoyed 
under state socialism shifted towards nationalist positions that included a 
“populist” critique of pro-market transformation. In the 1992 Czecho-
slovakian elections voters supported secessionist movements and populist 
economic ideologies. Combining autocratic methods with the mobilization 
of voters through nationalist ideologies, Vladimír Mečiar became the key 
figure in disqualifying socially sensitive alternatives to market liberalism in 
Slovakia. Supporting the emergence of a “domestic capitalist class” through 
privatization, Mečiar’s rule came to symbolize the peak of cronyism and 
corruption after the fall of state socialism, which had itself been identified 
with the informal economy, familism and corruption. The success of foreign 
privatization that followed the end of Mečiar’s rule in 1998, including the 
privatization of banks, healthcare and pensions, some of which were trans-
ferred to international corporations, would not have been easily accepted by 
the population if “national privatization”, which drew primarily on surviv-
ing socialist power networks, had not allowed this previous extensive ‘state 
capture’ under the national populism of Vladimír Mečiar.
When it came to joining the EU, membership required the restructuring of 
heavy industry, privatization and internationalization (Trappmann 2013). 
The popular notion of a “return to Europe” was perceived as integral to eco-
nomic liberalization. In the 1990s Slovakia produced and exported mostly 
low value-added products, with steel products representing the exception to 
the rule. Since the early 2000s, manufacturing benefited from direct foreign 
investment that introduced higher levels of technological and managerial 
sophistication, especially in the automotive industry, in electronics and in 
steel production. The Slovak economy experienced stable and continuous 
growth until late 2008, when the economic crisis began to weaken demand 
for exports, especially automobiles and electronics. Economic growth and 
increased production were associated with higher levels of employment. As 
the economy gradually recovered from the crisis after 2011 wages increased. 
The growth of the automotive industry encouraged the development of sub-
contracting supply chains of firms, including the steel and metal sectors. 
The introduction of a flat tax rate in 2004, in place until 2013, increased 
the attractiveness of the Slovak Republic as a business location for domestic 
and foreign capital and, together with cuts in welfare benefits, initially had 
the effect of incentivizing employment. In fact, the benefits of high levels of 
growth in the 2000s remained largely concentrated in areas with the highest 
levels of foreign direct investment, especially Western Slovakia, resulting in 
regional disparities. Historically underdeveloped Eastern Slovakia suffers 
from a lack of domestic and foreign investment as well as state investment 
in infrastructure. As a result of uneven development, economic emigration 
to more developed parts of Europe has increased rapidly. Additionally, the 
social exclusion of the poor has increased, especially for the Roma popu-
lation who are mainly concentrated in Eastern Slovakia. This, along with 
long-term unemployment, continued to challenge state policies. Given the 
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loss of trust in the state and the law, elites have either tended to concentrate 
on the market as the basis of a legitimate modernizing project or remained 
‘populist’ with no feasible alternative development program. Because the 
state was discredited both in relation to socialism and post-socialism, pro-
market policies offered seemingly fair and democratic options in a society 
described by its members as corrupt and nepotistic. These developments are 
explored in the following sections in relation to two research sites.
Steel Making in Košice and Podbrezová6
As one of our informants, a 39-year-old worker in Košice remembers, 
“socialism was falling apart slowly. Comrades were still enjoying their 
positions and if not comrades then their children were!” One of the major 
instruments—and effects—of post-socialist transformation in Slovakia has 
been the privatization of state-owned industry. The process has been gener-
ally perceived as based on corruption, nepotism and cronyism. The most 
important Slovak steel plant, Východoslovenské železiarne (VSŽ) in Košice, 
was privatized in 1995, becoming the property of factory managers and 
trade union bosses through clientelistic relationships. In 1998 the firm was 
almost bankrupted as a result of incompetent management and after it was 
rescued by the state, it was finally purchased by the US Steel Corporation 
in 2000.7 The plant in Podbrezová followed a similar privatization path but 
remained in the hands of local managers who gained full control over the 
firm in the middle of the 1990s and have enjoyed a reputation for responsi-
ble ownership. Since privatization both companies have continued to be the 
major source of income in their region.
The major difficulty for the workers has been the fact that the country 
experienced massive deindustrialization in the decade following 1989. The 
re-industrialization that took place in the 2000s, based on automobile and 
electronics manufacturing in Western Slovakia, could not offer enough well-
paid jobs for the tens of thousands across the country who had worked 
in factories under the socialist system. In effect, the number of workers 
employed in the Košice steel plant has fallen by more than 50 percent, to 
the current level of 12,000, and in Podbrezová, employment levels have 
declined from 5,000 to 3,000 workers. The US Steel workers have contin-
ued to enjoy living standards well above the regional standard; however, the 
lack of employment opportunities—the unemployment rate in Eastern Slo-
vakia was above 17 percent in 2014 after the deeper decline above 20 per-
cent in 2011—and flexibility requirements at work have prompted anxieties 
about job loss. In Podbrezová, a position in the steel plant has remained 
even more desirable among the inhabitants of the Horehronie region, where 
unemployment has been higher than in Košice.
In 2011 the Podbrezová workers reported monthly salaries of about 600 
Euros net. In Košice the average wage of skilled workers with a permanent 
contract was about 750 Euro in 2010 (roughly the nominal average wage 
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in Slovakia by 2011). In 2013, official statistics from the factory suggested 
that the average worker’s wage rose to 1400 Euro in Košice. In Podbrezová 
wages increased more modestly since the crisis. Our informants say wages 
have probably reached 900 Euro net in 2014. According to workers from 
Podbrezová, the managers employ rhetorical devices, such as the claim that 
there are “thousands of unemployed waiting for a job in front of the factory 
gates”, and this image is in accordance with the widespread opinion that 
“Soták [the director] is feeding the region.” This representation of the fac-
tory director as a benign feudal lord overseeing his domain explains some 
patterns of local political culture, built on agrarian hierarchies but bolstered 
by conspiracy theories about Podbrezová managers making deals with local 
politicians to prevent competitors for local labor from emerging.8 As an 
economic and social center for Eastern Slovakia, Košice differed from Pod-
brezová, with a wider range of jobs available, including those in the public 
sector and services, as well as in the IT sector, education and culture.9 The 
Socialist era’s investment in metal production offered advantages regard-
ing the availability of skilled labor to support development in other sec-
tors, such as IT (Hudec and Šebová 2012). New jobs for young educated 
employees were created, with further investments arising when Košice was 
nominated European Capital of Culture 2013. Although unemployment has 
remained high—and extremely high among Roma—in recent years, with a 
national average of 14 percent in 2014 but almost 20 percent in some parts 
of Eastern Slovakia, the lack of skills and education of the workforce has 
created a demand for skilled workers across the country. By 2015, Slovak 
work agencies were stating that there was a need to import workers from 
abroad, especially for automotive and its auxiliary industries.
Despite the overall changes, most steelworkers interviewed in Košice and 
Podbrezová in 2010 and 2011 claimed that recruitment and promotion are 
still heavily based on personal connections and family ties, much in the 
same way as obtained under socialism. Sometimes this patronage system is 
presented as the firm’s strategy for supporting “the families of ironwork-
ers” or aimed at employing people who are loyal to the “steelworker’s des-
tiny”. In this instance the job is “inherited” by sons from their fathers or 
other close relatives. In Podbrezová this principle has been officially incor-
porated within the enrollment practices for holiday jobs and internships 
for secondary school and university students. Holiday jobs are provided 
on condition that at least one of the applicant’s parents is employed in the 
firm. In the case of internships, applicants are required to inform the firm 
whether they have—or have had—relatives working in the firm. A positive 
response enhances the chances of success. Generally speaking, but especially 
in worker-peasant Podbrezová, patronage contributes to uphold the posi-
tion of employers as an influential regional elite.
While family networks are important, workers in both plants describe 
the effects of new forms of work organization, especially in relation to pres-
sures in favor of efficiency and discipline, including the introduction of strict 
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anti-alcohol measures, which erodes contact between workers and reduces 
the opportunities for socializing. Investment in new technologies, the flexi-
bilization of work, including subcontracting and temporary contracts, con-
tributes to these effects as workers with similar experience are divided by the 
differences in their contracts. New models of individual advancement based 
on certification and continual individual evaluation, target-based individual 
systems of payment contribute to higher levels of workplace competition, 
gossip and envy. The recruitment of workers hired from outside the steel sec-
tor has increased competition for jobs and split the workforce between new 
and older employees. In response, older workers exclude newcomers from 
strategically important information circuits, signaling job insecurity across 
both groups and confirming the central role of patron-client relations. This 
contradiction—on the one hand the continuing effects of patronage and on 
the other, recruitment on the basis of ‘individual achievement’—does not 
eliminate the patron-client system. The individualized system is carried out 
by managers who are themselves involved in the informal power bargain-
ing at the workplace, making decisions about the individual worker’s fate. 
A 51-year-old informant reported: “If you are honest, they tell you that you 
are stupid. Those who are slim, they live best, whisperers and the like . . . 
Someone who works does not get the benefits, nothing . . . The one who 
sneaks gets the bonuses”.
The steelworkers have remained as removed from protest as they were 
during the massive deindustrialization of the 1990s and the lay-offs of the 
post-2008 crisis, despite these unfavorable changes. Considering the prestig-
ious position workers enjoyed under state socialism, it is important to ask 
what factors contribute to this passivity and how, instead, foreign investors 
praise the disciplined labor of Slovakia. The absence of mobilization or of 
alternative political proposals from the left must be understood not only 
as effects of neoliberal policies. Rather, explanations must reach beyond 
the factory and the ideologies and practices of contemporary capitalism to 
consider the autochthonous traditions of post-peasant populism with roots 
in pre-socialism and how it developed under state socialism.
Mobilization and Populism
Some elements of the explanation for the lack of mobilization over chang-
ing conditions of work—and the turn towards right wing populism—can 
be identified in the local histories of the trade unions. Under socialism there 
was a single trade union organization with workplace branches, based on 
compulsory membership. This contributed to worker apathy, aggravated 
by the fact that the unions did not depend on their members and had little 
incentive to fight on their behalf. Workers’ main recollections of that period 
revolve around trips and holidays organized by the union; furthermore, in 
late socialism several advances were made, especially for industrial workers, 
without the intervention of the trade union.
Workers and Populism in Slovakia 165
More recently, a significant decline in trade union membership is attrib-
uted to the domination of leadership positions by older men, a failure to 
address workers’ concerns and organizational weaknesses (Uhlerová 2009). 
Rather than being the champions of workers’ rights, trade union lead-
ers were for long identified with the dominant interests of the communist 
state, and later, of the employers. On the other hand, as working conditions 
and salaries in the steel plants remained at levels that were above regional 
averages, there was little pressure on union bosses or on their patronage 
networks; workers in Košice and Podbrezová saw the trade unions as pow-
erless and largely obsolete.10 While union leaders claim that their pressure 
on management is responsible for the social peace that has prevailed in the 
factory since privatization, workers suggest that the peace is based on the 
complicity between union leaders and the factory owners.
In Podbrezová workers’ relationships with their patrons are characterized 
by ambivalence, as anger mixes with gratitude. As we have seen, the direc-
tor of the plant is seen as a powerful man with a tough character who is in 
control of the situation, and whose qualities account for the success of the 
firm. Some workers believe that he is directly responsible for each worker’s 
fate; others think of him as a good patron who understands their needs but 
is led astray and is misinformed by his subordinates. Among his virtues is 
his ability to secure better access to healthcare for his workers, his support 
of employees studying at university, and his invitation to specialists to give 
lectures in local towns to reduce students’ need for travel.
Beyond the specific patterns of power relations in the factory, there is the 
widespread devaluation of the notion of class since the end of the socialist 
regime (Ost 2005). The decline in the efficacy of class symbolism in the pub-
lic sphere accounts for a deeper decline of working class identities than we 
see in parallel cases of transformation towards post-industrial reconfigura-
tions in Western Europe. As we argue, this “weak working class identity” 
has strong autochthonous origins in Slovakia and other parts of Eastern 
Europe. A more nuanced approach to populism in the post-peasant set-
ting is needed, recognizing the meaning and significance of “the people” 
as opposed to the elites, rather than the weak proletariat facing the mighty 
interests of global capital. This argument points to the longer-term transfor-
mations of class and of the agrarian sector that preceded socialism, further 
developed under state socialism and deepened under the impact of global 
neoliberalism.
In 2015 one of Buzalka’s key informants (a 45-year-old manufacturing 
worker) posted a joke on his social media page. The joke, entitled the “seven 
wonders of socialism”, claimed that under socialism: (1) everybody had a 
job; (2) even if everybody had a job, nobody worked; (3) even if nobody 
worked, the plan was 100 percent fulfilled; (4) even if the plan was fol-
lowed, there was nothing available; (5) even if there was nothing available, 
everybody had everything; (6) even if everybody had everything, everybody 
was stealing; (7) even if everybody was stealing, nothing was missing. The 
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joke illustrates the mixture of rational calculation of conditions (shortage 
economy and corrupt state) and deep nostalgia for relaxed work condi-
tions, relative affluence and a “good life” among workers under state social-
ism. The vast majority of workers in Slovakia do not want a return to the 
old communist system. Their nostalgia for a socialist past reflects a much 
wider set of issues that we have characterized as relating to the social and 
economic relations of a post-peasant setting. This explains why workers 
today are receptive to those politicians who do not promise a return to a 
socialist past but who do offer them a promise of security, encapsulated 
in the protection of family values, and support of a way of life they once 
supposedly enjoyed and that includes both the importance of conservative 
values, including religion, and the relative social peace that characterized 
the countryside during late socialism socialism, as well as defense of the 
nation, its cultural uniqueness and need for self-sufficiency. East European 
liberals and the left—writes David Ost (2005)—abandoned a concern with 
class, leaving open a space for the right and populist movements to mobilize 
the “people” instead. Although the case for a de-legitimation of class can 
be made, we would argue that in countries like Slovakia “class” has always 
been subordinated to the concept of “the people”. These were represented 
as rural folk with distinctive cultural features and traditions that distin-
guished them from agrarian, communist, and later cosmopolitan elites. In 
other words, in contrast with the workers of major Polish cities that gave 
rise to strong workers’ movements, in the small industrial towns of other 
Eastern European countries as well as Poland, what emerged under social-
ism was not an industrial working class, but a widely conceived non-elite 
class of worker-peasants that embraced conservative values.
The relatively recent departure from agrarian social structures in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) achieved through the modernization processes 
brought about by state socialism, failed to produce a break with many 
aspects of rural life that remained important during socialism and follow-
ing its demise. Ost recently argued that nationalism and other culturally 
grounded discourses are not an escape from class, “but a path of workers 
from the dominant culture to realize their class aspirations” (Ost 2015: 69). 
Following Tomasz Zarycki (2015) who argued in favor of the analyses of 
class and rank as ‘dually stratified’ processes in a tension that is far more 
significant in Eastern and Central Europe than in West European society, we 
would extend his observation to argue that class politics in countries like 
Slovakia has always had a stronger base in peasant values and social struc-
tures than in those we might associate with an industrial economy.
Final Remarks: Post-peasant Proletariat
In relation to the recent rise of populism in Europe, Don Kalb (2011) argues 
that nationalist populism is “in fact a displacement of experiences of dispos-
session and disenfranchisement onto the imagined nation as a community of 
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fate, crafted by new political entrepreneurs generating protest votes against 
neoliberal rule” (Kalb 2011: 1). According to Kalb (2011: 3–4) “cultural” 
dependency based on a nation’s narratives needs to be replaced by more 
dynamic, class-centered, world-systemic multi-level view on populism as 
“critical junctions” of local and global processes (Kalb 2011: 11–12). We 
agree with Kalb that the focus should be “on social relations first and only 
secondly on cultural symbols” (Kalb 2011: 11–12). However, local pro-
cesses and the specific sets of relations that strengthen the appeal of populist 
discourse do not always clearly reflect junctures with the “structural power” 
embodied amongst other things in the global market. We argue that the 
case studies we carried out in Slovakia reveal the continuing significance of 
(post)agrarian rather than (post)industrial parameters. It is the post-peasant 
condition rather than the circumstances of a post-industrial proletariat that, 
drawing on religious, rural and ethnic representations, were mobilized long 
before the wave of neoliberal transformations reached the shores of post-
socialism. The history of the state in Slovakia renders the forms of pop-
ulism we encounter here very different from those we observe historically 
in Western and Southern European and Latin American forms of populism. 
A fundamental difference is to do with the experience of the ambivalent 
modernizing interventions carried out in the socialist era. There have never 
been feasible liberal programs preceding the rise of populism, criticizing 
(market) liberalism in Eastern Europe, as Kalb argues in his theory of junc-
tions (see Kalb 2011; see also Kalb in this volume). We argue that patterns 
of post-peasant populism had already existed for decisive parts of popula-
tions before, under—and due to—the impact of autocratic communism, and 
in case of Slovakia and several other East European countries, due to earlier 
legacies of fascist autocracies under Nazi tutelage with deep roots in the 
Herderian concept of Volkgeist. As has been pointed out by many authors 
in the field, these histories are decisive in defining and understanding the 
current advance of populist politics in Eastern Europe (Hann 1985; Eyal 
et al.1998; Nagengast 1991; Pine 1987; Dunn 2004; Kalb 2011).11
Nevertheless, the entanglement of deeply rooted local values and struc-
tural domains is perhaps best illustrated in what is apparently the most 
significant evidence of the importance of the deep cultural patterns of con-
temporary populism: the historical animosities towards Roma. Michael 
Stewart’s edited volume (2012) approaches anti-Gypsy attitudes within 
broader shifts in European politics and culture, especially as a by-product 
of the European project. Drawing inspiration from Douglas Holmes’ con-
cept of “integralism” (2000) and Mabel Berezin’s sociological perspective 
on social and political insecurity (Berezin 2009), Stewart argues that the EU 
project “creates the broad conditions of receptivity to xenophobic politics” 
(Stewart 2012: 3). This politics is based on a shift away from mid-20th 
century racism towards a cultural politics resembling Huntington’s “clash 
of civilizations”, which, “re-framed as incomparability and purportedly 
culturally distinct behaviors is being used to justify radical demands for 
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‘root and branch’ reform of educational, welfare, and, in extreme cases, 
citizenship regimes” (Stewart 2012: 9). This analysis highlights the social 
and historical depth of cultural frameworks and responses. We suggest that 
a framework that recognizes the importance of post-peasant values is more 
sensitive to these complexities than the conclusions afforded by the post-
industrial paradigm favoring the decisive role of global neoliberalism.
In this chapter we wished to show that longer term, historical traditions 
of populism in Eastern Europe are important for understanding the success 
of contemporary populist positions prompted by Viktor Orbán in Hungary, 
Róbert Fico in Slovakia and Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland among others.12 
These historical legacies intersect with the pressures of global neoliberalism, 
which is increasingly the target of these skilled populist entrepreneurs. As we 
emphasized, the role of ambivalent socialist modernization in the creation 
of post-peasant settings has been the key internal factor in populism’s suc-
cess. This contributed to workers’ passivity and sympathy for the message of 
populist leaders. The parallels between the rise of populism in Eastern and 
Western Europe may, in our view, be emphasizing their origins in a systemic 
reaction to the pressure of global capital at the expense of the crucial impor-
tance of recognizing their autochthonous origins and relatively independent 
operation as forms of post-peasant populism in most of Eastern Europe.
Notes
 1 We would like to express very sincere gratitude for careful comments on the earlier 
version of the draft of this paper to Victoria Goddard. The research and this text 
were prepared thanks to the support of MEDEA—Models and their Effects on 
Development paths: an Ethnographic and comparative Approach to knowledge 
transmission and livelihood strategies; collaborative project no. 225670 of the 
EU 7th Framework Program. The final versions of the text were prepared thanks 
to WOGYMARKET—Workers, Gypsies, and the Market: The Anthropology of 
New Fascism in Eastern Europe; FP7-PEOPLE-2013 IOF contract No. 626128.
 2 A more thorough elaboration of the issue of post-peasant settings, with a focus 
on Catholicism, can be found in Buzalka 2007.
 3 For more details on how the socialist state reproduced populism in Slovakia, see 
Buzalka 2004.
 4 For a discussion about ambivalent socialist modernization of Slovakia, see espe-
cially Podoba 1999; 2003; 2015.
 5 The major part of fieldwork in Eastern Slovakia was carried out in Šaca, a dis-
tant suburb of Košice with five thousand inhabitants, located very near the steel 
plant. The suburb resembles a village more than an urban district, as it is built 
on what had been two pre-socialist agricultural settlements. This rural character 
of the suburb has provided appropriate conditions for agricultural activities even 
if only on a limited basis, of some gardening and/or animal breeding for one´s 
own family needs. The lowland region south of Košice, the steel plant location, is 
surrounded by villages and small plots of vegetable gardens where urban inhab-
itants come to spend their weekends and holidays, contributing to the suburb’s 
atmosphere of informality and conviviality.
 6 The fieldwork was carried out over several periods in 2010 and 2011 in Košice 
and Podbrezová; in total more than 40 current and former workers in both sites 
were interviewed in greater depth in summer and autumn 2011.
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 7 US Steel is an integrated steel corporation with major production operations in 
the United States, Canada and Central Europe (see www.ussteel.com).
 8 Under socialism, workers were trained in secondary schools attached to the fac-
tories and work trajectories were predictable from the moment of school enrol-
ment. After privatization education was detached from production and high 
unemployment levels meant that the number of skilled workers available for 
employment in the declining industry was high. There was no need to employ 
inexperienced school alumni. In the case of Podbrezová, qualified workers were 
hired by the steel plant from the collapsing machine factories in the declining 
region and even from the bankrupt chemical factory (e.g., locomotive drivers 
and shunters). Former well-positioned employees had to take lower grade posi-
tions in the organization of steel production, if they wished to have a job at all.
 9 The city was a hub for technical and technological innovation, at least in part 
because the Technical University in Košice, which cooperated closely with the 
steel plant, has remained one of the top higher education institutions in the 
country,
 10 According to official sources, the president of US Steel Košice, George Babcoke, 
earned 4,85 million Euro in 2014 (as a matter of curiosity, in the same year the 
USS corporation base in Pittsburgh was releasing 10 percent of its workforce). 
As a local journalist noted, the average US Steel employee would need 275 years 
to earn as much as the president earned in one year. In a similarly telling com-
parison, the amount earned by the president annually equals the price of 60 
three-bedroom apartments in Košice. See http://kosice.korzar.sme.sk/c/7707338/
babcoke-minuly-rok-v-kosiciach-zarobil-485-miliona-eur.html, accessed on 21st 
March 2015.
 11 Analyzing the failure of the Polish state to collectivize the peasantry, Chris Hann 
(1985: 169) registered a ‘contradictory persistence of peasantry’ and of a ‘peasant 
ethos’ in rural, socialist south-east Poland, as well as a ‘late flowering of peasant 
populism’. He also noticed similarities between the rural Solidarity movement of 
the 1980s and populist protests from before the Second World War. Hann was 
unsure what sort of populism could be preserved by modernized family farmers, 
but he noticed in his “village without solidarity” that the only functioning com-
munity institution was the Roman Catholic Church. He wrote that “certainly 
the ethos has survived and peasants are united in their profound suspicion of the 
authorities”, and “peasant religiosity remains at a high level, ensuring that the 
Catholic Church remains the major solidifying force in local communities and in 
the nation” (Hann 1985: 176). Nagengast’s (1991) description of the reproduc-
tion of class relations in Poland during the socialist period offers perhaps a more 
direct view of the reproduction of some elements of pre-war populism. Focusing 
on elites, Eyal et al. (1998) called what happened in Central Europe after 1989, 
“making capitalism without capitalists”. They characterized this process as a 
distinctive new strategy of transition adopted by an alliance of technocratic and 
intellectual elites in societies in which no class of private owners had existed 
before the introduction of the market. The most important mechanism for the 
installation of capitalism was the reproduction of various forms of capital based 
on status, prestige, skills and social ties that the elites held and reproduced 
despite regime changes. In Poland, Pine (1987) observed continuity in issues of 
land and inheritance, in social stratification and family structures and in cultural 
practices and ideologies, all of which took only slightly different forms under 
socialism. Dunn (2004) found that in a food processing plant in Poland the 
Catholic values of the family were reproduced in the workplace in post-socialist 
capitalism. The surviving peasantry, the role of the family and the existence of 
an independent Catholic Church are the most important examples of this kind 
of continuity from the agrarian era in Eastern Europe. Last but not least, Kalb 
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also acknowledges the “different surface” of East European populisms, even 
while predominantly focusing on the “big picture” of synchronized appearance 
of populisms East and West, driven by neoliberalism (Kalb 2011).
 12 The leaders of the respective East Central European countries have been fre-
quently known for, and accused of, populist demagogy and illiberal attitudes. 
After his victory in 2014, the Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán even 
introduced changes towards illiberal constituionalism and has been criticized for 
xenophobic nationalism, and openly anti-European attitudes. After the elections 
held in the autumn of 2005, the new Prime Minister and and, since the Autumn 
of 2015 the leader of the government party Jarosław Kaczyński, announced 
the Fourth Polish Republic with a program of reforms couched in moral terms, 
invoking patriotism and proclaiming the moral recovery of Polish society based 
on conservative Catholicism. Nominal social democrat and twice Prime Minister 
of Slovakia Róbert Fico, whose party won the parliamentary elections of 2016, 
has been known for expressing controversial xenophobic attitudes towards 
minorities, including Hungarians, Roma, sexual minorities and recently, also 
Muslims.
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The Saturn automobile factory in Spring Hill, Tennessee was idled during 
GM’s bankruptcy reorganization in 2009. The decision to temporarily shut-
ter the plant was part of the restructuring plan presided over by the US 
government after it put up tens of billions of dollars in loans and cash and 
became the majority stakeholder in the company. By the time of the bank-
ruptcy, fewer than 3,000 people worked at the Spring Hill facility. Most of 
the 7,200 union autoworkers employed there just a decade earlier had taken 
buyout packages or transferred to other GM plants in the intervening years, 
as Saturn sales dropped off, Spring Hill lost bids for new products and the 
plant bled jobs. In 2011, GM finally made public its plans to assemble a 
Chevrolet model and employ 1,800 people in Spring Hill; 400–500 in a 
first round of hiring, the rest later. But the majority of those who moved 
to Tennessee in the 1980s-90s to work at Saturn had already left the area. 
The facility would therefore reopen with new GM employees, in entry-level 
jobs. Significantly, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) contract signed 
in the wake of GM’s bankruptcy permitted newly hired workers to be paid 
roughly half of what veteran workers earn (New York Times, July 12, 2011 
and November 11, 2011, The Tennessean, Dec. 29, 2011).2 Spring Hill 
would thus offer a compensation packet to union autoworkers equivalent 
to that paid to nonunion workers in Nissan, Honda, and Toyota plants in 
nearby, southern locations.
The fact that GM is now hiring in Tennessee and elsewhere in the US 
speaks to the significant savings it secured after the government bailout 
helped deliver UAW concessions and cheapen unionized labor. Despite con-
cessions on entry-level wages in recent contracts, the UAW held out against 
a widespread, two-tier workforce, for the inequality among members and 
diminution of union power it would bring.3 GM, Ford, and Chrysler—the 
US “big three”—won this give-back under threat of bankruptcy and the 
strong hand of the state. This situation replayed the government’s bailout of 
Chrysler in 1979. Then, the UAW granted wage cuts to Chrysler and set into 
motion GM’s own pursuit of concessions on wages, benefits and work rules. 
The combined power of state and capital won historic setbacks against US 
autoworkers in both 1979 and 2009.
11  ‘A Trojan Horse in Our Midst’
The Saturn Plant and 
the Disorganization of 
Autoworkers in the US1
Sharryn Kasmir
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At first appearance, Spring Hill’s diminished current condition seems a 
stark reversal of the facility’s origins as a highly touted model plant. Sat-
urn was planned in the 1980s, when Japanese automakers were gaining an 
increasing share of the small-car market and their management innovations 
offered labor cost savings and flexibility that US firms could not match. Sat-
urn was GM’s response to Japanese competition. It was designed to have the 
most developed team concept and worker participation programs in the US, 
and its advertising and carefully crafted brand image claimed it was creating 
a new labor elite, using cooperation rather than labor conflict to remake the 
industrial workplace and class identity. Saturn’s UAW Local 1853 collabo-
rated with management in this project to make Saturn workers better than 
and different from other union autoworkers. It cast aside the national UAW 
contract and adopted a local Memorandum of Agreement that instituted the 
farthest reaching regime of labor-management cooperation in the industry 
and that served as its only labor accord. UAW autoworkers moved to Ten-
nessee from Michigan, Ohio, California, and other states, where their GM 
plants were struggling or had closed. Some believed they would find more 
rewarding and fulfilling work lives; others hoped that Saturn would prove 
to be the “100-year company” that the company promised and that union 
involvement in planning, managing, sourcing and cost saving would provide 
the long-term security that eluded them in the places they left.
I argue in this chapter that Saturn instead contributed to widespread 
insecurity by facilitating the disorganization of autoworkers, one of the 
most powerful sectors of the US working class. I sketch the part Saturn 
played in this process by charting three moments in which distinct scales 
of working-class identification, alliance and struggle—local, national and 
international—were made and unmade. Following these political moments, 
we see autoworkers and their union sometimes expanding and other times 
constricting their political vision and aspiration; sometimes in a position of 
relative power vis a vis capital while at other times backed into defensive 
postures. Viewed in this way, the case of Saturn lends insight into the long 
unmaking of the US Fordist working class.
I reflect on these insights at the conclusion of the chapter by engaging 
David Harvey’s (2001) essay on a campaign to save jobs at the Cowley 
auto plant in England. The case of Cowley offers important parallels with 
Saturn. Notably, both expose the shortcomings of “militant particularism” 
divorced from “abstract universalism”, paired terms that Raymond Wil-
liams (1989) conceived to capture what he considered the central dialectic 
of working class power—the relationship between the immediate, particular 
feelings and loyalties at the plant or community level, and the universal 
sentiments and wider geography of struggle and solidarity made through 
organizational connections and ties (see also Narotzky 2011). Harvey used 
this framework to express his misgivings about Cowley and the fact this 
fight to keep one plant open and to save jobs in one location might fore-
close a broader, anti-capitalist struggle. However, to stop analysis there and 
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to cast labor struggles such as those in Cowley or Spring Hill as defensive 
actions with little political potential, as Harvey does (2003), is a mistake. 
If we are to fully confront the processes at the heart of working-class disor-
ganization, we are better served by the vantage point of historical ethnogra-
phy that brings into focus an understanding of how workers’ visions came 
to be limited, how organized labor was dismantled in particular places and 
sectors and how wider alliances and aspirations were defeated in the course 
of these events. What follows is a (necessarily) brief account of the role of 
Saturn in these developments in the US auto industry.4
Localism and Difference
During contract negotiations in 1991, UAW Local 1853 President Mike Ben-
nett led a brief job action in which Saturn workers wore black-and-orange 
armbands and staged a slowdown to protest quality problems in the plant; 
the display was meant to symbolize workers’ commitment to the company 
and to their unique cooperative labor-management pact. It was also intended 
to delay the launch of Saturn’s “risk-and-reward” pay structure, which tied 
20 percent of wages to production and quality targets. The unusual stunt 
won the union praise from Saturn’s corporate president who commended 
workers for refocusing “everyone to the sense of urgency to get the quality 
problems fixed” (Business Week, Dec. 2, 1991: 117). The job action viv-
idly positioned the union as the defender of the brand, and it signaled that 
1853 was “a different kind of union”, a message that its leaders frequently 
sounded and that pointedly echoed Saturn’s advertising slogan “a different 
kind of company”.
Bennett demonstrated his devotion to Saturn’s difference during a 1992 
strike at a stamping plant in Lordstown, Ohio over GM’s plan to outsource to 
a nonunion facility. Spring Hill and eight other assembly plants were stalled 
for lack of parts due to the walkout, and Bennett complained to the press 
that the International UAW should allow those workers making Saturn 
parts to cross the picket line. In his view, UAW solidarity was less important 
than protecting the maverick experiment at Saturn and keeping that facility 
open. Bennett did not support the strike; to the contrary, he believed that 
Lordstown strikers should support Saturn. He insisted that the role of a 
local union should be to help the company find ways to compete, includ-
ing outsourcing. “I don’t support the current process”, he told the Wall 
Street Journal. “We can’t continue to remove wages from competition in 
the international economy”. Although it was hardly necessary, he clarified, 
“That’s my position, not the UAW position”, underscoring his distance from 
the International and what he deemed its adversarial approach to labor- 
management relations (Wall Street Journal, Sept. 4, 1992: A8). Bennett’s 
public comments were all the more consequential since the strike was widely 
considered to be the UAW’s “test of GM’s toughness”, as the corporation 
rolled out a three-year plan to shut 21 plants and eliminate 70,000 jobs. 
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Indeed, GM closed a plant in Van Nuys, California and laid off 2,500 work-
ers on the very day that Lordstown workers went on strike (Los Angeles 
Times, Aug. 28, 1992; Parker and Slaughter 1997:18; Wall Street Journal 
Sept. 4, 1992:A8).
Bennett’s disregard for solidarity is evident from his public comments, as 
is his conviction that 1853 was different from and superior to other UAW 
locals, but his position is also a manifesto on the geography of working-
class identity, alliance and struggle. On this occasion and others, Bennett 
asserted, “if unions have a future . . . it’s ‘at the local level’ where they can 
help companies ‘explore opportunities to compete’ ” (Wall Street Journal 
Sept. 4, 1992:A8). He strongly “advocated that unions pursue their interests 
at the local level” (emphasis added, Parker and Slaughter 1997:218) rather 
than in a national or international field. I interviewed Bennett during my 
fieldwork at Saturn in 1998–99. He was a committed reformer who believed 
in the Saturn project. Along with hundreds of others who held union-side 
leadership positions in the plant and who were members of his Vision Team 
union caucus, he considered that he was playing an historic, transformative 
role in the US labor movement. He became a national spokesman for labor-
management cooperation, authoring articles and persuading other unions 
to institute Saturn-like reforms. To Bennett labor-management cooperation 
was a local-level endeavor to collaborate with management to preserve the 
wage bargain in the US, one plant at a time. But this necessarily involved 
putting union locals into fierce competition with each other in ways that 
eroded union control of the shop floor and dismantled UAW power at the 
national and international scales. This development had important ramifica-
tions for disorganizing North American autoworkers.
Whipsawing and the Defeat of Internationalism
Fordist localism initiated a key dimension of monopoly capitalist control 
in the US beginning in the 1920s. It was reinforced in the ensuing decades 
by federal legislation that codified decentralized labor agreements and out-
lawed secondary boycotts, mass picketing and multi-employer actions, 
therein placing significant restriction on labor’s sphere of action. This long 
legal and cultural project of capital and the state, “Americanism and Ford-
ism” in Gramsci’s phrasing, severely undermined the ability of labor unions 
to coordinate actions across space (Carbonella 2014). Localism was greatly 
extended and deepened in the US during the 1980s, as capital and the state 
put union chapters into competition, just as they pitted municipalities and 
states against each other, all vying for investment in an age when the threat 
of capital flight was ever-present and real. The devastating effect of deindus-
trialization in cities such as Youngstown, Ohio or Flint, Michigan became 
part of the national political and popular discourse and a central symbol 
for the emerging common sense that competition for investment was neces-
sary and urgent. These counter moves narrowed workers’ worldviews and 
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disciplined a working class that had become restive, relatively well organized 
and increasingly radical in the late 1960s to early 1970s (Lembcke 1991).
In auto, this nascent working-class consciousness was manifested in the 
cross-fertilization of new social movements with political developments in 
the factories and unions. The important influence of the counter-cultural 
movements and the anti-authoritarian protests against the US War in Viet-
nam on workers’ consciousness and subjectivity was apparent during the 
1973 wildcat strike at GM Lordstown. This infamous strike was over work 
pace and quality of work life, rather than wages or benefits. The protest 
of Lordstown’s largely young, male workforce signaled that they viewed 
masculinity, their own humanity and their class subjectivity differently than 
had their fathers, whose version of working-class manhood was grounded 
in how much they produced and how tough they were on the job. The sons, 
on the other hand, demanded more respect and more meaningful work than 
their rote and exhausting assembly tasks afforded (Rothschild 1973; Ter-
kel 1972: 256–265). The UAW’s tactic of staging unannounced, targeted 
wildcat strikes across the industry, such as the one in Lordstown, similarly 
evinced a changing political climate and workers’ increasing willingness to 
be militant. Union locals pursued grievance after grievance in order to pro-
voke strikes, and workers used this method to wrest a measure of control 
over the pace of work and their time, often walking out on a Friday to get 
a three-day weekend (Rubenstein 1992:237–238). For the UAW this cross-
local, national strategy signaled a wider struggle beyond the local wage 
bargain.
The Civil Rights and Black Power movements likewise influenced organ-
izing, activism and scale in auto. African-American workers formed the 
Revolutionary Union Movement and League of Revolutionary Black Work-
ers, Marxist-Leninist groups that issued a trenchant critique of racism in the 
auto industry and the UAW. Their members ran for union office; published 
radical newsletters connecting exploitation in US car factories with that 
experienced by black and brown workers in the Third World and farm and 
service workers in the US; marched in solidarity with Palestinian-American 
autoworkers protesting the UAW’S investment in Israeli government bonds; 
and in other ways voiced socialist and internationalist visions that mapped 
a global geography of identity and struggle (Georgakas and Surkin 1998: 
62–68, 132; Geschwender 1977: 92).
In reaction to these developments, GM moved production from the cent-
ers of militancy and set out to build plants in the US south, where a strong 
anti-union tradition and a legacy of racism had long thwarted labor organ-
izing. In response, the UAW focused attention and resources on organizing 
in the south and successfully subverted this spatial assault by unionizing all 
of the new GM plants by 1979. GM then turned from its “southern strat-
egy” to a decidedly global plan, and the company invested in technology, 
experimented with new managerial strategies and set union locals against 
each other to further undermine labor’s power.
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The strategy of provoking competition among locals had its seeds in the 
1935 National Labor Relations Act’s provision for decentralized labor agree-
ments, but it was considerably furthered by GM in 1982, when the corpora-
tion demanded that the International UAW reopen its contract to negotiate a 
cut in hourly wages. Such a concession had been granted to Chrysler during 
its bankruptcy reorganization and government bailout three years earlier. 
GM now wanted to cheapen its labor costs to match Chrysler’s. The union 
refused and GM immediately announced it would close four plants; within 
months it shut Southgate in California. With this heavy-handed maneuver, 
GM perfected the tactic of threatening plant closings to win national-level 
give-backs. The company then applied this policy to union locals, requiring 
them to submit bids in order to secure new product lines; the bids involved 
plant-specific concessions to make the local attractive enough to win invest-
ment and secure work for its members. This practice of pitting local against 
local is known as “whipsawing” (Mann 1987).
Whipsawing was quickly challenged in Van Nuys, California where 
Local 645 organized to save their threatened plant. The struggle began 
after several California factories were closed, including nearby Southgate. 
In strategizing the campaign, Local 645 ’s political action committee asked 
the critical question: “[W]hy, except for the most narrow self-interest of its 
5,000 workers, the plant should be kept open” (Mann 1987: 108). They 
envisioned their campaign as a fight for worker and community control 
over economic planning, and the organizers saw themselves as mavericks 
within the UAW, charting a more militant response to plant closings than 
had the International, which responded by offering give-backs and facilitat-
ing the transfer of workers from plant to plant. Local 645 leaders hoped to 
set a different course to be followed by other locals and that would push the 
International to a more radical stance. The campaign moved from the local 
to the general, developed alliances across ethnic and racial lines and geo-
graphic space, and had aspirations beyond saving jobs. In these ways, the 
Van Nuys fight productively engaged the dialectical relationship of militant 
particularism and abstract universalism.
Local 645 sent delegates to the 1983 UAW convention, where they raised 
questions about labor geography and class power: “Why isn’t your Inter-
national union doing more to stop these plant closings?” “Why isn’t your 
local doing more to get other UAW locals to develop a national strategy 
against plant closings?” (Mann 1987:155). At this juncture, the UAW might 
have devised a challenge to global capital and made demands of the state, 
and the effort to protect jobs might have moved to an international stage 
and broader class politics. But the UAW instead sounded, “the constant 
theme [of] the battle against imports and calls for protectionist legislation. 
While delegates cheered wildly at every verbal assault against Japan, there 
was no strategy offered with which to confront the Big Three automak-
ers on the issue of capital flight or the widespread problem of whipsaw-
ing” (Mann 1987:156). Activists again brought their agenda to the 1986 
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UAW convention, where they joined the dissident caucus New Directions 
Movement to fight concessions and build a more progressive, international-
ist working-class organization. But their New Directions protest slate lost 
the union elections, and more conservative candidates prevailed. Van Nuys 
activists likewise lost their fight when their plant finally shut in 1992.
With their position sidelined, whipsawing and intense localism became 
an ordinary, daily fact of UAW micropolitics. The widespread and unre-
lenting competition it engendered narrowed the political visions of local 
unions and their members and pitted insecurity in one place against invest-
ment, employment and (temporary) job security in another. Competitive 
bidding weakened the International, turning it into what one New Direc-
tions leader called “a loose federation of locals competing among them-
selves” (quoted in Mann 1987: 82). Losing a bid for a product might 
mean that workers faced lay off or saw their factory permanently closed. 
Successful bids required locals to implement quality circles, worker par-
ticipation programs and the team concept, a set of practices associated 
with labor-management cooperation: this managerial regime became the 
rule of the day. The New Directions Movement and the left labor journal 
Labor Notes considered these so-called cooperative work arrangements to 
be thinly disguised union-busting tactics. They maintained that the team 
concept turned workers into petty supervisors of each other’s efforts and 
robbed the union of control over job classifications and seniority rules, 
two long-time sources of union power on the shop floor. Further, participa-
tion and quality programs facilitated the introduction of lean production 
and brought a speed-up throughout auto (see Parker and Slaughter 1985, 
1988, 1994). The Canadian wing of the UAW so strongly opposed labor-
management cooperation that it left the International in 1985 over the 
issue, thereby limiting the union’s reach at a time when international con-
nections were more important than ever.
Saturn was the standard bearer of labor-management cooperation, and as 
such it exerted considerable pressure on the rest of the UAW to adopt flex-
ible, cooperative work rules. Saturn “team members” (as employees were 
called) worked in groups of 10 to 15 and rotated tasks, thus eliminating job 
classifications and seniority, and enabling them to replace fellow workers 
who were late or absent. Teams were “self-directed,” operating like small 
businesses within the plant, responsible for their own budgets, schedules, 
quality and records. Workers traded hourly wages for a formula that held a 
portion of compensation “at risk” and paid “reward” based on factory-wide 
training, quality and production targets, something that looked to critics 
like a petty form of capitalist return on investment. Rather than a griev-
ance procedure, errant workers went to “coach and counsel” sessions where 
they were asked to commit themselves to more self-regulating attitudes and 
behaviors. These techniques were meant to encourage an entrepreneurial 
ethos on the shop floor (Kasmir 2001) and to harness for corporate profit 
workers’ own aspirations for more rewarding, less monotonous work that 
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was demonstrated in the 1970s at Lordstown and throughout auto by work-
ers who questioned the meaning and purpose of their labor.
Saturn’s labor accord departed from the national contract in other impor-
tant ways, as well. Significantly, it extended job security to 80 percent of 
the workforce “except in situations of . . . unforeseen or catastrophic events 
or severe economic conditions” (Memorandum of Agreement 2000:16). In 
this event, workers would be left without transfer rights or lay off assistance 
provided by the national contract. The 20 percent without job security had 
no protection at all, leaving them more vulnerable than were workers cov-
ered by the national contract (Rubinstein and Kochan 2001:16). In these 
many ways, Saturn afforded management a far greater degree of flexibil-
ity than any other division of GM, something the corporation wanted to 
achieve across its workforce.
Along with these contractual changes, corporate managers, counting on 
the active participation of the Vision Team union leaders, crafted a cultural 
and ideological campaign carried out in the factory and the public sphere. 
This campaign had much in common with the Fordist corporate programs 
of the 1920s that set out to remake class relations. Saturn workers were the 
objects of a dense public-relations effort that extolled their difference from 
other autoworkers, who they left behind in the “old-world” of Detroit, 
Flint, Lordstown, and other ailing industrial cities, where, as the narrative 
went, the “baggage” of labor-management conflict created a poor work 
ethic and jeopardized the future of auto manufacturing in the US (Kasmir 
2001, 2014). The combined effect of Saturn’s labor accord and cultural/
ideological project was so great that the president of a Michigan local con-
sidered that “Saturn had become a Trojan horse in our midst. Armed with 
the threat of plant closing, the company is now playing local against local 
to see who will meet or exceed Saturn’s give-backs” (quoted in Mann 1987: 
82). Saturn thus marked a milestone in the dismantling of labor’s power in 
auto, a process that began with capital flight in the 1970s and continued 
in the 1980s with labor-management cooperation, lean production, whip-
sawing and localism. It was a short step from the narrowed spatial scale of 
working-class identity and struggle that these developments brought about 
to Mike Bennett’s fervent public defense of localism and difference.
The UAW Contract and a National Geography of Dissent
Given the divisive role 1853 played within the UAW, it is not surprising that 
when Saturn workers finally expressed their dissent, their opposition came 
as a refusal of 1853’s extreme localism and their own difference from the 
rest of the union. Dissatisfaction mounted in 1998 amidst growing insecu-
rity in the plant. Sales were off, reward payments and overtime were cut, 
and there was no sign of a much-needed new product. Saturn workers had 
already been displaced and their families uprooted (some two or three times 
before), and they sensed that Saturn would not be a 100-year company and 
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they would face lay off yet again. In this context, union dissidents affili-
ated with New Directions and Labor Notes formed Concerned Brothers 
and Sisters and waged a months-long effort to return Saturn to the national 
contract. They sought to regain the security offered by layoff protections 
(guaranteed income stream, sub-benefits, and the job bank) and transfer 
rights provided the national UAW contract but not by their Memorandum 
of Agreement. They also meant to express solidarity with the International.
Concerned Brothers and Sisters held meetings, distributed leaflets, encour-
aged workers to send letters and emails to the International and they raised 
questions of identity and alliance. One member expressed his frustration at 
the destructive impact of Local 1853: “This membership is tired of being 
the Experiment that is Tearing down the Foundation Our Great Union was 
Built Upon” (Benavides, Feb. 6, 1998). Another assembly worker implored 
the International to come to Spring Hill and set the local straight: “Please, 
brothers and sisters of the International don’t forget us down in 1853 for our 
local leadership has lost the way” (Dalton, n.d.). With a restive shop floor 
and pressure from the International, Concerned Brothers and Sisters forced 
a referendum on returning to the national contract. Although the referen-
dum was defeated, activists were nonetheless emboldened by their stronger 
ties to the International and by their success in orchestrating dissent.
Months later, a GM-wide strike that began at two Flint parts plants over 
outsourcing to nonunion plants offered Concerned Brothers and Sisters 
a chance to act. With the supply chain interrupted and given widespread 
concern that GM intended to spin off the Delphi parts division and leave 
53,000 workers outside of the GM system (a fear that was soon realized) 
strikes quickly spread throughout GM. The combined action of the locals 
had the distinct appearance of a solidarity strike in support of Delphi work-
ers fighting for their jobs: 186,000 workers were out, and 27 of 29 North 
American assembly plants and scores of parts facilities shut down in the 
biggest labor stoppage in GM since the 1970s (see Collins 1999). It was an 
exhilarating time when localism was briefly overcome and the UAW demon-
strated resistance that extended across the US and to Canada. Saturn work-
ers, however, remained on the job.
This situation was a disturbing reminder of Mike Bennett’s inflammatory 
position in 1992 during the Lordstown strike. It looked as if Saturn work-
ers would once again stand against their fellow autoworkers, as their union 
worked with management to find alternate parts suppliers. The New York 
Times reported that 1853 leaders “set aside union solidarity by assembling 
cars using parts from Japan and at least one nonunion American company, 
instead of parts from Flint” (July 22, 1998). This was deeply shameful to 
men and women who came from union cities and UAW families, and whose 
brothers, sisters and former co-workers were on strike. Their difference had 
gone too far, and, as they told me, they felt like “scabs”. Concerned Broth-
ers and Sisters worked with the International to force their local leadership 
to hold a strike authorization vote. It was the first time Saturn workers took 
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such a vote, and it was an exciting and emotional time when they rejected 
their localism in favor of solidarity and broader alliance. The strikes were a 
month-and-half old when the vote was taken; nevertheless, Saturn’s decision 
to join them was momentous.
Concerned Brothers and Sisters rallied again in 1999 to support Members 
for a Democratic Union (MDU), a dissident caucus that ran candidates for 
chapter elections on a platform of bringing Saturn closer to the national 
contract. In a stunning defeat, all thirteen officers from the Vision Team, 
including Mike Bennett, were unseated by their opponents. After the elec-
tions, there was renewed discussion of returning to the national contract, 
and in 2004, 1853 voted by overwhelming majority to scrap its Memo-
randum of Agreement. This decision marked Local 1853’s unity with the 
International, and it suggested an expanded geography of class identity and 
struggle. But the International was now much diminished: it had suffered 
decades of capital flight, whipsawing and localism, some of which was facil-
itated by 1853 itself. The disempowered International was unable to do 
much to protect jobs in Spring Hill, or anywhere else, and the plant steadily 
downsized. Workers retired or used the transfer rights they regained in the 
national contract to move to other GM plants.
Spring Hill no longer produced Saturn models by 2007. GM assigned a 
portion of the plant to a Chevrolet model, and the remainder went unused. 
During bankruptcy, GM terminated the Saturn brand altogether and put 
Spring Hill on hold, until it reopened in 2012 with a two-tier workforce 
and new hires paid half the wage of veteran workers. Production of a new 
Cadillac model to begin in 2016 will finally engage the whole facility but 
only one-third of the workforce. Rather than suffering a reversal of fortunes 
from its original promise, Saturn might be said to have done its job well. Its 
purpose was not to dole out privilege by shoring up livelihoods and better 
working conditions for workers in one location, as the lore of the Saturn 
model told, but to make a difference among workers and UAW chapters, to 
encourage localism and competition and to further the disorganization of a 
once powerful segment of the Fordist working class in the US.
Politics and the Disorganization of US Autoworkers
David Harvey makes a provocative interlocutor for reflecting on Saturn. 
Harvey joined activists in the late 1980s to help stop the closure of the 
Rover Group’s car plant at Cowley, and he co-edited a volume (1993) with 
Teresa Hayter to document the campaign. Years later he revisited his politi-
cal differences with Hayter, who had aligned herself with the militant shop 
stewards who led the fight (Harvey 2001). Harvey was concerned that the 
effort to save jobs at Cowley was backward looking, since it sought to pro-
tect the privileges of Rover workers and to preserve the social relations of 
capital rather than imagine a more universal struggle for human betterment. 
He even questioned whether he should have defended the auto jobs at all, 
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since there was overcapacity in the industry, the plant was a notorious pol-
luter, and Rover made luxury cars for the rich. His long list of misgivings 
indicates how carefully he weighed his responsibility to the campaign and 
for the published volume.
Most significantly, Harvey was torn between his support for the militant 
particularism born in and around the plant and his hope for a broader social-
ist movement. As he saw it, the campaign was a necessary battle against 
the company, but waging this local fight might at the same time thwart a 
larger struggle. Harvey had wanted the conclusions to the book to reflect 
the complicated nature of the struggle; however, his co-editor prevailed, and 
they published a more partisan chapter in favor of the shop stewards. After 
reading Second Generation and other works of Raymond Williams’ fiction, 
in which the characters experienced the contradiction between their local 
loyalties and socialist aspiration, Harvey believed he should have held out 
for a Brechtian conclusion to expose the shortcomings of the campaign, 
while also leaving open the possibility that future struggles might emerge 
from this one. This thoughtful essay has long engaged and troubled me, 
and my analysis of Saturn developed in dialogue with it. The tensions Har-
vey pointed to for Cowley resound for Saturn as well. Taking his critique 
to heart, I similarly reserve endorsement of Saturn dissidents’ campaign to 
return to the national UAW contract as a real advance for labor; at best it 
was a small victory that suggested that the expansion of political horizon 
was possible. But if Harvey imagined a rewritten, Brechtian conclusion in 
order to recuperate the future political possibilities that his initial pessimism 
might have precluded, I fear that his analysis shortchanged Cowley’s past.
When he encountered them in 1988, and as some of the chapters in the 
co-edited volume detail, Cowley workers had already suffered protracted 
defeat. In brief, and parallel to the developments in US auto, in the late-1960s 
and early-1970s workers’ frustration resulted in absenteeism, sabotage and 
constant strikes; in the main, the strikes were not for higher wages, but over 
conditions of work. This labor unrest together with a militant shop-steward 
movement coincided with a slowdown in the car market and a decline in 
the rate of profit. According to John Holloway (1987), workers’ militancy 
was undermining the post-Second World War structure of control; capital 
was threatened, and British Leyland (BL), then-owner of the Cowley works, 
sought fixes in technology, but also in a concerted drive to discipline work-
ers. The company declared bankruptcy in 1975, and the restructuring plan 
effectively nationalized the firm. BL then appointed a get-tough director who 
called for the full or partial closure of 13 factories, the loss of 25,000 jobs, 
and a defeat of the shop stewards’ power. Management intended to strip 
stewards of their role in negotiating wages, bonuses and workloads. There 
was considerable opposition to this effort, but management prevailed. The 
effect was brutal. One Cowley worker described the impact,
There’s now a constant attack, and all the protective agreements that 
were established in the sixties are now all gone. Workers are herded 
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around like cattle [. . .] Workers [. . .] that have worked in off-track jobs 
for thirty or forty years are given five minutes’ notice to get onto track. 
Often with medical conditions. Often working in a pit with overhead 
conditions that make it absolutely impossible for them to do the job. 
And they’re just directed totally ruthlessly after forty years of work-
ing with the company. ‘Get into that pit and do that job or find your-
self another job outside.’ And I’m not exaggerating at all—that is what 
is happening every day. Every day in those plants. And the difference 
between that and what existed when the trade unions had power a few 
years ago is absolute difference if chalk to cheese.
(quoted in Holloway” 1987: 150)
The iron-fist phase of management was temporary, meant “to destroy the 
obstacles to managerial control,” and deliver a “resounding defeat for labor. 
What management need to do now is build on this defeat and mould the 
submissive worker into an enthusiastic worker, proud of his company” 
(Holloway 1987: 151). In the 1980s Cowley workers were summoned to be 
enthusiastic, enterprising, and cooperative, as were workers in Spring Hill.
By the time Harvey joined their struggle, Cowley workers had lived 
through bankruptcy, recovery plans, rounds of corporate merger and divi-
sion, nationalization, privatization, authoritarian management and finally 
a cooperative managerial regime that cast them as privileged. This compli-
cated chain of events, characterized by small and large defeats, but also by 
partial victories and promise, would surely have been difficult to navigate. 
It might therefore be useful ask the same historical ethnographic questions 
for Cowley as for Saturn: How were workers’ political visions so narrowed 
that they did not build a struggle beyond attempting to save their own jobs? 
How were wider alliances and aspirations defeated over the long course of 
events?
Disorganization is often a protracted process, having the effect of dis-
sipating struggle, rupturing alliance and narrowing fields of identification. 
Local 1853 leaders and those in other union locals throughout the US 
engaged in hyper-local politics, and the deleterious effects of their support 
for whipsawing and labor-management cooperation are an important part 
of the story of the disempowerment of the UAW and of US labor more 
broadly. But union members and locals, such as Concerned Brothers and 
Sisters, Van Nuys Local 645 and the New Directions Caucus, also pursued 
national and international solidarity. Indeed, the successes of these kinds of 
larger struggles in the 1960s–1970s triggered revanchist GM’s strategy of 
capital flight, plant closure, whipsawing and a new managerial regime. To 
neglect this history is to do injustice to the past victories of working classes 
and to offer analyses that do little to envision a different future. If this short-
sightedness with regard to organized labor were Harvey’s alone, the point 
would be academic, but the tendency for Western scholars, even Marx-
ian ones, to dismiss labor while they support what they deem to be more 
radical social movements is widespread (Collins 2012; Heroux and Palmer, 
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n.d.; Kasmir 2009). Instead, we need to pay close attention to the lives of 
exploited people, such that we can reconstruct experiences of loss but also 
of organization and strength, even when those successes have been erased by 
political discourse, media and official history. We see this attempt in histori-
cal ethnographies that carefully trace the processes by which capital and the 
state unmake working classes—through violence and fear, the creation of 
difference, dismantling connections and alliances across space, destroying 
working-class publics—and that assess the manifold effects of these moves 
on politics and consciousness and the ways that possibilities and scales are 
closed off (e.g., Narotzky and Smith 2006; Kasmir and Carbonella 2014; 
Striffler 2002). More than a critique of the defensive struggles that workers 
in many places have backed into, this fuller perspective allows us to pose the 
“very radical question of whether or not another life had once been possible 
and could be again” (Carbonella 2014: 110).
Notes
1 My research was supported by Vanderbilt University’s Robert Penn Warren Center 
for the Humanities, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and Hofstra 
University.
2 As this volume is being prepared for press in the fall of 2015, GM announced 
a new Cadillac model and 1,100 new jobs for Spring Hill. This will bring total 
employment to approximately 2,900 in 2016. Reports are that these will likely be 
entry-level, tier-two jobs, although the local union is still in negotiations over this 
issue (The Detroit News, Oct. 13, 2015).
3 There were earlier instances of two- and even three-tier concessions in individual 
plants, and the 2003 and 2007 national contracts with the Ford, GM and Chrysler 
contained temporary two-tier concessions. However, the post-bailout agreement 
more firmly entrenched this practice and facilitated the wider use of entry-level 
wages throughout the industry.
  In fall 2015, contract negotiations were stalled on this issue, and tensions 
between UAW members and leadership were evidence of the damage done by 
these concessions. UAW finally bargained wage (but not full benefit) parity to 
be implemented over eight years. While the prolonged timeframe may mean that 
two-tier wages will have to be fought again in 2019, and while this provision is 
balanced against increased leeway in hiring temporary workers, it represents an 
important advance.
4 For a fuller discussion, see Kasmir 2012, 2014.
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This chapter is based on an ethnography1 of heavy industry workers in Fer-
rol, Galicia. The region’s economy is largely dependent on the state-owned 
shipyards of Navantia, formerly Bazán, which have undergone a restructur-
ing process since the 1990s that threatens the continuity of the local indus-
trial fabric. In contrast with this general situation, a family-owned steel 
plant founded in the 1950s continues to thrive, even during the first years of 
the present economic crisis. Its success can be attributed to the profitability 
of the plant, to the tight discipline imposed on workers by an authoritar-
ian employer and to the flexible adaptation of production to changes in 
demand. The support of local authorities, who value the company as one of 
the few remaining sources of employment in the region, and the company’s 
close connections with national and international distribution networks, 
may also account for its success.
Aside from two major strikes in the early and late 1970s, the workers in 
this company have been docile relative to the lively and prominent labor 
movement that developed around the shipyards. The rural origins and the 
middle age of the first generation of workers, who were bound to the com-
pany’s owners by patron-client relationships, contributed, along with their 
weak identification with the industrial working class, to a lack of mobili-
zation. In the last decade, however, the workers’ committee has called for 
strikes and protests, with considerable success. Furthermore, the cohesion 
among blue-collar workers during mobilizations is outstanding, as they feel 
well represented by their leaders. Their claims, made in the framework of 
particularly harsh collective bargaining processes2, include a wide range 
of demands. The most veteran members of the union identify an evolution 
of earlier demands, namely the so-called “social” demands that seem to be 
replacing the “economic” aspirations of previous generations of workers, 
focused primarily on wages and health and safety measures:
We started off with economic claims, because that was the most urgent 
issue. [. . .] When we started to have economic results, we started aiming 
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for social issues. And the company wasn’t used to that. It was hard to 
negotiate social issues with them . . . Now, with this new agreement, we 
have another personal day, the second [per year]. We’re slowly moving 
ahead. Young people now value social aspects more than money. And 
we have to take advantage of that in order to make things better.3
But what do workers and trade union members mean by the adjective 
“social”? I argue that the “social” aspect of working conditions provides 
the clearest indication as to how steelworkers are embedded in their house-
holds and communities. In past decades, while most of men’s domestic 
responsibilities revolved around their role as breadwinners, their claims 
were articulated in relation to a “family wage” (Borderías 2001), with little 
attention paid to time issues, such as shift work. But now a new generation 
of industrial workers who find themselves in traditionally male jobs (Straz-
dins et al. 2004) seems to be facing domestic requirements in a more acute 
manner. As the need for a double source of income leads wives to participate 
in wage work, industrial workers are increasingly required to perform tasks 
at home that make considerable demands on their time.4
Diverse social agents, including policy makers, trade unions and other 
civil society associations, as well as researchers, have discussed the recon-
ciliation of work and family life. This debate has had an impact on labor 
law and social policy, for example, with the implementation of parental 
leave and career breaks, more flexible work schedules and improved child-
care facilities (Eurofound 2006). Such measures are critiqued by feminists 
because they are solely aimed at women, and because gender-specific pro-
tective regulations (Humphries 1981) fail to question the gender division 
of care and domestic work at home (Torns et al. 2007). Critical voices sug-
gest instead that there is a need for a broader and more ambitious analysis 
and transformations of the “politics of time” to generate more egalitarian 
distributions of productive and reproductive work between genders (Bor-
ràs et al. 2007), ultimately aiming at an improvement of the entire society’s 
well-being.
Such goals have been viewed with indifference or distrust by traditional, 
male-controlled trade unions (Humphries 1981) and today are only incipi-
ently incorporated by those fractions of the labor movement that are sen-
sitive to gender issues. Consequently, only limited changes have affected 
collective bargaining and the workplace:
For us, work is a central issue in this debate, as it articulates not only 
wage work, but also the rest of our time. It is particularly important to 
take into account its impact on the time for care, for raising children, 
for looking after the elderly, and also for housework.5
In our ethnographic context, renegotiations of the balance between pro-
duction and reproduction are needed if male steelworkers are to take on 
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a wider range of domestic responsibilities, at least in part in response to 
their wives’ participation in the labor market. This entails changes within 
the household, in the workplace (through collective bargaining) and in the 
national–and sometimes international–arena of labor legislation. The patri-
archal ideologies that characterize the domestic unit have been denounced 
by feminist scholars (Hartmann 1979, quoted in Humphries 1981). Simi-
larly, Marxist analysts have criticized State regulations of labor relations 
as ultimately supporting the interests of the capitalist class, by ensuring the 
provision of labor, an essential factor of production:
The matter takes quite another aspect if we contemplate not the single 
capitalist and the single worker, but the capitalist class and the working 
class [. . .]. The capitalist [. . .] profits not only by what he receives from 
the worker, but also by what he gives him. The capital given in return 
for labor-power is converted into means of subsistence which have to be 
consumed to reproduce the muscles, nerves, bones and brains of exist-
ing workers, and to bring new workers into existence.
(Marx 1990: 717)
But, as a matter of fact, workplace negotiations take place in relation to 
each employer, and because the reproduction of the employee’s family is 
not a priority for the individual employer (as opposed to the interests of the 
capitalist class), the company does not prioritize these issues. Furthermore, 
as a highly male-dominated sector, the steel industry is quite impervious 
to the question of family obligations. These circumstances complicate the 
efforts of households to organize their everyday lives.
Nevertheless, this chapter illustrates workers’ growing concerns with, 
and efforts towards achieving improved working conditions, particularly 
concerning the use of time and seeking a balance between productive and 
reproductive activities. Childcare arrangements in particular highlight the 
constraints and opportunities stemming from fathers’ working conditions 
at the steel plant, and the contradictions between production and reproduc-
tion as they are experienced at the level of households and family relations.
Some Theoretical Considerations
The anthropological literature has shown how households “get by”, not 
only in relation to gaining access to income from paid work or other sources, 
but crucially through a variety of strategies based on reciprocity and on 
the non-monetary circulation and provision of goods and services (Lomnitz 
1983; Stack 1974; Pitrou 1977; Narotzky 2012). Despite the importance 
of non-monetized relations and exchanges, the organization of reproduc-
tion cannot be isolated from the monetary sphere of production, as some 
dichotomous conceptualizations suggest (Gudeman 2001; Parry and Bloch 
1989). On the contrary, the boundaries between both realms are permeable. 
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This is also the case with industrial work, despite its depiction as a paradigm 
of the historical separation between production and reproduction (Daly 
2001). Although some ethnographies confirm the extent of this separation 
in industrial workers’ imaginaries and experiences (Weber 1986; 1989), 
research has also shown that the distinction may be fuzzier than suggested 
by conceptualization of wage work and housework as “cultural opposites” 
(Ahlander and Bahr 1995: 55). The effects of industrial wage work extend 
far beyond the specific times and locations where it takes place (Sierra Álva-
rez 1990) and wage labor is necessarily intertwined with other provisioning 
logics (Weber 1986; 1989). Conversely, alternative provisioning systems, 
broadly understood as forms of reciprocity, also contribute to shaping the 
diverse developments of industrial capitalism in particular contexts and may 
even be seen as a condition of possibility for capitalist accumulation itself 
(Narotzky 2010).
The close intertwining of production and reproduction is evident as rela-
tions of solidarity and moral obligations regulate care giving and household 
work (Ahlander and Bahr 1995), but are also at play in relations of pro-
duction, for instance, in recruitment mechanisms or in the imposition of a 
work discipline. It follows that power inequalities and exploitation, typical 
of capitalist production, can also underpin divisions of labor in the sphere 
of reproduction.
A historical transformation has been underway with the decline of the 
Fordist male breadwinner-female housewife model in modern capitalist 
societies (Moss 1991; Hank and Buber 2009).6 This has not led to a recali-
bration of the gendered division of labor towards a more egalitarian basis. 
In fact, despite the reorganization of roles caused by women’s return to paid 
work (Hill and Hill 1990; Leonard 2001; Hook 2006; Craig and Powell 
2011), gender differences persevere and may become more acute as children 
are born and parents reconfigure their household organization in a more 
traditional manner (Gjerdingen and Center 2005). In these circumstances, 
many women opt for part-time jobs or limit their career aspirations at least 
momentarily (Hill and Hill 1990; Maume 2008; Apps and Rees 2002; Can-
dela and Piñón 2013). Some authors anticipate that there will be a gradual 
convergence of male and female roles as a result of additional sources of 
income and renegotiations of domestic organization forced by employed 
women (Hank and Buber 2009; Gershuny, in Hook 2006). Others point to 
the need for specific policies to induce changes in this respect (Carrasquer 
and Torns 2008; Borràs et al. 2007; Torns et al. 2007).
Who Takes Care of the Steelworkers’ Children?
Despite the company’s recalcitrant attitude to workers’ claims, significant 
advances have been made in relation to economic gains, and current wages 
comply with the minimum levels set by the provincial agreement for the 
metal sector.7 On the other hand, working conditions have improved very 
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little, especially concerning shifts and work schedules. A large proportion of 
workers carry out shift work, working on weekends and holidays, switch-
ing from mornings to afternoons and then to nights every seven working 
days. This requires complicated arrangements within households, particu-
larly if wives are also employed.8 Work schedules are extremely rigid and 
workers’ needs are rarely accommodated while the employer often makes 
changes at very short notice, calling a worker at home during his days off 
and demanding him to join a shift to meet production requirements. Unpaid 
leave is strictly limited to two days per annum and managers may reject the 
dates requested if they are deemed to conflict with the priorities of produc-
tion. Parental leave for fathers has recently been increased in Spain to 15 
days (Lapuerta et al. 2008); nevertheless, workers are discouraged by their 
employer’s reticence, to the point that some of those who are entitled will 
not make use of their right.
Childcare arrangements are a paradigmatic example of a problem house-
holds must solve in order to “get by”. Steelworkers repeatedly stress this 
as a major concern for themselves and their families. Rather than talking 
about how little time they have to care for their children, they observe their 
failure to fulfill their children’s needs and those of the rest of the family. 
While they may have days off during the week, or free time in the morning, 
they miss important family and social events that usually take place in the 
evenings or on weekends. Thus, it is a matter of quality rather than quantity 
that describes the effects of their “non-standard” work schedules on their 
social life and domestic routines (Strazdins et al. 2004; Boisard and Ferma-
nian 1999). They tend to see this as an outcome of the lack of workplace 
support to work-family reconciliation (Glass and Estes 1997).
Given the Spanish State’s deficiencies in providing childcare (Meil Landw-
erlin 1994; Hank and Buber 2009), and given that paid childcare is not 
an affordable solution for these families, they come to rely on their sup-
port networks, especially those based on the extended family and on inter-
generational solidarity (Pitrou 1977; Krzyzowsky 2011; Hank and Buber 
2009). Steelworkers’ families rely heavily on grandparents’ help, as Mar-
cos,9 a worker with a four-year-old son whose wife also worked shifts in the 
healthcare sector, explained. Shift work, and particularly night shifts would 
not be possible without this assistance.10
In order to deal with these conflicting demands, many women abandon 
activities other than paid work when they become mothers and adopt more 
traditional roles (Gjerdingen and Center 2005). Jenny was married to a 
steelworker in his 40s; she left her voluntary work with an NGO when 
she returned to employment after having her two daughters. Similarly, Lor-
ena, employed in the Navantia shipyard, had to leave the charity she had 
founded some years before when she felt overloaded by work and house-
hold duties. Fathers, on the other hand, tend to continue with their for-
mer engagements, although awareness of the implications of their absence 
from home lead some members of the younger generations to reduce their 
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involvement in these other activities. However, when fathers prioritize their 
political commitment, as a necessary sacrifice for reaching collective goals, 
occasional conflicts with their wives may arise, as the women may not share 
this order of priorities. This was ironically expressed by Carmen, the wife 
of a well-known political activist since the days of Franco, who complained 
that her husband did not take care of their garden, referring to his political 
activities as conachadas, a localism that could be translated as “nonsense”.
However, some husbands do sacrifice certain aspirations in order to gain 
family time. Anxo, a 44-year-old steelworker who would like to study and 
write nonfiction, assumes that he will have to postpone these aims until 
his daughters are grown. Similarly, Rubén, an engineer in Navantia who 
entered the company as an apprentice while studying for his degree in the 
evenings, believes that now he could not invest as much time and energy in 
education after his workday, as he has two daughters to care for.
A salient aspect of the parenting experience (Daly 2001) in this group is 
the sense of “juggling” (Strazdins et al. 2004) to organize everyday activities. 
This goes beyond unexpected circumstances, such as a sick child demanding 
“urgent childcare” (Maume 2008). These households face the impossibility 
of planning their daily routines for more than a week, as men’s schedules 
are always changing. Hence, time management and investment have to be 
solved almost on a daily basis (Apps and Rees 2002), which adds consider-
able stress to their everyday lives. Children also experience the consequences 
of their parents’ work schedules. For example, Marcos is convinced that his 
son’s negative attitude towards food is due to the lack of consistency and 
mealtime routines, as he stays with different relatives depending on his par-
ents’ shifts. Some problems appear to be intractable: Jenny’s elder daughter 
refused to sleep away from home, for example, with her grandparents, and 
thus required her mother’s presence when her father was working. These 
are examples of the limits that children themselves set to the flexibility of 
household arrangements.
The need to resort to relatives, particularly grandparents, for childcare 
reinforces the links between households and extended family networks 
that are also vehicles for other kinds of exchanges (Brandon 2000; Uttal 
1999; Hank and Buber 2009). Mutual aid circulates on the basis of moral 
obligation and solidarity, but does not exclude the possibility of conflicts 
and negotiations, or the potential unease caused by feeling permanently 
indebted (Ahlander and Bahr 1995; Reschke et al., 2006; Krzyzowsky 
2011). Tensions between self-sufficiency and relatedness may emerge when 
the widespread ideal of a relatively independent nuclear family cannot be 
fulfilled and households become more dependent on kin networks than 
they expected. This is exemplified by Marcos, who was dissatisfied with 
the childcare arrangements he and his wife had to make, forced to rely on 
grandparents more than they wished. To avoid increasing the burden on 
their own parents, they are determined not to have a second child, a decision 
reached reluctantly and against their original plans. In contrast with what 
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happens during the rest of the year, in his summer holidays Marcos devotes 
most of his time to his son, avoiding contact with his workmates and mini-
mizing his participation in the workers’ committee.
Victoria’s case is different. Married to a Navantia worker who has always 
been very active in the labor movement and virtually absent from home, 
she proudly describes how she succeeded in bringing up her two children, 
who are now entering adulthood, without depending heavily on relatives. 
Although she sometimes accepted help, especially from an unmarried 
sister-in-law who lives nearby, she managed to combine childcare and 
housework with paid work and even with advancing her education. She 
took the two little children with her wherever she went, while her hus-
band attended endless meetings and demonstrations. Victoria appears to 
be resigned to the fact that her husband will never share domestic respon-
sibilities on an equal basis. She resents that, even if her husband and the 
children take on some housework, she must take the initiative and keep 
an eye on domestic organization. For her, the problem is not so much the 
amount of time allocated to housework by each family member, but the 
degree of their commitment to and the “quality” of the time devoted to 
it, a crucial distinction that has also been noted in the literature (Maume 
2008).
Sole, the adult daughter of a steelworker in his 50s, whose mother never 
had a paid job, described the allocation of responsibilities at home: her 
father brought home a salary and, added to his need to rest between shifts, 
he devoted much time to participating in the workers’ committee. Her 
mother took on all the housework and childcare, and the little girl had to 
concentrate on doing her homework and on doing her best at school. Sole 
now lives away from home and is trying to start a career as a university 
researcher. Although she does not share her mother’s world view and would 
not like to follow her footsteps, she understands the distribution of roles 
she grew up with as a pragmatic strategy in terms of domestic survival and 
reproduction, and even as a condition for her own upward social mobility.
Although childcare was highlighted in workers’ accounts, household 
members frequently confronted other care needs within the family, relat-
ing to other dependents such as the sick or the elderly. Jaime, a Navantia 
worker who took early retirement and had a son and a daughter in his 20s, 
was looking forward to becoming a young grandfather in the near future. 
He was enthusiastic about his plans to take his grandchildren with him 
when he went hiking or camping, two of his favorite activities now that he 
had plenty of leisure time. Interestingly, his wife Isabel’s view was slightly 
different. Although she was also willing to become a grandmother and she 
shared her husband’s outdoors activities, she was more ambivalent, stress-
ing the workload she would have to take on with the grandchildren because 
of the moral obligation towards her children. After some years caring for 
her sick parents, who had died recently, she now preferred to enjoy her free-
dom before taking on new care obligations. However, she expressed these 
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views gently, and acknowledged she would be available, no matter what her 
children decided.
Wallace and Young (2007) refer to the impact of childcare on work-
ers’ productivity, while other authors point to its implications for parents’ 
career opportunities, especially for women (Carrasquer and Torns 2008; 
Leonard 2001; Candela and Piñón 2013). These issues did not emerge from 
our interview data. The absence of comments about workers’ careers may 
reflect the paucity of opportunities for promotion within the steel plant’s 
hierarchical organization.
“Good Fathers” and “Ideal Workers”
How do the inner workings of domestic reproduction affect relations of 
production and, more precisely, working conditions as they are experienced 
by workers? Marxist approaches have shown that capitalism draws on 
mechanisms that are not reducible to capital accumulation, such as reci-
procity (Narotzky 2010) or the domestic mode of production (Meillassoux 
1977), to ensure continuity through the reproduction of the workforce at 
local and global scales of interdependence (Harvey 2004). However, at the 
level of the household, the focus shifts to women as the central actors in the 
tensions between paid work and domestic reproduction at home, as well as 
for the reproduction of the working class as a whole (Humphries 1981). To 
complement this emphasis, the following exploration of the effects of house-
hold organization privileges the experience of fathers, at work and at home, 
a task that has already been taken on by other authors (Lattrich and Blanco 
2012). I argue that, while work—along with levels of indebtedness and con-
sumption–determines childcare and other domestic arrangements, the pres-
ence of children, and fathers’ involvement in their care, also affects working 
conditions. For example, responsibility for supporting children while paying 
the bills or making mortgage payments may well hinder workers’ involve-
ment in struggles for improvements at work, if they are perceived to entail 
potential economic losses, such as lower wages during strikes. Manuela, a 
widow with several steelworker sons, saw this as the main obstacle to mobi-
lization. Likewise, members of the workers’ committee stressed the need to 
choose mobilization strategies carefully, for example by distributing strikes 
throughout the year, so that salaries were not too severely affected at the end 
of each month and the workers’ families did not suffer the consequences of 
significantly reduced wage packets. This strategy had been the key to success 
in putting pressure on the employer over the course of two years, until they 
obtained an acceptable collective agreement.
In the steel plant, many workers appear to accept exploitative conditions 
and a dull work experience in exchange for job security. This compromise 
in the interests of job security, at the cost of enduring drudgery, emerged in 
conversations with relatively young workers. They joined the plant after 
having worked for other firms, such as auxiliary companies subcontracted 
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by the shipyards, where work was less monotonous and wages were higher 
thanks to overtime. However, these jobs were temporary and depended 
on market fluctuations. Besides, workers had to be geographically mobile. 
Consequently, when they came to settle down and start a family, they chose 
to work at the steel plant, trading in their career ambitions for the stability 
needed to guarantee their family’s livelihood.
These arguments suggest that there is a connection between the repre-
sentation of what a “good father” is, and what employers consider as an 
“ideal worker” (Sierra Álvarez 1990), in that they submit to the interests of 
production both through high productivity and a docile attitude. Indeed, it 
seems that, in the case of men, there is no cultural contradiction between the 
archetypes of father and worker (Wallace and Young 2007). And yet there 
is no simple correspondence between them, which becomes evident in the 
conflicts and negotiations that may disrupt work and production. Labor law 
and regulations have often been understood as the outcome of the historical 
achievements of the labor movement in setting limits to individual employ-
ers’ drive to achieve maximum productivity (Fuma and Cohen 2007; Glass 
and Estes 1997), while securing the availability of labor through the repro-
duction of the working class as a whole (Humphries 1981). Ideally, policies 
pursuing the reconciliation of work and family aim to change attitudes and 
protect workers devoting more time to their families from being labeled 
as lazy or unmotivated (Lattrich and Blanco 2012). But, as we have seen, 
the gender bias underpinning these policies has limited their impact (Borràs 
et al. 2007).
Anxo exemplifies the possibilities of commitment to struggle, overcoming 
the material determinisms of capital-labor relations. He has two daughters, 
and his was the only income in the household while the children were young. 
But this did not prevent him from playing an outstanding role in mobiliza-
tions, and even to represent the steelworkers in the public sphere. This has 
been noticed by his employer, who has imposed disciplinary measures and 
threatened legal action against him. Jorge’s case is somewhat different for, 
despite his ideological affinity with the labor movement, his participation 
in particular conflicts and his awareness of the mechanisms of exploitation 
that are at play in the steel plant, he is not a member of a trade union and 
prefers to delegate the collective representation of the workers’ interests to 
others. Like several of his fellow workers, he pragmatically accepts the con-
ditions in the plant as the price for stability. But now he faces a dilemma 
that is forcing him to reconsider his position. He and his wife are on a 
waiting list to adopt an African child. As soon as the child is assigned to 
them, they will have to travel to the country where they applied in order to 
pick him or her up. They know that the entire procedure will take about a 
month, while Jorge is only entitled to 15 days of parental leave as stipulated 
by law. There is no precedent for such a case in the steel plant and he fears 
his employer will deny permission to leave for a month. Jorge will apply 
for unpaid parental leave or will try to negotiate an exchange for part of 
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his summer holidays. But he is skeptical, given the extreme rigidity of the 
human resources managers. If unsuccessful in his negotiations, he would 
choose to fetch his child and face the consequences, severe as they may be 
given that his wife is currently unemployed:
As a final resort, I’d just leave. I’d rather go pick up my child than any-
thing else, of course. I’ll try to act in good faith, otherwise I don’t know, 
I’ll get a sick leave, or will disappear and let them take disciplinary 
action . . . I don’t know.
In contrast to what has been discussed, domestic factors can enhance 
workers’ combativeness, particularly in demanding changes in their 
working conditions. Where conflict erupts, workers rely heavily on mate-
rial and moral support from their families. This is especially so where 
the struggle is protracted, as Manuela recalls. During the strike that took 
place in the late 1970s, she and other women supported their husbands, 
both privately and in the public sphere by participating in mobiliza-
tions, organizing actions (such as demonstrations in front of the employ-
er’s home), and by explaining the reasons for the strike in their social 
environment:
My father-in-law said why are you letting him get into trouble? You 
have three children! And I told him, that’s exactly why, because I have 
three children, and because it’s his right as a worker. He should stand up 
for it. Your son is struggling for your grandchildren’s bread. I will never 
tell him to quit the strike. I will always support him.
Francisco, a trade union member with a long history of struggle in the plant, 
acknowledges his wife’s contribution to his militant activity. She offered 
emotional support, and her work as a nurse reduced their dependence on 
his wages. She also supported the workers, for example, by lending them her 
car whenever they needed transportation.
Finally, informal work and domestic production may reduce workers’ 
acceptance of adverse working conditions and increase their bargaining 
power. Some informants remember that, during the factory’s first dec-
ades, steelworkers and their families engaged in agricultural activities. 
This provided a supply of food that helped to complement their low 
wages. Furthermore, during the two major conflicts of the 1970s, one 
of which ended with a lockout, workers’ families were able to survive in 
the absence of wages thanks to the distribution of the vegetables grown 
by steelworkers families. Similarly, Antonio increased his usual fishing 
activity during the 1971 strike in order to get food and earn some money. 
Here the “travail-à-côté” (Weber, 1989) shows its two sides, providing 
resources independently from the factory, but also defusing revolt under 
unfair economic conditions by enabling households to meet their needs 
despite low wages.
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Final Remarks
The difficulties entailed in organizing family time on a daily basis, and 
not only in special circumstances or crisis situations, constitute an often-
neglected dimension of the precariousness and uncertainty experienced by 
significant sections of the working class. This adds to other sources of insta-
bility, such as the health and safety risks of industrial activities, low wages, 
dependence on overtime, the uncertainty of temporary contracts or manage-
ment strategies that undervalue the contributions of workers. Besides these 
factors, I argue that the inability or the difficulty to match the organization 
of family time to productive and reproductive needs, rights, duties, expecta-
tions and aspirations—what we can call “time precariousness”, generates 
great pressures on individual workers and on their households.11 The poli-
tics of time becomes thus a major factor for the reproduction and aggrava-
tion of social inequalities, as patterns of social differentiation emerge not 
only from income inequalities, but also from the unequal distribution of 
opportunities to organize productive and reproductive tasks in a balanced 
and satisfactory manner. The case of industrial workers, particularly those 
constrained by shift work, shows how time use and availability is both a 
contributing factor and a consequence of inequalities (Strazdins et al. 2004).
The emic notion of “social” conditions of work, mostly related to time 
organization, and its growing importance in trade union discourses,12 can be 
interpreted as a symptom of an increasing sensitivity towards these issues. 
Younger workers, aged 45 at the most, are particularly likely to express con-
cerns about family time. But it is unclear whether this recent prioritization 
of social over economic claims is a symptom of a process of re-signification 
of gender roles, in the sense that new generations are becoming more egali-
tarian concerning the sharing of housework duties, as one of our informants 
suggested and some authors anticipate (Gershuny, in Hook 2006). It does 
not appear to be so: rather, researchers point out that women’s entry into 
the workforce does not entail major changes in the practice of housework 
(Hook 2006; Leonard 2001; Hill and Hill 1990; Craig and Powell 2011; 
Candela and Piñón 2013).
However, even if a radical change in real practices concerning the division 
of reproductive labor by gender has not occurred, at least a new awareness 
is revealed on the part of younger men, who are confronted with the need to 
negotiate their domestic responsibilities as husbands and fathers with their 
working wives. Regardless of the results of this negotiation and its transla-
tion into real practices, this already constitutes a difference from the previ-
ous generation of industrial workers in the Ferrol region.
State action does not fulfill steelworkers’ need to balance productive and 
reproductive needs and duties, as, even if labor laws include regulations 
that aim to improve social well-being, their application is subject to factors 
that escape formal control, such as the historical peculiarities of employer-
employee relationships, the management models implemented, or the bar-
gaining power of workers in each particular factory. Therefore, a deficit in 
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the support afforded by the state to household reproduction is perpetuated 
despite the existing regulations (Brandon 2000). As a result, households try 
to counteract the threats to their reproduction by resorting to social networks 
for support, as in the case of the childcare arrangements discussed above.
This ethnography of a traditionally male industrial sector illustrates how, 
in a company where jobs are designed as if workers had no care responsi-
bilities beyond their role as breadwinners (Strazdins et al. 2004), the con-
tradictions between private and public, production and reproduction, have 
enduring effects, but also show important changes. For decades, concessions 
made to employees reflected a paternalistic morality and the employer’s 
particular view of workers and their families. At that time, the company’s 
priorities supported the argument about the self-destructive character of 
capitalist society (Humphries 1981; Polanyi 2001), as, in his pursuit of 
profits and competitiveness, the individual capitalist did not feel concerned 
about the reproduction of the working class. This is why regulations were 
needed—and were partly achieved, with great effort on the part of work-
ers—to govern labor relations. But the social and labor rights that workers 
derive from these regulations are only potentialities. They are not automati-
cally enforced in the particular spaces and times where work is performed. 
In this process, the intervention of relationships and ideologies originat-
ing from and involving different domains—the family, the firm, the market, 
public administration—makes the course toward achieving rights particu-
larly tortuous. Only through processes of legitimation and institutionaliza-
tion (Lapuerta et al. 2008) will legal entitlements become real rights for 
workers and their households, and will thus have tangible effects at the 
grassroots level of households’ life projects and everyday practices.
Notes
 1 The chapter is based on field research carried out by the author together with 
Susana Narotzky as part of the FP7 Collaborative Project (Grant Agreement 
No. 225670) MEDEA- Models and their Effects on Development Paths: an Eth-
nographic and comparative Approach to Knowledge Transmission and Liveli-
hood Strategies and presented at the project’s international conference held at 
the University of Barcelona on 23–24 February 2012.
 2 And, since 2010, facing a labor force adjustment plan that was justified by the 
current crisis in the building sector, which includes steel product buyers.
 3 Interview with a long-standing trade union member and worker at the steel 
plant.
 4 The extent to which they really become involved in parenting and reproduction, 
and they thus contrast significantly with previous generations, would require a 
deeper insight into their domestic routines and will not be addressed here.
 5 Excerpt from a document entitled ‘Les dones transformen des del temps i els 
treballs’ (“Women make transformations on the basis of time and [different 
types of] work”), disseminated by the trade union Comisiones Obreras in Barce-
lona, June 2009. Translated from Catalan.
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 6 As Borderías (2001) shows, it is misleading to interpret this model in a dehistoricized 
way, as it was not applicable, for example, to earlier periods of industrialization.
 7 The unions also complain about a productivity bonus that accounts for a con-
siderable proportion of their wages. As it inflates the total amount, it fuels a 
groundless reputation of work in the steel plant as particularly well paid, regard-
less of its harshness and other considerations. They also demand extra overtime 
pay (weekends and holidays) and for economic compensation for health risks 
resulting from the plant’s environment.
 8 This situation was not as usual for previous generations of industrial workers in 
the region, but has now become the norm.
 9 All names are fictitious.
 10 This arrangement was also made easier by the short distance between both 
homes, a facilitating factor that is stressed in the literature (Rose 1990; Hank 
and Buber 2009; Brandon 2000), especially in rural environments (Reschke et al 
2006).
 11 Since, as we have seen, time is best understood as a family resource (Strazdins 
et al. 2004).
 12 Further investigation would be needed in order to address the gradual incorpora-
tion of the new agenda of the “politics of time” into the labor movement, with 
an analysis of the difficulties encountered when the traditional aims of trade 
unionism—as well as the foundations of social and labor policies—have to be 
reconsidered from a gender perspective (Borràs et al. 2007; Torns et al. 2007).
References
Ahlander, N.R., and Bahr, K.S. (1995). ‘Beyond drudgery, power, and equity: toward 
an expanded discourse on the moral dimensions of housework in families’. Jour-
nal of Marriage and Family 7(1): 4–88.
Apps, P., and Rees, R. (2002). ‘Household production, full consumption and the 
costs of children’. Labour Economics 8: 621–648.
Boisard, P., and Fermanian, J.-D. (1999). ‘Les rythmes de travail hors norme’. Écon-
omie et statistique 321–322:111–131.
Borderías, C. (2001). ‘”Suponiendo que ese trabajo lo hace la mujer”. Organización 
y valoración de los tiempos de trabajo en la Barcelona de mediados del siglo XIX’, 
in C. Carrasco (ed) Tiempos, trabajos y género, Barcelona: Publicacions de la UB, 
pp. 103–128.
Borràs, V., Torns, T., and Moreno, S. (2007). ‘Las políticas de conciliación: políticas 
laborales versus políticas de tiempo’. Papers 83: 83–96.
Brandon, P.D. (2000). ‘An analysis of kin-provided child care in the context of intra-
family exchanges’. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 9(2): 191–216.
Candela, P., and Piñón, J. (2013). Vida, trabajo y relaciones de género en la metrópo-
lis global. Madrid: La Catarata.
Carrasquer, P., and Torns, T. (2008). ‘Les dones i el treball: la transformació de les 
desigualtats de gènere?’ in E. Bodelón and P. Giménez (eds), Desenvolupant els 
drets de les dones: àmbits d’intervenció de les polítiques de gènere, Barcelona: 
Diputació de Barcelona, Àrea d’Igualtat i Ciutadania, pp. 33–36.
Craig, L., and Powell, A. (2011). ‘Non-standard work schedules, work-family bal-
ance and the gendered division of childcare’. Work, Employment and Society 
25(2): 274–291.
200 Irene Sabaté Muriel
Daly, K.J. (2001). ‘Deconstructing family time: from ideology to lived experience’. 
Journal of Marriage and Family 63(2): 283–294.
EUROFOUND (2006). ‘Reconciliation of work and family life and collective bar-
gaining in the European Union’. Available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/
pubdocs/2006/06/en/1/ef0606en.pdf
Fuwa, M., and Cohen, P.N. (2007). ‘Housework and social policy’. Social Science 
Research 36: 12–30.
Gjerdingen, D.K. and Center, B.A. (2005). ‘First-time parents’ postpartum changes in 
employment, childcare, and housework responsibilities’. Social Science Research 
34: 103–116.
Glass, J.L., and Estes, S.B. (1997). ‘The family responsive workplace’. Annual 
Review of Sociology 23: 289–313.
Gudeman, S. (2001). The Anthropology of Economy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hank, K., and Buber, I. (2009). ‘Grandparents caring for their grandchildren: Find-
ings from the 2004 Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe’. Journal 
of Family Issues 30(1): 3–73.
Hartmann, H.I. (1979). ‘The unhappy marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards 
a more progressive union’. Capital and Class 3(2): 1–33.
Harvey, D. (2004). El nuevo imperialismo. Madrid: Akal.
Hill, E.M., and Hill, M.A. (1990). ‘Gender differences in child care and work: An 
interdisciplinary perspective’. The Journal of Behavioral Economics 19(1): 81–101.
Hook, J.L. (2006). ‘Care in context: Men’s unpaid work in 20 countries, 1965–
2003’. American Sociological Review 71(4): 639–660.
Humphries, J. (1981). ‘Protective legislation, the capitalist State, and working class 
men: The case of the 1842 Mines Regulation Act’. Feminist Review 7: 1–33.
Krzyzowsky, L. (2011). ‘In the trap of intergenerational solidarity: Family care in 
Poland’s ageing society’. Polish Sociological Review 173(1): 55–78.
Lapuerta, I., Baizán, P., and González, M.J. (2008). ‘Who benefits from parental 
leave in Spain? A life course analysis’. DemoSoc Working Paper 26, available 
online: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/264
Lattrich, K., and Blanco, R. (2012). ‘Conciliación de la vida personal, laboral y 
familiar en clave masculina’. Estudios de la Fundación 1° de Mayo 52, available 
online: http://www.1mayo.org/nova/files/1018/Estudio51.pdf
Leonard, M. (2001). ‘Old wine in new bottles? Women working inside and outside 
the household’. Women’s Studies International Forum 24(1): 67–78.
Lomnitz, L. (1983). Cómo sobreviven los marginados, México: Siglo XXI.
Marx, K. (1990) [1976]. Capital. Volume I, London: Penguin Books.
Maume, D. J. (2008). ‘Gender differences in providing urgent childcare among dual-
earner parents’. Social Forces 87(1): 273–297.
Meil Landwerlin, G. (1994). ‘L’évolution de la politique familiale en Espagne. Du 
salaire familial à la lutte contre la pauvreté’. Population 4–5: 99–983.
Meillassoux, C. (1977). Mujeres, graneros y capitales, Madrid: Siglo XXI.
Moss, P. (1991). ‘School-age child care in the European Community’. Women’s Stud-
ies International Forum 14(6): 39–49.
Narotzky, S. (2010). ‘Reciprocidad y capital social: modelos teóricos, políticas de 
desarrollo, economías alternativas. Una perspectiva antropológica’, in V. Bretón 
(ed) Saturno devora a sus hijos. Miradas críticas sobre el desarrollo y sus prome-
sas, Barcelona: Icària, pp. 127–174.
Getting by Beyond Work 201
Narotzky, S. (2012). ‘Provisioning’, in J. G. Carrier (ed) A Handbook of Economic 
Anthropology, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 77–94.
Parry, J., & Bloch, M. (1989). Money and the Morality of Exchange. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Pitrou, A. (1977). ‘Le soutien familial dans la société urbaine’. Revue française de 
Sociologie 18(1): 47–84.
Polanyi, K. (2001) [1944]. The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon Press.
Reschke, K.L., Manoogian, M.M., Richards, L.N., Walker, S.K. and Seiling, S.B. 
(2006). ‘Maternal grandmothers as child care providers for rural, low-income 
mothers’. Journal of Children and Poverty 12(2): 19–174.
Rose, D. (1990). ‘“Collective consumption” revisited: Analysing modes of provi-
sion and access to childcare services in Montréal, Quebec’. Political Geography 
Quarterly 9(4): 353–380.
Sierra Álvarez, J. (1990). El obrero soñado, Madrid: Siglo XXI.
Stack, C. (1974). All our Kin. Strategies for Survival in a Black Community, New 
York: Harper & Row.
Strazdins, Lyndall, Korda, Rosemary J., Lim, Lynette L-Y., Broom, Dorothy H., and 
D’Souza, Rennie M. (2004), ‘Around-the-clock: parent work schedules and chil-
dren’s well-being in a 24-h economy’. Social Science and Medicine 9:1517–1527.
Torns, T., Carrasquer, P., Parella, S., and Recio, C. (2007). ‘Les dones i el treball 
a Catalunya: mites i certeses’. Estudis 2, Institut Català de les Dones, available 
online: http://ideo.sectorweb.es/arxius/Dones%20i%20treball_mites%20i%20
certeses_estudis2.pdf
Uttal, L. (1999). ‘Using kin for child care: embedment in the socioeconomic net-
works of extended families’. Journal of Marriage and Family 61(4): 845–857.
Wallace, J. E. and Young, M. C. (2007). ‘Parenthood and productivity: A study of 
demands, resources and family-friendly firms’. Journal of Vocational Behavior 72: 
110–122.
Weber, F. (1986). ‘Le travail hors de l’usine. Bricolage et double activité’. Cahiers 
d’Économie et Sociologie Rurales 3: 13–36.
Weber, F. (1989). Le travail à-côté. Étude d’ethnographie ouvrière, Paris: Institut 





Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances exist-
ing already, given and transmitted from the past.
Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852)
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead and make whole what has 
been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in 
his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This 
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, 
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we 
call progress.
 Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History (1955)
Anthropologists often tend to stress the particularities of the cases they 
study through intense ethnographic encounter. This provides an extremely 
nuanced approach to process and practice that has become the trademark of 
our discipline. It leads us to use complexity as an argument to eschew describ-
ing simple laws of movement for social processes. I find this a growing trend 
that places us in a politically irrelevant position. Often, the ethnographic 
detail appears as a free floating crystallization of contingent assemblages 
of items, agents and connections devoid of historical logic. The problem, 
then, is why and how to explain human projects that seek to change the 
connections that exist into something different. Designing an image of the 
future and of the logical process leading to it is, fundamentally, creating 
the conditions of possibility for its transformation (Bourdieu 2003). The 
other, often forgotten, leg of anthropological enquiry is comparison which 
enables similarities to emerge while it renders differences meaningful in the 
larger picture. Through the pieces in this volume we begin to perceive a 
thread of commonalities that, paradoxically, serve to underscore the central-
ity of the differences that are played out as well as produced by the various 
actors involved in industrial production.
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Making Difference, Making History
Walter Benjamin’s metaphor of the angel of history looking at the debris of 
the past piling under its eyes while it is being blown forcefully backwards 
toward an unimaginable future can be understood as a poetic rendering 
of Marx’s historical materialist approach (Benjamin 2007 [1955]: 257–8). 
For several decades now, workers in the heavy industry and their families 
have witnessed the piling of debris of what used to make their livelihood 
(Hudson and Sadler 1989). This is often remembered as a “stable” period 
where plans for the future were easier to develop. Often this entailed inher-
ited positions in the local industrial firm(s), a form of training framed by 
the plant’s vocational school and including intra-plant mentorship based on 
seniority, a certainty about male identity and bread-winner responsibilities, 
together with clear household divisions of labor and gender-power geom-
etries. These stable albeit unequal structures of mutual obligation, state 
protection and production organization existed in a Fordist past for the 
“key” or “strategic” industries (steel, energy, cement, automobile, etc.) but 
they were often a recent development of nationalizations or import substi-
tution policies that expanded throughout the first half of the 20th century 
in both capitalist and socialist polities (Dal Forno and Mollona 2015). The 
“debris” of this industrial past started piling up at an increasing pace in the 
1980s unsettling deeply embedded practices and livelihood expectations. 
It is certain that the form of this debris and the pace of its accumulation 
varied according to colonial, post-colonial and political histories; uneven 
regional patterns of capital expansion; the local embedding of “moderniza-
tion” and “development” economic models; and changing theories of profit 
maximization.
At the same time these debris resulted from the actual resistance and resil-
ience practices of people in their everyday attempt to make a living and care 
for proximate others, and from their active engagement in struggles that 
occurred at different scales, from the very local to the very global. As Bey-
non, Hudson and Sadler (1994) pointed out 20 years ago, place is formed 
and transformed by the articulated forces of capital, labor and the state (or, 
rather, various capitalists, workers and representatives of the administra-
tion), in the longue durée. Place is the domain of actual existing people 
while space is the domain of abstraction: of capital—as an abstract social 
relation—although capital can only be realized in places, through places and 
their differences; of state—as an abstract relation of domination—although 
its power can only be realized in places through the concrete production 
and enforcement of difference. Place grows from the meaningful relation-
ships that people build with each other in the long-term and from their 
engagement and creative production of institutions in particular locations. 
Place is multidimensional and the primary referent of people’s lives (Beynon 
et al. 1994: 5–6). And it is also multi-scalar, as social, economic and power 
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relationships that produce place occur at various scales (local, regional, 
national, global) and simultaneously transform the operational scale of 
political–economic processes (Peck 2002). Space, in contrast, is an abstract 
assessment of the value of localities in political, symbolic and economic 
terms. It is used by public administrators to lure investment to a locality and 
by capitalists to generate profits through the mobilization of investment. In 
the globalized present, it supports a neoliberal scalar narrative where places 
compete in a global market of locational assets. “Investment and divestment 
decisions perpetually relate to a spatial dimension, and this can often pose a 
deep threat to the integrity of places” (Beynon et al. 1994:6).
In the history of heavy industry sometimes capitalist forces have been 
dominant in the shaping of place and have been able to co-opt the other 
players in the field, often through a kind of blackmailing that uses jobs, 
and therefore the very basic ability to make a living, as the ultimate trade 
off token. As the chapters in this volume show, this has been the case in 
many places at different moments, e.g., in most of Europe in the early 20th 
century and then after 1973. At other times the state has been the dominant 
force as was the case in strong nationalist economies such as that of socialist 
countries, but also in capitalist countries in particular historical conjunc-
tures. Sometimes unions have become dominant, albeit for a brief period, 
as the success of some labor struggles might express (Herod 2001) or their 
conjunctural position as political brokers in some regimes (such as Argen-
tina). But, generally, the tension between these three forces is what creates 
the “circumstances” that get “transmitted from the past” and set the ground 
where people “make their own history”.
The tension between place and space points to difference as it emerges 
from the human attempt to “make history” in two distinct ways. First, dif-
ference results from the everyday spontaneous entanglement of peoples’ 
lives as they engage with the spatial expressions of capitalist uneven regional 
development in place. Second, the intentional production of difference 
appears as a strategy of control by capitalists, the state or workers in space. 
Therefore, the attempt to “make history” is often an attempt to create “dif-
ference” from various positions and at various scales in order to yield power. 
As Jamie Peck has stated: “hegemonic power (. . .) is reflected in the con-
trol of scale and/or the assertion of a particular scalar fix in which certain 
sectional-political interests are privileged” (2002: 337). Some of the chap-
ters in the volume present this struggle during processes of restructuring 
(outsourcing, whipsawing, labor flexibility) when difference becomes the 
argument of a competitive worth that defines a collective in space: a com-
munity, a plant, a nation (Kalb, Kasmir, D’Aloisio, Wódz and Gnieciak, 
Diaz Crovetto, this volume). Other chapters express embedded and indi-
vidualized processes of differentiation in the workplace, in the household 
(Kalb, Spyridakis, Perelman and Vargas, Pine, this volume). Ethnography 
and geography enable us to address the actual relationship between these 
208 Susana Narotzky
two processes (spontaneous or intentional) of making history. Compari-
son of ethnographic cases enables us to understand the various scales that 
interlock in the concrete places where livelihoods are materially situated. 
What Doreen Massey (1993) defined as “a global sense of place” helps us 
understand the kind of structure that connects different locations and is 
expressed through these differences in their relational value. I have found 
critical topography (Katz 2001) and power geometries (Peck 2002, Yeung 
2005) helpful concepts to think through the tension of place and space 
in the complex processes of capitalist realization. As a geographer who 
has worked with dispossessed communities in the Sudan and the US, Katz 
reflects on how what she observes in these two locations is related and she 
finds the concept of topography and its associated term of contour lines 
helpful:
Topography is associated not just with the description of place but also 
with measurements of elevation, distance, and other structural attributes 
that enable the examination of relationships across spaces and between 
places. (. . .) the effects of capitalism’s globalizing imperative are experi-
enced commonly across very different locales, and understanding these 
connections is crucial if they are to be challenged effectively. Topogra-
phies provide the ground—literally and figuratively—for developing a 
critique of the social relations sedimented into space and for scrutiniz-
ing the material social practices at all geographic scales through which 
place is produced.
(Katz 2001: 1228–9)
She uses the concept of contour lines as a metaphor of the original concept 
where lines connect different places of precisely the same altitude.
I want to imagine a politics that maintains the distinctness of a place 
while recognizing that it is connected analytically to other places along 
contour lines that represent not elevation but particular relations to a 
process (e.g., globalizing capitalist relations of production). Such con-
nections are precise analytic relationships, not homogenizations.
(Katz 2001: 1229)
Katz’s relational concepts provide anthropology with tools to discover 
analytical similarities that make sense in structural terms, but they remain 
mostly descriptive in their aim. In his review of relational economic geogra-
phy Yeung (2005) attempts to go beyond the descriptive aspect of relation-
ality and proposes a theoretical turn that will enable explanation, what he 
describes as “theorizing explanations of difference” (2005:42). He proposes 
to address why and how difference produces power that becomes expressed 
in concrete outcomes, in place. The geometries of power concept, therefore, 
attempt to unpack the power tensions between places (2005:44). I will use 
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these methodological and theoretical insights to engage with the cases pre-
sented in this volume.
Flexibilities of Work and Life
Restructurings of heavy industry have had similar effects, namely, job losses 
and the reorganization of production relations around the polysemic con-
cept of “flexibility” (Narotzky 2015). Structural and functional flexibility 
are imposed by capital in industry allegedly to enhance productivity and 
become more competitive in a globalized market. The injunction to produc-
tivity has become such an entrenched hegemonic discourse that it is rarely 
argued and is considered as self-evident by all concerned parties. This flex-
ibility results in some common traits, namely the use of subcontract and 
outsourced labor often composed by workers who have been made redun-
dant from the core staff or by younger generations of workers that cannot 
get hired into the core staff of the firm. This situation produces difference 
between types of workers in the plant, even when they work side by side, a 
difference that is often marked by their distinct overalls. Outsourced, tem-
porary contract workers, are confronted as another kind of worker to per-
manent, core workers in the firm. Stability that had become ingrained in 
what the “normal” life of a steel, shipyard or autoworker was, suddenly 
becomes a “privilege” in the face of the growing majority that have precari-
ous jobs, although in turn they represent the living expression of the fragil-
ity and instability of this “privilege”. These new situations push people to 
diverse kinds of strategies that operate at different scales. Some of them take 
advantage of forms of “embeddedness” such as kinship or other local con-
nections (e.g., through the unions) in order to facilitate access to the better 
jobs (Perelman and Vargas, this volume). Others strive to individually bet-
ter their competitive position in the local labor market, such as the sneaks 
in Piraeus who accept extremely low wages, or the rabbits who become 
benchmarks for productivity, speeding the work process and consolidating 
their value for the firm (Spyridakis, this volume). In other cases, the ten-
sions between a union local plant strategy and larger scale, national or even 
global solidarities, express the ways in which “difference” or its negation 
through similarity or connection, gets played out on the side of labor (Kas-
mir, this volume).
This common reality of flexibility, however, presents local variations that 
relate to history as it has produced place at various scales. In the steel indus-
try case from Argentina, for example, the privatization of the firm strength-
ened the outsourcing process although articulating it with technical and 
vocational training systems partially controlled by the unions. In addition 
to formal credentials, young people now need a further career in the satellite 
(contract) companies of the firm in order to acquire the proper “work ethic” 
and “attitude” which might eventually provide employment in the main 
firm. The expectations of “naturally” following the previous generation into 
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the factory have been shattered and strategies of differentiation are key both 
for the process of segmented recruitment and for obtaining a stable job. 
Credentialism appears as a normative evaluation of difference that the firm 
uses to legitimate its hiring practices that rest on hyper selective incorpora-
tion of core employees, which systemically reproduces the pressure on stable 
employment. Simultaneously, recommendation and union brokerage are the 
usual practice for anyone who aims at achieving a job at the main firm. 
These produce another kind of difference by extending responsibility for the 
worker beyond his or her individual person and expressing the local power 
they can mobilize through kinship and other personalized links. Unions, 
here, emerge as crucial actors both in their control of training institutions 
and in the informal power they are able to yield towards management, 
probably related to the political power of unions in Argentina’s history. This 
results in particular patron-client networks that young aspiring workers and 
their families have to cultivate with key union members in order to succeed 
in the career to stability.
Both these networks and the low salaries and precarious conditions of 
young people’s labor are based on their families’ support, and become a form 
of dispossession of the family of orientation’s resources and care work. As in 
the case of women workers in the Italian Melfi auto plant whose small-scale 
often informal activities supplement a decreasing income, salaries that are 
not sufficient to reproduce labor get subsidized by unrecognized forms of 
work and non-market resources (D’Aloisio, this volume). This is analogous 
to the support function that subsistence gardens of steelworker’s families 
have in Slovakia (Buzalka and Ferencova, this volume). In a challenge to the 
labor theory of value, the cost of labor reproduction here is systematically 
undervalued and labor power exchanged below cost. Colonial and feminist 
scholars have repeatedly underlined that market exchange is supported by 
forms of depredation that are embedded in historically produced geometries 
of power, a process akin to what Harvey has defined as “accumulation by 
dispossession” (Amin 1970, Elson and Çagatay 2000, Harvey 2005, Kasmir 
and Carbonella 2008), and this process seems to be expanding in present-
day globalized capitalism. In his chapter, Kalb points at an important aspect 
of this process when he compares two different forms of locally producing 
labor devaluation or “worthlessness” and their connection through the spa-
tial movements of capital in the white goods sector. This reveals an embed-
ded and changing structure of alienation which is nevertheless connected in 
a topographic manner to the global movement of capital accumulation and 
its temporalities. Embeddedness is crucial in this development as it thrives 
on, reproduces and transforms aspects of inequality deeply entangled with 
livelihoods, intimate responsibilities and identity belongings. Hence, age, 
gender, nationality or ethnic factors become structurally entangled in how 
family relations or community networks contribute to structure present-day 
forms of exploitation in place and across space. The scalar dimension of 
social reproduction dialectically embracing the household or family’s une-
qual obligations with larger processes of social reproduction of inequalities 
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and surplus extraction becomes transparent in the chapters of this volume 
(Narotzky 2004, 2015).
A similar situation seems to emerge in the Galician Spanish case where 
the mini-mill that has expanded into an international venture has addressed 
flexibilization mostly in functional terms (Sabaté, this volume). Here, the 
pressure on reproduction work in the household becomes extreme as wives 
of younger workers have entered the workforce and the inflexible shift 
work policies of management are not up for negotiation. Differentiation 
here hinges on an implicit assertion on the part of management that “tradi-
tional” male-breadwinner families are the norm, reassessing an unrealistic 
gender division of labor that justifies not giving in to work-balance needs for 
the male workforce. For management, male workers are decidedly another 
kind of worker (as beholds family responsibilities) which results in a form 
of dispossession of the kinship network’s resources that creates tensions 
between male and female household members as they try to renegotiate 
their family responsibilities. Often households extend the care network out-
wards in search for help, therefore redistributing dispossession. The central-
ity of the male-breadwinner ideology in producing a kind of identity that 
sets limits to the kinds of jobs that are acceptable to men is also stressed 
in Trappmann’s chapter on employability. Beyond the issue of employabil-
ity, however, and similar to the Polish workers in Kalb, Pine, and Wódz 
and Gnieciak chapters, we can witness a “making of difference” that rests 
on developing a feeling of inadequacy about the capacity to fulfill crucial 
obligations of social reproduction (whether referred to gender, generations 
or the nation) that had been produced under different political-economic 
conditions and contributed to a sense of adequacy, of social worth. It is this 
attack on personal “worth” that challenges the contours of past “stable” 
identities that contributes to the present devaluation of labor value. Con-
versely, the attempt to prevent this situation drives workers and the union 
local in the GM Saturn plant to a strong cooperation with the firm (making 
themselves different from the rest of UAW workers, allegedly producing a 
“new” kind of worker’s worth). However, this does not prevent the final 
self-deprecation of “scab” even as they try to recuperate workers’ collective 
action (Kasmir, this volume). In Piraeus, “sneaks” appear as both inevitable 
expressions of the place bound and gender inflected individual strategies to 
earn a livelihood and of the larger structures of global shipbuilding capital 
(Spyridakis, this volume). The poignant consciousness and embodiment of 
this devaluation takes different forms that are historically path-dependent 
along a continuum that spans from more “moral” depictions to more 
“political” ones.
Geometries of Power and the Production of Moral Economies
Emerging in the comparison of these cases is a topography of capitalist 
relations of production that defines the precise distinctions that make each 
place unique as it has engaged historically with diverse social, political and 
212 Susana Narotzky
economic forces. But contour lines appear that show how these differences 
latch into the enactment of a cost cutting, competitive, “supply side” econ-
omy. Indeed, in all cases what amounts to the same destruction of workers’ 
value and workers’ power is realized through various forms of flexibility. 
On the one hand, flexibility in the firm, both structural and functional, 
brings uncertainty to workers. On the other hand, flexible livelihoods of 
different kinds are forced upon all workers and their families in an environ-
ment of skyrocketing relative and absolute surplus population, what neolib-
eral voices are defining as the structural “acceptable” rate of unemployment 
(Smith 2011). In practice, however, the changes of labor/capital relations 
that this restructuring brings forward in each location depend on how each 
particular place has become an expression of previous capital, labor and 
state forces and hence sets the ground for working out and working through 
further transformation.
Moreover, another vision which is not that of contour lines uniting places 
in a similar relation to industrial capitalist processes emerges configuring 
a spatial power geometry: that of power differentials between and within 
places that are played against each other by the different actors. Places in 
management’s vision appear constructed as locations containing assets that 
can be valorized by capital. These include physical resources (e.g., iron, coal, 
a maritime port) and institutional frameworks (e.g., labor and environment 
regulations, trade unions), but also people with their different skills, their 
kinship networks, their webs of dependencies (both political and economic), 
their histories of conflict; in sum, people with an experience of making a 
living and memories of making history. Places in state’s vision are territories 
to govern, firms and citizen’s to regulate and tax, but also to provide for 
and seduce. The state’s territory is materially a relational aggregate of places 
although symbolically it presents itself as an abstract projection of the “imag-
ined community” of the nation (Anderson 1983). Places in workers’ vision 
are where they need to make a living in all the social complexity that this 
entails, i.e., sustaining life, being a social person, someone with dignity and 
respect. The attempt to hold back worthlessness is their main purpose and 
often results in moving from place to place and creating trans-local places 
(Narotzky & Besnier 2014, Glick Schiller and Çaglar 2008, Pine 2014, and 
this volume). These various actors’ understandings inform practices occur-
ring at multiple scales that take into consideration the values (or value) most 
dear to each actor and use them to make differences. Some actors will have 
a great capacity to define, impose and benefit from particular differences 
between and within places while others will have a limited one. Geometries 
of power result from the capacity of some actors to define and take advantage 
of difference both within and between places (and people) in their interest. 
Making difference between places is also often making difference between 
the past of these places and an alleged better present or future. Finally, mak-
ing a difference is always about trying to impose a moral economy (i.e., pro-
duce an hegemonic model of the economy that rests on moral imperatives), 
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a set of basic distinctions in terms of what is “bad” and “good” for the 
larger “common good”, not for any particular or parochial interest. These 
moralities are often presented as universals and tend to get essentialized; but 
they are always historical and political, the result of struggle. In this strug-
gle of producing differences and juggling them, the scale at which the actors 
are able to operate is often an expression of the power they can yield. Peck 
(2002) speaks of hierarchies of scale and asserts that actors’ power is gener-
ally linked to “the ability to shape extralocal rule regimes that constrain and 
channel the strategic options and tactical behavior of local actors”. Herod 
(2001) points, however, at the possibility for “local scale models of struggle” 
to be powerful tools for workers in particular crucial positions in the pro-
duction process of Transnational Corporations in a global economy. There-
fore, local actors can shift the scale hierarchy if they work in a place that 
“makes a difference” in the production process, enabling them to overturn 
the power geometry of the firm. Conversely, the GM Saturn plant union local 
is co-opted into localism through their conviction of becoming part of a new, 
better, form of labor-capital relations, one based on cooperation rather than 
confrontation. Their refusal to participate in the national scale UAW mobi-
lizations stands on a misunderstanding of their actual power in the structure 
of production and points to their co-optation into the firm’s moral economy. 
As workers in the plant increasingly realize this, they attempt to renew strug-
gle at the wider scale of national union solidarity and reassert an older kind 
of class-based morality (Kasmir, this volume).
We initiated these concluding comments with the methodological distinc-
tion that Beynon et al. (1994) propose between what they call space as 
opposed to the more concrete place. Do the chapters in this volume support 
such a clear cut proposition? In my opinion, the tension between abstract 
and concrete seems appropriate while the placing of particular processes 
(e.g., the power of capital) in what appears as a fixed higher scale, is not 
(Peck 2002). The hierarchies of scale that generally favor actors with the 
extralocal capacity to define difference and act accordingly generally set 
capital in a position of power, but not always. Indeed, the “space” scale is 
also concretely dependent on previous historical processes that have config-
ured it as a particular kind of abstraction in relation to “places”.
The struggles that the various actors wage through making difference 
within and between places refer to the value(s) that they seek to produce 
and reproduce. For capital in the global industrial firm, profits are often 
tied to the value of shares in the stock market, but this in turn is linked to 
particular actions that are interpreted as pushing the competitive edge of the 
firm in production, namely restructuring (e.g., cutting costs and increasing 
productivity) and playing places against each other (including in symbolic 
and cultural terms). For workers the main value is a life worth living, which 
is a complex entanglement of material and social values (e.g., food, health, 
housing, justice and dignity) and which develops in a different timeframe, 
one of families, households, generations and memories (Pine; Wódz and 
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Gnieciak, this volume). The cases presented in this volume show how this 
makes them struggle in the everyday sometimes through organized contesta-
tion, but often pushing them into personalized networks that give access to 
all sorts of resources (e.g., income, jobs, influence, care). The articulation 
and permanent tension between the contrasting objectives of capital and 
labor is coordinated by political brokers (in the different levels of govern-
ment administration and other institutions) that “take sides” through regu-
latory norms and their greater or lesser enforcement. In this process policy 
makers differentiate between values. They define and fix through regulation 
what is allegedly most valuable for the common good—a commonality pro-
duced through hegemony—helping constrict and channel practice for the 
benefit of enhancing that particular value. Any future of politics of the left 
is, like any past of politics, the attempt to shift power geometries through 
making the differences that are useful to make history support the worth of 
people. And this struggle is always expressed in terms of the common good.
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